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Abstract
The thesis contributes to the perspective on the role of stakeholder engagement 
in negotiating corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and practices in 
developing country context. It critically examines the role of societal pressures 
as drivers of Shell’s CSR agenda, and explores the forms of relationships 
existing between Shell and its stakeholders in Nigeria, as the company 
implements its CSR programme, both in the light of its strategic business 
objectives and of its social responsibilities and environmental liabilities. 
Furthermore, it examines the role of government in the oil MNCs’ CSR agenda, 
and explores the conditions under which the government, in its dual role as 
business partner and as state authority, promotes CSR policies and practices in 
Nigeria.
Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria were examined under the 
theoretical lenses of the resource-based view perspective extended to notions of 
legitimacy and the licence to operate. Additionally, the stakeholder engagement 
perspective was applied as the theoretical framework for examining Shell’s 
stakeholder engagement, and the role of the company’s stakeholders in 
negotiating its current CSR policies and practices in Nigeria.
Data collection was undertaken during field research in Nigeria. The evidence 
presented is drawn from individual interviews with corporate executives at Shell 
Nigeria, Shell International, several stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector, and 
from an online survey conducted in 2005 on Shell Nigeria’s stakeholders. Both
quantitative and qualitative methods were used throughout the analysis 
presented in the thesis.
The research findings suggest that the relationship between the firm’s pursuit of 
the social licence to operate through CSR initiatives and stakeholder 
engagement is more complex than assumed. It adds to the understanding of the 
dynamics of a MNC’s stakeholder engagement in the local context. It highlights 
the various interdependencies that develop between stakeholder groups and the 
company at the institutional level as well as within the context of the 
organisation, as the corporation develops and implements its CSR agenda. As 
such, the research invites an examination not just of the differences and barriers 
existing between the firm and its stakeholders, home and host country practices, 
but also of the ways in which they are embedded in each other, and how this 
affects their collaboration.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH CONTEXT AND 
OBJECTIVES
1.0 Introduction
This thesis contributes to the debate on stakeholder engagement in the context 
of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda of a multinational company 
(MNC) in developing countries. The central goal of the research is to examine 
the role of stakeholders in negotiating CSR policies and practices in a 
developing country context. It analyses how Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria 
translates into local practices and initiatives from a stakeholder perspective. The 
research examines forms of relationships existing between Shell and its 
stakeholders in Nigeria and examines how the oil company pursues its business 
objectives and strategy in engaging stakeholders- such as the state, non­
governmental organisations (NGOs), expert groups of various kinds, and 
communities. It explores how this engagement may create the basis on which 
the latter may develop their perceptions about the activities of the oil company 
as well as make sense of their role and mutual responsibilities. The research 
highlights the various interdependencies that develop between stakeholder 
groups and the company, and adds to the understanding of the dynamics of a 
MNC’s stakeholder engagement in a developing country context. The evidence
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presented is drawn from interviews with corporate executives at Shell Nigeria, 
Shell International, and executives from several stakeholders in the Nigerian oil 
sector including non-govemmental organisations and development agencies. It 
is also drawn from an online survey conducted in 2005 on Shell Nigeria’s 
stakeholders. The research subsequently contributes to the literature on CSR and 
stakeholders, CSR and business strategy, and CSR and development in an 
African context.
1.2 Background, context and research gap
The emergence of CSR is often traced back to Victorian Britain and the 
industrial revolution, although it does not become a major issue in business and 
society scholarly debates until the 1950s and 60s. The growing concern that 
business enjoyed a great deal of power, with little responsibility, led to attempts 
to explore fundamental questions relating to the role, the nature as well as the 
scope of business responsibilities in society (Bowen, 1953; Elbing & Elbing, 
1967; Eberstadt, 1973). As such, CSR research studies what is demanded of 
business by society and to what extent society's demands should and can be 
fulfilled in practice by the firm. It has led to the recent conceptualisation of CSR 
in terms of sustainable development thinking and corporate business strategy.
However, the emergence of CSR has spawned controversy between different 
schools of thought over some fundamental differences in perceptions and 
understanding of the role and purpose of the business corporation in society. 
The main tension has existed between the stockholder vs. stakeholder
13
perspectives of the firm, which have often led to disagreements about the 
nature, and the scope of the responsibilities of the firm.
The stockholder perspective regards the firm as an artificial person which can 
not assume moral responsibilities and should above all not be distracted from its 
primary responsibility to make a profit (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001). Social 
responsibilities are construed as the responsibility of the state, and not in the 
firm’s remit. The stakeholder perspective dismisses the stockholder view and 
defines the firm’s responsibilities more broadly as extending beyond the narrow 
focus on the firm’s shareholder interests (Davis, 1960; Eberstadt, 1973). The 
stakeholder perspective has received greater consideration in the current context 
of global economic integration. The expansion of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has heightened the profile of MNCs and their perception as an undisputed 
engine of economic globalisation, structural and functional integration of the 
world markets and production systems across national boundaries (Dunning, 
1997; Dickens, 1998). However, as MNCs’ business operations expand to 
foreign jurisdictions, their activities are often associated with incidents 
involving environmental pollution and social disputes that threaten to damage 
companies’ business activities and their overall reputation. This brought severe 
criticisms levelled against business and the rise of activism against MNCs in 
particular.
In developing countries, local communities have demonstrated the ability to 
undermine MNCs’ local business operations and as the Nigerian experience 
demonstrates, communities’ actions could be controlled neither by the company
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nor the state. As such, managing these local encounters and related social, 
ethical, and development concerns while pursuing the social licence to operate, 
has emerged as a critical part of MNCs’ CSR agenda in the local context. The 
increasingly larger proportion of business in industrial countries that are 
involved in developing countries either directly (through direct investment or 
direct trade), or indirectly (via extra-company supply chains), underlines the 
importance of the developing country dimension of the CSR agenda. The 
strategic importance of local CSR initiatives in which the reputation focus, the 
need to obtain a stable working environment and the need to maintain a 
competitive advantage leads MNCs’ local CSR agenda to a central focus on 
stakeholder engagement as a key aspect of corporate social performance.
Moreover, as the studies by Waddock and Graves (1997) and Orlitzky (2005) 
reveal, social performance is both a determinant and a consequence of high 
financial performance. Whereas the positive impact of social performance is 
associated with reputation, the latter originates from complex interaction 
relationships of various social groups, organisations and individuals (Moldaschl 
and Fischer, 2004). According to Branco and Rodriguez (2006), an attempt by 
the firm to identify and behave according to stakeholder expectations implies 
the need to consider the prevailing social norms and dominant views of social 
responsibility, all of which have an ethical dimension. Furthermore, engaging in 
CSR for strategic reasons may in many cases have ethical and moral 
motivations, as well as leading to social benefits (Ibid.)
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The localization of CSR is however under-researched and controversial. Critics 
of MNC’s involvement in developing countries depict CSR as no more than the 
moral vision of global capitalism (Jenkins, 2005). However, the contested 
nature of MNCs’ CSR initiatives in developing countries is unfathomable 
without revisiting the debates about the role of MNCs in developing countries. 
Although a growing number of developing countries embraced FDI as a route to 
economic development, there is a strong critical tradition, by the proponents of 
the dependency school, which rejects the argument that the growth of FDI and 
the involvement of MNCs are beneficial for socio-economic development in 
developing countries. The dependency school has often considered the growing 
involvement of MNCs in developing countries as a travesty (Barnett and 
Muller, 1974; Pack & Saggi, 1997; Lall, 2000) and likely to lead to negative 
consequences for developing countries (Madeley, 1999; Strange, 1996; Jenkins, 
1987). This long-standing criticism levelled against MNCs’ involvement in 
developing countries has re-surfaced in recent CSR debates (Jenkins, 2005).
Whilst MNCs have played a critical role as vehicles of foreign direct investment 
flows (FDI) to developing countries, this relationship has been clouded by 
decades of malpractices, such as the misuse of power and the neglect of social 
and environmental impacts of their operations in developing countries (Jenkins, 
1987). Consequently, the dependency school and the anti-globalisation 
movement, consider the involvement of MNCs in the development process of 
developing countries as detrimental. They argue that it is possibly leading to 
increased social and environmental deterioration and conflicts between local 
forces and cultures, and the new forces of global capitalist production (Barnet
16
and Muller, 1974; Pack & Saggi, 1997; Lall, 2000; Madeley, 1999; Strange, 
1996; Jenkins, 1987; Sklair, 1995).
Advocates of the economic development perspective however dismiss the above 
and argue that the involvement of MNCs in developing countries through FDI 
will boost local economic development leading to increased employment 
opportunities, infrastructure development, and technology transfer (Dunning, 
2002; French, 1997; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Reuber 1973, Rugman, 1996). 
They commend CSR as an opportunity for businesses to respond to their social 
and environmental responsibilities, and believe that significant changes in 
business practices are underway because of widespread adoption of CSR 
agendas by an increasing number of MNCs (Dryzek, 1997; Holiday et al., 
2002).
Despite these controversies surrounding CSR and the role of MNCs, this thesis 
recognises that CSR has in recent years become an established feature of 
business and society relationship locally as well as globally, and an important 
component of corporate policy and strategy process. Although there are some 
concerns over the scope of corporate responsibility, advocates for CSR argue 
that CSR provides a framework, through which MNCs can manage the 
challenges and dilemmas arising from their encounter with local societies and 
the ensuing challenges and dilemmas.
Whilst an increasing number of MNCs already have CSR policies in place, 
sceptics have raised questions concerning the extent to which CSR principles
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influence their strategic and operational business decisions and practices (Davis, 
1960; Frederick, 1983; Mintzberg, 1983; Boele et al.; 2001). Recent studies 
have explored CSR and development from the point of view of local community 
development (Frynas, 2001, 2005; Newel, 2006; Friends of the Earth (FoE), 
2003, 2004), but stop short of examining the forms of relationships that develop 
between stakeholder groups and the company. They also overlook how this may 
shape the stakeholder engagement process and the basis on which CSR practices 
are negotiated. In particular, the CSR-stakeholder literature has not paid much 
attention to the conditions under which stakeholders may influence the firm’s 
CSR practices in the developing country context, and the nature and scope of 
this influence.
This research project is particularly important given the fact that MNCs have 
increasingly had to implement CSR initiatives under significant pressure from 
local and international pressure from anti-corporate campaigners(Zadek, 2001; 
Hoffman, 2000) threatening to undermine corporate reputation (Zadek, 2001; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). For example, it has been suggested that Shell 
introduced an ambitious CSR programmein Nigeria as a new approach for 
addressing decades long social and environmental problems associated with its 
oil production activities in Nigeria (Wheeler et. al 2001). Shell has spent up to ' 
$ US 304 million from 1998 to 2003 amidst a major reputation crisis. The oil 
corporation faced mounting pressure from local communities and increasingly 
negative responses from the global civil society and media (Rwabizambuga, 
2007b).
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However, there is controversy surrounding Shell’s intentions. Critics raise 
doubts about Shell’s CSR performance, as greenwash rather than destined to 
improve the living conditions of communities that are negatively affected by oil 
production activities in Nigeria (Wheeler et. al 2001; Frynas, 2000; Friends of 
the Earth, 2004). Sympathisers view Shell’s efforts as comprehensive and 
farreaching, only hampered by a non-enabling socio-political environment in 
Nigeria. Hence, in the absence of efficient or effective government, 
communities hold the company to ransom by increasingly engaging in rent 
seeking behaviour while the government is less concerned with the needs and 
plights of communities in oil producing regions (Uwem, 2004).
Research has shown that the accruing financial resources from oil production 
have had detrimental impacts on the socio-economic and political condition of 
Nigeria, (Khan, 1994; Sala-i-Martin & Subrahamanian, 2003). The flow of oil 
revenues in the late 1960s has exposed the Nigerian economy to Dutch disease 
(Soremekum, 1995; Khan, 1994) with the decline of productive sectors such as 
agriculture and the service sector (Frynas, 2000). The country grew dependent 
on oil revenues, which presently account for 98% of its export revenues and is 
often cited as a quintessential case where the considerable natural resource- 
based inflows of capital have immiserating effects (Sala-i-Martin & 
Subrahamanian, 2003).
Nigeria’s inability to deal with the social, political, and economic problems 
related to its oil sector is largely rooted, if  not blamed on the historical 
framework within which its energy industry emerged, i.e. the country’s colonial
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past, the dysfunctional identity of Nigeria as a new nation and its inherent 
institutional weaknesses (Bierstekker, 1987 Forrest, 1995 Khan, 1994; Frynas, 
2000. Several explanations were advanced, including poor accountability in 
public governance, lack of participation and weak institutions (Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001), lower growth associated with unsustainable over­
consumption (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Sala-I-Martin & Subrahamanian, 
2003); and civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). As such, Nigeria’s long 
history of political turmoil and corruption has paralysed its institutions. In 
addition, the country has faced many internal conflicts driven by competition 
over oil resources, access to land, or motivated by religious and political 
motives (Forrest, 1995; Alao, 2007).
In terms of development, the country’s performance since independence in 1960 
has been dismal (Forrest, 1995). Nigeria’s GDP has stagnated since the 1970’s, 
and ranks amongst the 15 poorest countries in the world according to recent 
development indicators (Kaufmann et. al 2003). Studies carried out on Nigeria’s 
performance in terms of poverty reduction and income distribution (Sala-I- 
Martin & Subrahamanian, 2003) show stunning under-performance. While the 
country’s GDP of $ 1,084 million in 2000 is similar to its 1970 level, the 
poverty rate increased from 36 per cent to 70 per cent, with 70 million people 
living on less than $1 a day. Despite having cumulative earnings of about US 
$350 billion over the 35 years since oil was first produced in the country in 
1957, the poverty rate increased while the income distribution deteriorated. 
Whereas the top 2 per cent and the bottom 17 percent earned the same income 
in 1970, the top 2 percent earned the same income as the bottom 55 per cent by 
2000. While oil revenues per capita were about US $ 33 in 1965, and per capita
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GDP was US$245, the latter remained more or less unchanged in 2000 even 
though oil revenues were US$325 per capita. Sala-I-Martin argues that there is 
evidence demonstrating that the oil revenues did not seem to add to the standard 
of living of the general population (ibid.).
Moreover it is argued that despite Shell’s CSR investments, the corporation has 
failed to fulfil the expectations of communities, and that the oil producing 
region is continuously plunged into violence and protests, employee kidnapping 
and attacks on corporate infrastructure (Friends of the Earth, 2003; 2004). The 
structural conditions described above raise some serious questions as to whether 
Shell’s CSR investments can succeed where the government has failed over the 
years, and whether the overall structural conditions will enable the company’s 
CSR agenda to have real noticeable effects on the environment and local 
development (Uwem, 2006). Some studies attempt to explain this failure by 
scrutinising stakeholder perceptions, and relating these to overall CSR 
performance and to how community level perceptions in Nigeria are translated 
into demands put to the oil companies (Idemudia, 2007; Duruigbo, 2003, 
Friends of die Earth (FoE), 2002, 2003, 2004). However, there is comparatively 
little scrutiny on how CSR practices are negotiated through broader stakeholder 
engagement, and how forms of relations existing between the corporation and 
its different stakeholders may shape the basis for engagement and shape CSR 
practices. This research gap is an opportunity to examine corporate-stakeholder 
engagement in negotiating CSR policies and practices in a developing country 
context.
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1.3 The Research objectives and conceptual focus
The thesis will pursue three main objectives as outlined in this section. Firstly, 
the thesis undertakes a critical examination of how Shell implements its CSR 
programme in Nigeria, both in light of strategic objectives associated with the 
company’s business operations, and the oil company’s social responsibilities 
and environmental liabilities. The research highlights the ways in which the 
company may adjust its CSR practices in pursuit of specific business goals. This 
research objective represents an attempt to further the understanding of the link 
between corporate objectives and CSR initiatives and the role stakeholders play 
in negotiating CSR initiatives. In addressing this objective, the following 
research questions are considered:
1. What are the drivers of Shell’s CSR strategies manifested in policies and 
strategies?
2. What are the main pillars of Shell’s CSR programme in Nigeria and what is 
the internal implementation process in terms of delivery, and how are the 
different elements of the programme justified?
3. How do CSR projects map on the company’s business operations and what 
are the context and the benefits for implementing CSR investments?
Secondly, it will explore forms of stakeholder relationships with the oil 
company, as well as identify the different context within which the different 
categories of stakeholders make sense of their relationship with the oil 
company. Despite the acknowledged centrality of stakeholders, there has been 
no serious attempt to address how stakeholders’ relationship with the company 
may influence its CSR policies and practices, and how the dynamic interaction 
between the company and its stakeholders affects their engagement. In 
addressing the second objective, the research considers the following questions:
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1. What is the geography of stakeholders of Shell in Nigeria?
A. What are the interests they represent?
B. What is the source of their legitimacy in engaging Shell’s CSR programme?
2. What is their understanding of CSR obligations and what are the 
assumptions/rationale underlying their claims?
3. How do they understand the role of Shell and their relationships to the 
company?
4. What are their distinctive expectations and claims from Shell?
5. What is the expectation of the company from stakeholders?
Thirdly, the thesis will explore the interaction of CSR programmes and the host 
country’s development framework. This is important given the central role that 
institutions play in shaping organisational behaviour. In particular, the role of 
the state as enabler is gaining prominence in the debates about the role of 
multinational companies and their CSR initiatives in the development policy 
agenda for developing countries. This is even more important as the Nigerian 
Government is the major stakeholder in the local operating company, and is 
therefore familiar with the CSR issues. In addressing the third objective, the 
following questions are considered:
1. How does CSR address development in Nigeria, and how does this fit with 
the country’s resource curse problems (Governance, accountability, 
corruption, over-consumption, structural problems)?
2. What are the ways in which the government is participating in CSR 
(Facilitating, endorsing and partnering), and what is the relationship 
between the government and Shell?
The thesis will finally examine the implications of the research findings for a 
conceptual framework for corporate social responsibility and business strategy 
in developing countries.
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1.4 Structure of the thesis
The introduction has provided a contextual overview for this thesis by outlining 
the key issues and current debates concerning Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will provide the theoretical basis for this thesis and the field of 
research. Chapter 2 will set out the evolution of the CSR discourse, and outline 
the resource-based perspective of corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
engagement to serve the basis of assessment of the theoretical and empirical 
analyses of Shell’s CSR policies and practices both at the level of the firm’s 
strategic objectives and at the level of its relationship with stakeholders. As 
noted earlier, a combination of these theoretical frameworks balances the firm’s 
economic pursuits and the ethical principles, both of which underpin the CSR 
agenda. They were both tested as part of the field research to ensure the 
relevance for the case study considered. Chapter 3 explores corporate social 
responsibility implications for multinational companies operating in developing 
countries. It examines the debates relating to the role of CSR in the global 
governance of corporations and explores the conditions under which CSR is 
most effective in terms of enabling sustainable development objectives at the 
core of the CSR agenda in Africa, and Nigeria in particular. In addition, validity 
of the CSR agenda for developing countries is discussed. Its potential in 
development is discussed along with a framework for assessing the governance 
of MNCs in developing countries. Chapter 4 outlines the methodological 
framework for the research, while Chapter 5 provides a review of the case study 
and situates Shell within the context of the environment justice movement. It 
traces both the globalisation and the localisation of Shell’s CSR agenda and 
assesses its current context in Nigeria. Chapter 6 outlines the findings of the
24
field research. It aims to understand the nature of Shell’s CSR strategies 
manifested in policies and strategies, and identify the main pillars of Shell’s 
CSR programme in Nigeria. In addition, it explores the internal implementation 
and delivery processes, and how the different elements of the programme are 
justified. It also seeks to understand how CSR projects map on the company’s 
business operations and what is the context and rationale for implementing 
specific CSR investments. Chapter 7 details the field research relating to Shell’s 
CSR agenda and its stakeholder engagement dimension. It seeks to establish the 
geography of Shell’s stakeholders in Nigeria and the interests they represent, 
and the source of their legitimacy in engaging Shell’s CSRprogramme. In 
addition, it presents the findings relating to their understanding of Shell and 
their relationships to the company, CSR obligations, and the assumptions 
underlying the respective claims and expectations they may have. Chapter 8 
details the findings on how Shell’s CSR agenda fits within the country’s 
governance context. It further establishes the role that the government and the 
civil society play in Nigeria in terms of creating the conditions enabling the 
success of Shell’s CSR initiatives in the country. Chapter 9 will draw the 
conclusions on CSR policies and practices in Nigeria from the point of view of 
its business-strategic rationale, stakeholder engagement, and development 
dimensions. In addition, it outlines the contribution of the thesis both on the 
theoretical and empirical levels, and assesses their implications and outlines 
areas for future research.
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Chapter Two
THE EMERGENCE OF CSR: ISSUES, BACKGROUND AND
RATIONALE
2.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a conceptual basis for understanding the central 
research issues in this thesis by focussing on debates surrounding the issues and 
research questions that were outlined in the introductory chapter. The chapter 
explores the origins of the CSR concept and its evolution throughout the last 
decades. It revisits the heated debates that took place as the different schools of 
thought attempted to establish a theoretical basis for business-society relations 
embodied in the CSR concept. It examines and discusses the theoretical 
frameworks that will guide the investigation in this thesis of how companies 
made commitments to CSR principles, and set out to translate them into CSR 
policies, strategies, and practices.
2.2 The emergence and evolution of CSR
Since Victorian times in Britain and the industrial revolution, it has become 
obvious that the activities of business corporations have resulted in significant 
ecological footprints and social costs for which they have not been held 
accountable despite their growing financial power (Bowen, 1953; Elbing and 
Elbing, 1967; Eberstadt, 1973). The emergence of CSR is linked to a number of 
social and ecological problems associated with the activities of the business 
enterprise, the principal actor in the industrial growth and unprecedented global
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economic expansion throughout the 19-21st centuries. CSR has become almost 
universally sanctioned and promoted by all constituents in society from 
governments and corporations to NGOs, and individual consumers. For example, 
most of the major international organisations, such as the UN, OECD and ILO 
not only endorse CSR, but have established guidelines and permanently staffed 
divisions to research and promote CSR. In 1977, less than half of the Fortune 500 
firms even mentioned CSR in their annual reports (Boli and Hartsuiker, 2001). By 
the end of 1990s, close to 90% of Fortune 500 firms embraced CSR as an 
essential element in their organisational goal, and actively promoted their CSR 
activities in annual reports. The change has been so dramatic that the Chief 
Executive Officers of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt, and the former CEO of 
HP-Compaq, Carly Farina, both declared that the world has changed and that a 
new reality of business has emerged (Gunter, 2004).
Concern over the issues surrounding the role of business in society is 
longstanding. Although the concept of CSR has only recently been formalised, 
there is a long history in both the East and West, of a commitment to social 
philanthropy, in the belief that the creation of wealth is primarily geared to social 
good. For example, this aspect of ethical business in modem times can be traced 
back to 19th-century philanthropists, such as Robert Owen, and the various 
Quaker-owned businesses, which made money while offering honest products 
and treating their people honestly (Anita Roddick, KLM Herald magazine, 
August 1999).
The industrial revolution and the adoption of laissez-faire economics may have 
prompted a value shift in society whereby wealth, and wealth creation, gained 
prominence over social obligation (Eberstadt, 1973). Consequently, even the
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earliest forms of CSR through philanthropic donations were not enough to offset 
a string of corporate misbehaviours, the effects of which were reinforced by other 
socio-economic, and geo-political and strategic conditions throughout the two 
world wars and the colonial period. Consequently, ensuring that markets 
contributed fully to the nation’s development goals, especially where markets 
altered the economic, social and environmental effects of private sector 
development, was left to government (Jenkins, 2005).
However, most government regulations failed, mainly due to lack of efficiency 
(Buchholz, 1991), leading to increasing pressure from civil society in reaction to 
various major industrial incidents in the last decades (Hoffman, 2000; 
Schumacher, 1973; Jenkins, 2005). For example, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(1962) and Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) sounded alarms in terms 
of growing concern over pesticides, automobile emissions and oil spills.
Industry in general and the oil sector in particular were in denial that their 
activities were harming the environment, and rejected the scientific integrity of 
the evidence presented by civil society activists, particularly environmentalist 
groups (Hoffman, 2000 cited in Skjaerseth and Skodvin, 2003). However, the 
persistence of high profile corporate scandals involving business misuse of 
power, such as the ITT scandal in Chile, prompted another wave of regulations in 
the 1960s and 1970s.
The case for CSR was also driven by debates on the regulation of MNCs and the 
globalisation process that exposed MNCs to a range of new challenges (Kapelus,
2000). In particular, Beck (1992) points out that while the environmental and 
social hazards associated with MNCs’ activities increasingly dominated the
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public agenda, and caught the interest of the public in industrialised societies, 
they simultaneously became a cause for concern in developing countries. This 
prompted an avalanche of negative protests against MNCs, driven by a coalition 
of the global environmental justice movement, the anti-globalisation activists and 
local community activists.
The industry generally faced pressure from the external institutional 
environments (Zadek, 2001; Hoffman, 2000) comprising consumers, community 
activists and NGOs, which gradually convinced corporations that they were 
facing an irreversible movement. It is argued that this pressure strengthened the 
case for CSR and its position within the business community (Andriof et al., 
2002; Hollender, 2004), and led to a realisation that a global shift in values was 
taking place. It is further asserted that societal pressures prompted a re­
examination by the business community of the extent to which CSR undermined 
or potentially strengthened the competitive advantage of the corporation. For 
example, the realisation by major corporations that cause marketing, development 
partnerships and environmental concerns make good business sense in terms of 
materials recycling, employee satisfaction and reputation building, prompted 
some enthusiasm in the business community about the commercial potential of 
CSR.
CSR has increasingly been seized upon as a means for successful corporations to 
improve their social and environmental practices continuously through innovative 
strategies that involve improved relations with society, and responsibility for the
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impacts of their business activities on communities and the environment. For
example, W. K. Shireman1 declared that:
The companies that excel today are those that restructure themselves as 
adaptive, resilient, creative and sustainable as ‘living companies’ with the 
capacity to learn and change. These companies are increasing their profits 
by continuous innovation. They turn waste into new products, leasing and 
remanufacturing billions of dollars of equipment that used to be thrown 
away, driving pollution and waste towards zero, and systematically 
eliminating products and even whole industries while continuing to provide 
the services that are actually wanted.
2.3 Definition, formalisation and theorisation of CSR
The growing concern that business enjoyed a great deal of power with little 
responsibility (Bowen, 1953; Davis, 1960; Elbing and Elbing, 1967; Eberstadt, 
1973) gave rise to scholarly debates that centred on some fundamental questions 
including: What are the nature and scope o f corporate responsibilities to society? 
Should corporations be morally responsible for their actions? Are they capable of 
assuming social responsibility? The early challenge facing the study of CSR was 
that the concept had no agreed definition and was undeveloped conceptually and 
methodologically (Preston, 1975; Abbot and Monsen, 1979; Aupperle et al.; 
1985). Clarkson (1995) argued that as a concept, CSR remained unbound, as it 
was difficult to establish a single commonly accepted definition or commonly 
accepted classification of its main components.
This work, which is epitomised in Bowen’s seminal book Social Responsibilities 
o f  the Businessman (Bowen, 1953), focused on the social responsibility of 
business, an early attempt to define the responsibilities of business to society. 
This work generally advocated that the business community should accept social
1 Keynote address at the Asian Productivity Organisation's conference in Tokyo, April 2000.
http://infochangeindia.org/200210045934/Corporate-Responsibility/Backgrounder/Corporate-Social- 
Responsibility-Background-Perspecti ve.html21/06/2008
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responsibility. Bowen (1953) argued that the primary motivation of a business 
enterprise should be to pursue policy objectives in accordance with the objectives 
and values of society. He pointed out that it is not so much a matter of whether 
profit subsequently arises from social actions, but whether profit or altruism is the 
main reason for action in the first place (ibid.).
Davis (1960) and Frederick (1960) supported Bowen’s (1953) views and were 
particularly concerned with the increasing power and the operational flexibility 
enjoyed by business corporations. Davis formulated two principles that express 
how social power should be managed. Firstly the so-called social power equation, 
which states that social responsibilities of businessmen arise from the amount of 
social power that they have (Davis, 1967, p. 48), and secondly, ‘the iron law of 
responsibility’ which refers to the negative consequences of the absence of use of 
power. He asserted that in the end those who do not use power in a manner that 
society considers responsible would tend to lose it because other groups 
eventually will step in to assume those responsibilities. His second assertion was 
that the business organisation is essentially set up to fulfil a social purpose and is 
permanently subject to the influence of society and to societal expectations 
(Ibid.). Consequently, business should use its resources to serve the social, 
human, and economic needs of society beyond its economic/financial pursuits.
According to Davis (1960), the social power equation has to be understood 
through the functional role of business and managers. The limits of functional 
power are associated with pressures from different constituency groups, which 
restrict organisational power in the same way that a governmental constitution 
does. According to this corporate constitutionalism view, the constituency groups 
define conditions for its responsible use and channel organisational power in a
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supportive way to protect other interests against unreasonable organisational 
power (Davis, 1967).
Frederick (1960) further declared that the social responsibility of businessmen 
was to oversee the operation of an economic system that fulfils the expectations 
of the public. Frederick maintains that responsibility rested with the management 
to make sure that the factors of production were employed in such a way that 
production and distribution enhance the socio-economic well-being of society. As 
such, he defined CSR in terms of the willingness of the corporation to deploy its 
resources to serve the broader needs of society beyond stockholder satisfaction. In 
the same vein, Austin (1965) pointed out that business defined CSR narrowly. He 
urged corporate managements to address the problems of social change that they 
partly created, and argued that the issue of the cost of CSR obligations should not 
be an obstacle. He shifted attention from the social responsibility of businessmen 
to the social responsibility of business.
Elbing (1970) further emphasised this social embeddedness of the business 
corporation, as a justification for its social engagement, by drawing attention to 
the fact that business activities acted upon a larger system of social relationships 
within which the business corporation is grounded. He suggested that business 
decisions should reflect the social realities of the corporation, and conceived the 
business-society relationship in terms of ‘business in society’ implying that 
business was an integral part of society. He pointed out that any separation of 
business economic decisions from the social impacts of corporate actions was 
misguided and false.
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Lodge (1970) argued that business should play an active role in shaping its 
institutional environment, for instance by strengthening the political structure, 
respecting the laws and existing codes of practice, and by using its abundant 
resources to solve the problems faced by society. Lodge (Ibid.) had a broad vision 
of CSR as a framework enabling the creation of partnerships between institutions 
to solve social problems.
The notion of CSR is related to ethical and moral issues concerning corporate 
decision-making and behaviour. The controversy has been over the 
responsibilities firms have regarding their activities. It is imperative to establish 
when the corporation should undertake certain activities or refrain from doing so, 
because they are respectively beneficial or harmful to society. The dominant 
conception is that firms voluntarily integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their operations and interactions with stakeholders. Walton (1967) and Austin 
(1965) suggested that CSR should be a voluntary initiative implemented 
regardless of whether or not it had economic benefits, and despite the fact that it 
involved some costs. Jones (1980) added that as a voluntary endeavour, CSR was 
a form of self-control based on altruistic incentives and a moral imperative.
The assumption that firms can be trusted to address on their own any problems 
their operations may cause leads to the need to understand what kind of 
motivations companies have to engage in social responsibility activities. 
According to Fitch (1976) CSR is a corporate endeavour to help solve social 
problems the corporation may have caused or been part of. He suggested that the 
corporation must make a distinction between social and non-social problems. The 
definition of CSR in terms of problem solving focuses on social problems 
implicating the corporation and forces it to scope the limits of the responsibility it
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is faced with. While this definition narrows the scope of the CSR concept, the 
point of departure for Fitch’s conception is the negative outcomes o f corporate 
activities to which the corporation must respond.
However, others (Simon et al., 1972; Elbing, 1970) have argued that the scope of 
the corporation’s social responsibilities should be widened to include not only 
preventive actions against possible negative impacts caused by corporate 
activities (such as ensuring employee safety or prevention of pollution) as 
suggested by Fitch (1976). He argued that corporate responsibilities should 
extend to positive initiatives such as development investments to improve the 
living conditions of host communities. Accordingly, the scope of CSR should 
include actions taken within the corporation, benefiting internal stakeholders, and 
actions benefiting external stakeholders. As such, ‘stakeholders’ and ‘stakeholder 
needs’ became an integral part of CSR as a definitional construct.
Moreover, CSR drew heavy criticism from and produced bitter controversy 
among different schools of thought. It is suggested that the protests of the 1960s 
dramatised the seemingly eroding relationship between Western corporations and 
the public (Zenisek, 1979), while the widespread public prejudice against 
corporations put corporate executives on the defensive (Elkins, 1977). However, 
Burt (1983) argues that CSR was mostly a reflection of public relations strategy 
adopted by corporations at the top level, and that it was rarely embraced or 
implemented by all levels within organisations. Ackerman (1973) asserts that 
most mid-level managers considered CSR to be damaging to the financial 
performance of their organisations, so most paid it only cursory attention.
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Generally, the debates opposed those that viewed CSR as a means of business 
reaching out to the communities, and vice versa; and those that were reluctant to 
accept the idea that business should assume more functions. The most prominent 
objection to CSR was the classical economic argument proposed by Milton 
Friedman (1962, 1970). He argued that the social responsibility of a corporation 
is to make money for its shareholders. He considered CSR a subversive doctrine 
that threatened the very foundations of a free enterprise society (Friedman, 1962). 
While many researchers accepted Bowen’s (1953) assumption of corporate 
obligation to society and simply moved on to address his two key questions 
regarding the content and process o f CSR (Fitch, 1976; Murray, 1976), opponents 
o f CSR challenged Bowen’s basic assumption and its validity (Levitt, 1958). 
Their premise was that social responsibility and the provision of welfare was a 
government responsibility. They argued that although the corporation was the 
bearer of rights, it had no moral responsibilities (Dunn, 1991; Friedman, 1970), 
and that any responsibility for corporate actions should be bom by its founders 
(Ibid.). Henderson (2001) and Jensen (2001) further supported Friedman’s 
position by arguing that the pursuit of any other goal by management than profit 
making, constituted a betrayal of its social responsibilities to the shareholders.
Proponents of the stockholder view do not preclude the adoption of CSR actions, 
but only their being carried out for reasons of self-interest (Jensen, 2001). The 
validity of a positive contribution to society is not disputed if  it is instrumentally 
regarded as a long-term investment, aimed to maximise the long-term profit of 
the corporation. They argue that such activities are not CSR, but merely profit 
maximisation under the guise of social responsibility (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 
2001).
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Advocates of CSR (Buchholz, 1991; French, 1979) systematically dismissed the 
stockholder view, asserting that since CSR is grounded in moral principles, it is 
an opportunity for the corporation to clarify its moral status and purpose in 
society. Moore (1999a) further pointed out that although corporations have legal 
independence from their members, corporate agency is independent and may not 
be assigned to any individual action. He argued that the majority of corporate 
actions stemmed from the firm’s internal decision-making culture, which directed 
corporate decisions in line with pre-determined goals. As such, the organised 
decision-making framework of a corporation transcends an individual’s 
framework of responsibility whose agency is based on the beliefs and values of 
the corporation (Ibid.).
The two decades following Bowen’s publication were characterised by 
acrimonious controversies over the legitimacy of CSR (Wartick and Cochran, 
1985). However, the two sides in the dispute could not carry on a constructive 
dialogue and very little theoretical advancement was achieved beyond what 
Bowen had already laid down (Elkins, 1977; Preston, 1975). The primary cause 
of this intellectual stalemate over CSR was that the concept of CSR remained 
detached from the day-to-day operations of business organisations with no signs 
of reconciliation. Although many experts noted the outward growth of CSR, few 
noticed that CSR was changing internally in meaning. The concept of CSR, 
particularly in terms of how it relates to other organisational goals, has been 
steadily evolving since the concept was introduced half a century ago.
2.4 Emergence o f the instrumental perspectives o f CSR
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In the 1950s and 1960s, CSR was generally understood as a moral obligation of 
corporate managers to do their share in improving society, whereas there was no 
link between this obligation and profit generation. These two responsibilities of a 
commercial organisation were conceived to be exclusive. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
new theoretical developments attempted to make CSR more appealing to the 
broader corporate and investment communities. The mechanisms linking CSR 
and profitability were suggested (Weick, 1977), although it was not until the late 
1980s through to the 1990s that the concept of CSR became much more closely 
related to market outcomes through a number of empirical and theoretical studies 
(Kotler and Lee, 2005; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 
2002). Therefore, a growing number of shareholders began to accept the idea that 
strategic adoption of CSR could, in fact, lead to financial rewards in the end. 
What changed shareholders’ attitudes regarding CSR were the changes in their 
perceptions of the relationship between CSR and bottom-line performance of the 
organisation. In terms of theoretical orientation, Preston (1978a) argues that 
researchers have moved from explicitly normative and ethics-oriented arguments 
to implicitly normative and performance-oriented managerial studies.
The shift in conceptualisation of CSR did not occur instantly. Rather, it was a 
gradual and arduous process. As mentioned previously, it is well known that 
public intellectuals, such as Milton Friedman, vehemently opposed the idea of 
CSR because it imposed an unfair and costly burden on the shareholders 
(Friedman, 1962; Friedman, 1972; Levitt, 1958). Moreover, because most mid­
level managers saw CSR as a cost with highly uncertain outcomes, until the late 
70s there was significant resistance from the ranks of management within 
corporations to implementing CSR. They were simply not ready to jump on the 
CSR bandwagon (Ackerman, 1973; Klepper and Mackler, 1986).
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However, during the last two decades, the concept o f CSR has become more 
harmonised with corporate financial performance. The shift has occurred in three 
main evolutionary stages. Firstly, the classical view of the relationship between 
corporate social performance and CSR is that they are mutually exclusive. The 
main assumption in the classical view is that a business organisation is a unique 
social entity created just to engage in economic transactions, and the primary goal 
is to create profit through organisational efficiency or technological innovation. 
In that sense, it has no immediate or apparent responsibility toward public 
welfare. However, its activities are likely to generate unintended public good 
(McKie, 1974).
In the second stage, a new view emerged in which the relationship between 
corporate financial performance and CSR was seen as not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, but that there was a considerable overlap between them. In the short- 
run, engaging in CSR might erode a corporation’s short-term profits, but in the 
end, it would help all social constituents including the corporation itself. The 
view of CSR as an investment in long-term competitive advantage is based on the 
assertion that in certain conditions, the satisfaction of stakeholder interests can 
contribute to maximising shareholder value (Mitchell et al., 1997; Ogden and 
Watson, 1999). Investing in philanthropic activities may improve the context of 
competitive advantage of a firm, creating greater social value than individual 
donors or government can, since the firm has the knowledge and resources for a 
better understanding of how to solve certain problems (Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
Burke et al. (1986) further pointed out that when philanthropic activities are 
closer to the company’s mission they create greater wealth than other kinds of 
donations.
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According to Wallich and McGowan (1970), a modern version of this view is 
represented by the enlightened self-interest view. The main premise is that 
corporations and society depend on one another for their well-being and that the 
cooperation between corporations and society is mutually beneficial in the long 
run. Thus, although CSR may not produce immediate benefits in terms of 
financial outcomes and there are no unambiguously proved causal linkages 
between CSR and profit, the interaction between the two spheres is necessary and 
useful for corporations (Ibid.). The ‘new rationale’ that Wallich and McGowan 
offered was that it is consistent with stockholders’ long-term interests for 
corporations to be socially minded. Most o f the research that followed in that 
decade conceptualises CSR as supporting the corporation’s long-term interest by 
strengthening the environment to which corporations belong. For instance, Davis 
(1973, p. 313) argued that firms have an obligation to ‘evaluate in its decision­
making process the effects of its decision on the external social system in a 
manner that will accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic 
gains which the firm seeks’. The underlying assumption was that if the 
surrounding society that businesses belong to deteriorates, businesses lose their 
critical support structure and customer base. Therefore, it is in the corporation’s 
long-tem interest to support the well-being of its environment.
In the third phase, the integration of CSR and the firm’s financial performance 
took another step forward, with the assertion that there is a business case for CSR. 
In other words, firms can perform better financially by doing good. The main 
argument is that companies that do good can improve their reputation and 
consumer loyalty (Kanter, 1999; Kotler and Lee, 2005) and develop new markets 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002), while significantly reducing the risks of becoming the
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target of lawsuits or consumer boycotts. They will also attract socially conscious 
consumers and investment and boost employee morale (Lazio, 2003; Turban and 
Greening, 1997), and above all forestall legislation, hence ensuring greater 
corporate independence from government regulation (Mintzberg, 1983, Greening 
and Turban, 2000). Others went further, suggesting that decisions regarding CSR 
should be treated by managers “precisely as they treat all investment decisions 
and should be considered as a form of strategic investment” (McWilliams et al., 
2006, p. 4).
The alleged link between profitability and CSR prompted extensive empirical 
research into whether the two are positively linked. Some found evidence of a 
positive association (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003), while 
others concluded that the firm’s economic performance was not directly linked, 
either positively or negatively, to its social responsiveness (Arlow and Gannon, 
1982). Moreover, these empirical assessments were complicated in view of the 
imperfect nature of the studies (problems related to the measurement of both CSR 
and financial performance, criticisms of omission of controls, lack of causality 
and other methodological problems) (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Others 
however suggested that there was a positive long-term relationship (Auperle et 
al.; Waddock and Graves, 1997).
However, Holmes (1976) pointed out that the widespread adoption of CSR by 
industry could have an economic rationale. For example, Branco and Rodrigues 
(2006) pointed out that it is difficult to believe that managers will take decisions 
which they know will be detrimental to the firm’s financial performance. Even if 
managers’ personal values are aligned with CSR values, it will be very difficult 
for them to decide to engage in social responsibility activities if they do not see
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the possibility of furthering financial performance. The business case, whose 
primary motive is wealth creation, progressively dominates the managerial 
conception of responsibility (Windsor, 2001, cited in Garriga and Mele, 2004; 
Gond and Matten, 2007).
2.4.1 The resource-based view and CSR
The proponents of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Wemerfelt, 1984) further picked up the view of CSR as a strategy for achieving 
competitive advantages. The number of studies devoted to CSR which adopt a 
RBV (albeit, in many cases, combining it with other theoretical perspectives), has 
grown in recent years. This tendency began with a focus on environmental 
aspects (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998), but has 
subsequently extended to more general issues of CSR (Bansal, 2005; Hillman and 
Kein, 2001).
This perspective maintains that the ability of a firm to perform better than its 
competitors depends on the unique interplay of human, organisational and 
physical resources over time. The resources that are likely to lead to competitive 
advantage are valuable, rare and inimitable, and must be deployed effectively by 
the organisation. They include the assets that firms use to accomplish the 
activities they are engaged in to convert inputs into outputs, and can be classified 
as tangible (physical and financial assets) or intangible (corporate reputation, 
employees’ knowledge, experiences and skills, and commitment and loyalty) 
(Mathews, 2002, p. 32). According to Russo and Fouts (1997, p. 537), resources 
are not productive on their own and can only be a source of competitive 
advantage if they are used by firms to perform their activities. Thus, the analysis
also needs to consider a firm’s abilities to assemble, integrate, and manage these 
bundles of resource’ (Ibid.). Firms provide social members with the products or 
services that will fulfil their needs and establish relations with each other. They 
control the resources needed for such activities, build the processes through 
which resources are used, in terms of their own goals (Mathews, 2002).
Dynamic capabilities refer to the organisational and strategic routines that enable 
managers to acquire resources, modify, integrate and recombine them to generate 
new value-creating strategies. This approach is focused on the drivers of the 
creation, evolution and recombination of the resources into new sources of 
competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). Capabilities refer to a firm’s capacity 
to deploy different resources in a coordinated fashion, using organisational 
processes, to achieve a desired objective. They are the outcome of organisational 
learning and are built from the learning of individual members or individual 
business units and the experience of individual members (Mathews, 2002; 2003). 
Firms use them to develop and implement their strategies.
Galbreath’s analysis (2005) establishes a typology consisting of tangible and 
intangible resources. The former includes financial assets and physical assets, 
while the latter includes resources and capabilities, which in turn include 
intellectual property assets, organisational assets and reputational assets. 
Intangible resources and capabilities are defined as non-physical factors that are 
used to produce goods or provide services, or are otherwise expected to generate 
future economic benefits for the firm (Ibid.). They include intellectual property 
assets, organisational assets and reputational assets. Intellectual property assets 
such as copyrights, patents, registered designs and trademarks are afforded legal
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protection through property rights arrangements. Such legal protection can create 
barriers to competitive duplication (Ibid.). Organisational assets, such as culture, 
human resource management policies and organisational structure, can also resist 
the imitation efforts of competitors, as they represent high levels of asset 
specificity and time compression diseconomies. These assets are seen as 
contributing order, stability and quality to the firm. On the other hand, contracts, 
such as franchise or licensing agreements, may be important resources for some 
firms, as they are legally enforceable and thus competitors may be prevented 
from replicating the benefits derived from such agreements (Matthews, 2002)
Reputational assets, although not legally protected by property rights, are 
considered path dependent assets characterised by high levels of specificity and 
social complexity. Reputation is built, not bought, thus it is a non-tradeable asset 
that may be much more difficult to duplicate than a tangible asset. These assets 
can inform external constituents about the trustworthiness, credibility, and quality 
of the firm. Therefore, reputational assets can be key drivers of external 
constituents positive reactions toward a firm vis-a-vis its competitors, thus 
positively affecting firm success (ibid).
According to Barney and Muhanna (2004), tangible resources, whether physical 
or financial assets, are easier to imitate or substitute even if they are valuable and 
rare. On the other hand, intangible resources and capabilities are difficult and 
costly to create because they tend to be historically contextualised, path 
dependent, socially complex and causally ambiguous. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that they are more likely to be a source of competitive advantage than 
are tangible resources (Conner and Prahalad, 1996).
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However, the RBV has been criticised firstly, for its non-political view and its 
failure to recognise that resources and capabilities are contested (Moldaschl and 
Fischer, 2004). For example, critics pointed out, management does not easily 
control those intangible assets, such as employee knowledge, and employees’ 
actions may have either positive or negative consequences for the firm. They 
suggest instead that the firm should be conceptualised as a ‘strategic coalition of 
groups of actors, each with their own interests and with different power’ (Ibid., p. 
141). Secondly, with a few exceptions, there is a tendency not to question the role 
that the firm’s exchange relationships with the environment play within the 
resource-based perspective. The firm’s environment is merely conceived as ‘a 
blind selection mechanism, as a source of competitive pressure’ disregarding the 
“institutional rules and resources this environment provides, how firms 
themselves depend on them and how they can create common resources” (Ibid., 
p. 129). However, resources such as knowledge and reputation originate “from 
complex interaction relationships of various social groups, organisations and 
individuals” (Ibid., p. 130).
Thirdly, another weakness associated with the RBV is the inability to explain the 
influence that the relationship between a firm and its environment has on the 
firm’s success. As Moldaschl and Fischer (Ibid., p. 6) suggest, “firms are 
embedded in specific political, social, cultural, legal conditions and rules. Not 
only do they pursue their activities in a given market system, but they also aim at 
exerting influence on the conduct of other actors and on the rules of the system. 
Additionally, their activities have numerous unintended consequences, i.e. 
externalities”. The need to see firms as social actors embedded in society within
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the resource-based perspective stems from the fact that numerous authors as key 
determinants of a firm’s success see intangible resources.
To overcome these theoretical shortcomings, the RBV has sought to extend to the 
notions of social capital and stakeholder management. According to Moldaschl 
and Fischer (Ibid., p. 137), intangible resources “are increasingly produced and 
provided by society, like human capital and knowledge, and many exist only in a 
social form”. Notions such as power, trust and legitimacy are crucial for 
understanding how resources and capabilities such as employees’ skills, corporate 
culture and corporate reputation are important in determining a firm’s success.
Post et al. (2002) argue that there are interdependencies between the firm and its 
stakeholders that cannot be described in terms of simple contractual exchanges. 
Furthermore, it is relationships rather than transactions that are the ultimate 
sources of a firm’s wealth, and it is the ability to establish and maintain these 
relationships within its entire network of stakeholders that determines its long­
term survival and success. Relationships imply continuity and involve ongoing 
conflictual as well as collaborative elements.
Post et al. (2002, p. 8) define the firm’s stakeholders as the “individuals and 
constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth- 
creating capacity and activities, and who are therefore its potential beneficiaries 
and/or risk bearers”. A firm’s stakeholders are seen as those who supply critical 
resources, place something of value ‘at risk’, and have sufficient power to affect 
its performance. The principal means of sustaining and enhancing a firm’s 
wealth-creating capacity are the linkages between the firm and its multiple 
constituencies. Due to their linkage with the firm, these constituents have a stake
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in its operations, in the sense that, because of the firm’s operations, they have the 
possibility of either gaining greater or lesser benefits or experiencing greater or 
lesser harm (Ibid.).
For involuntary stakeholders, on the other hand, “particularly those that may be 
negatively affected by externalities such as pollution or congestion, the guiding 
principle has to be reduction or avoidance or harm and/or the creation of 
offsetting benefits. These stakeholders expect that they will be at least as well off 
as they would be if the firm did not exist” (Ibid., p. 22).
Nahapiel and Ghoshal (1998, p. 243) defined social capital as:
The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network 
and the assets that may be mobilized through that network.
Social capital resides in the structure of relationships among people, which makes 
it a resource that does not lie with one individual, but rather is jointly owned, and 
has three dimensions: structural, cognitive and relational in terms of the 
organisation, norms and shared systems of meaning among parties (Ibid.). The 
notion of social capital thus refers to the relationships among individuals through 
which information, influence and resources flow.
Nahapiel and Ghoshal (1998) assert that the notion of social capital is important 
because high levels of social capital reduce transaction costs, facilitate 
communication and cooperation, enhance employee commitment, foster 
individual learning, strengthen relationships and involvement and ultimately 
enhance a firm’s performance. To this end, social capital plays a fundamental role 
in understanding how engaging in CSR may contribute to a firm’s long-term 
survival and success.
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In effect, CSR involves recognition on the part of society of both its significance 
and the efforts of a firm to gain society’s approval of its behaviour, and relates to 
society’s stakeholder expectations about corporate behaviour that firms have to 
identify and try to conform to. Consequently, stakeholder expectations about what 
constitutes desirable and undesirable firm performance, define the norms for 
corporate behaviour and the basis for evaluating the outcomes o f firms’ 
behaviours in terms of how they have met expectations and have affected the 
groups and organisations in their environment (Wood and Jones, 1996, p. 23).
2.4.1.1 Internal benefits of CSR.
Investments in socially responsible activities may have internal benefits by 
helping a firm to develop new resources and capabilities that are related to 
expertise and corporate culture. These resources and capabilities acquired 
internally, would then lead to more efficient use of resources.
It is argued that the urge for environmental cleanliness may lead to more efficient 
processes, improvements in productivity, lower costs of compliance and new 
market opportunities (Howard-Grenville and Hoffman, 2003; Goldstein, 2002; 
Russo and Fouts, 1997; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995;). Hart (1995) applied the 
RBV of the firm to the domain of corporate environmental strategies. He 
identifies the sources that contribute to environmental performance and may 
simultaneously improve industrial performance. These include strategies for 
pollution prevention and for minimising the environmental impact o f product 
systems. They further proposed that a prevention policy builds the resources of 
organisational commitment and learning, cross-functional integration, and 
increased employee skills and participation within the firm.
2.4.1.2 External benefits of CSR
The external benefits of CSR are related to its effect on corporate reputation. 
Firms with a good social responsibility reputation may improve relations with 
external actors such as customers, investors, bankers, suppliers and competitors. 
They may also attract better quality employees or increase current employees’ 
motivation, morale, commitment, and loyalty to the firm. This, in turn, may 
improve financial outcomes. Disclosure of information about a firm’s behaviours 
and outcomes regarding social responsibility may help build a positive image 
with stakeholders (Orlitzky et al., 2003).
As Roberts and Dowling (2002, p. 1078, cited in Branco and Rodriguez, 2006) 
pointed out, corporate reputation is a general organisational attribute that reflects 
the extent to which external stakeholders see the firm as good, and not bad. It has 
been identified as one of the most important intangible resources that provide a 
firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. Several studies have found a positive 
relationship between a firm’s reputation and its financial performance (Roberts 
and Dowling, 2002; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) view corporate reputation as resulting from a 
process in which firms compete for social status in a market characterised by 
incomplete information by signalling their key characteristics to stakeholders in 
order to maximise their reputation. However, a firm’s reputation is determined 
not only by the signals received directly from the firm but also from other 
sources, such as the media or the stock market. Corporate reputation reflects a 
firm’s “relative success in fulfilling the expectations of multiple stakeholders” 
(Ibid., p. 235). Reputational assets are determined by the congruence between
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firms’ behaviours and the expectations and preferences of stakeholders (Fombrun 
and Rindova, 2000). By demonstrating that they operate in accordance with social 
and ethical criteria, firms can build reputation, whereas failing to do so can be a 
source of reputational risk. The reputational capital of the firm is thus created 
when a firm is able to obtain support from its stakeholders (employee 
commitment, customer loyalty, and attractiveness to investors, collaboration of 
partners, favourable regulation, endorsement from activist groups, legitimacy 
within the community, and favourable coverage from the media). On the other 
hand, it is destroyed when stakeholders withdraw their support producing threats 
of rogue behaviour from employees, threats of misunderstanding from customers, 
threats to value from investors, threats of defection from partners, threats of legal 
action from regulators, threats of boycott from activists, threats of illegitimacy 
from the community, and threats of exposure from the media (ibid). CSR 
enhances the firm’s financial performance through accumulated rewards due to 
positive behaviour and through mitigation of the consequences of negative 
behaviour.
Others have defined CSR practices as innovative and less-imitable means of 
strengthening customer relationships (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). CSR is 
viewed as a form of product differentiation (ibid), and that involvement in 
corporate social initiatives can even increase stock value (Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996). MNCs’ CSR agendas in developing countries have also 
recently been perceived as long-term profit maximising, since they generate 
external benefits to the firm as discussed in the next section.
2.4.2 Legitimacy and the licence to operate
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Critics of the CSR agenda in developing countries claim that much of the 
corporate-stakeholder relations discourse reflects the language of the business 
case, such as the need to obtain legitimacy and ultimately the licence to operate. 
This helps reduce the costs of operations, and foster long-term beneficial 
relationship in terms of reputational capital and social capital (Jenkins, 2005; 
Newell, 2006).
Legitimacy can be described as the generalised perception that the actions of an 
entity are desirable and appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and expectations (Suchman, 1995). As such, corporate 
agency is legitimate when it is judged to be just and worthy of support (Dowling 
and Pfeffer, 1975), by the social community. The legitimacy concept relies on the 
notion of a social contract between the company and the community, and on the 
assumption that the company will adopt strategies to show the community that the 
organisation is attempting to comply with its expectations. This is all the more 
important for the corporation, since it requires legitimacy to maintain functional, 
long-term relationships with the various stakeholders on which it depends (Nasi 
et al., 1997). As such, CSR practices in part will ensure that there is no legitimacy 
gap, which arises when societal expectations of corporate behaviour differ from 
societal perceptions of corporate behaviour (Ibid.).
The loss of legitimacy can often be followed by a break down in corporate- 
stakeholder relations, and loss of the associated benefits of legitimacy (Burke, 
1999), such as the licence to operate. The licence to operate concept is an 
instrumental concept and invokes the profit-maximising function of the CSR 
agenda, and relates to the internal factors that may determine or undermine 
corporate financial success. The company’s licence to operate defines what it can
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and cannot do, and must be obtained in addition to the government licence to 
operate. There three variants of the concept of the licence to operate, and each 
one represents the demands of a set of stakeholders who police and enforce 
compliance. The first strand represents the legal licence to operate, consisting of 
the company’s regulatory permit and statutory obligations that embody the 
demands of regulators and legislators. The second variant is the social licence to 
operate, which represents the demands of local and national as well as 
international social and environmental activists and communities and the public. 
The licence is obtained from the communities and the neighbourhood (Burke, 
1999), and its terms, according to Thornton et. al. (2002) are more demanding 
than those of the legal licences are, and are generally enforced through threats and 
adverse publicity or complaints to regulators. The third form of licence to operate 
is the economic one, which consists of the demands of the management, lenders, 
and investors for profitability and cost management. As such, pursuing value 
maximisation through CSR agenda is negotiated with stakeholder expectations in 
terms of social and environmental sustainability (Thornton et. al. (2002). For 
example, as mentioned earlier, Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria has been criticised 
as based on the pursuit of the licence to operate, given that the oil company’s 
operations faced increased hostility from stakeholders locally, nationally and 
internationally (Frynas, 2005; Manby, 1999). Others consider Shell’s CSR 
agenda as a purely defensive strategy and an exercise in public relations 
(Christian Aid, 2004; Frynas, 2005).
However, CSR scholars have increasingly called for basic research to develop 
conceptual tools to explain changing organisational behaviour from broader
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societal perspective, beyond the current excessive and narrow emphasis on the 
business case for CSR (Gond and Matten, 2007).
Despite its limitations, the RBV is useful in the present thesis, as a framework to 
consider the question of how CSR projects map onto a company’s business 
operations and what the context and rationale for implementing specific CSR 
investments is, as outlined in section 1.4. It is used along with the stakeholder 
engagement perspective. Both provide the opportunity to examine corporate 
behaviour from both internal (business value perspectives) and external (societal) 
stakeholder perspectives. The next section reviews the stakeholder engagement 
perspective.
2.4.3 The role o f stakeholder engagement
There is a tradition in the study of business and society, which, amidst 
controversial debates, has sought to define and classify the relationship between 
corporations and their stakeholders. The main question has been how to define 
who is and who is not a stakeholder and how to explain why and how managers 
prioritise stakeholder relationships.
Despite an early attempt by Preston and Post (1975) who described corporate 
response strategies to stakeholder constituencies as ranging from reactive, to 
proactive, to interactive, and Frederick’s (1978) introduction of corporate social 
responsiveness as a process derived from CSR, it is Freeman’s (1984) seminal 
contribution that accounts for the stakeholder theory of the firm in its 
recognisable modem form.
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Freeman (1984, p.6) defined stakeholders as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”. He 
argued that corporate activities generate externalities that economically, culturally 
and physically affect various groups of stakeholders and who, for that matter, 
have a legitimate interest in the corporation. These include, on the one hand, 
groups of stakeholders to whom the corporation is related by all sort of contracts, 
and on the other, many other stakeholders with a legitimate stake in the 
corporation, such as employees, contractors, suppliers, etc., who are protected by 
public regulations. He further pointed out that shareholders do not buy shares 
only because they want to own the corporation, but mostly for speculative 
reasons. Hence, he argues, that it would not be sensible that the speculative and 
mostly short-term interests of shareholders should prevail over the often long­
term interests of other groups, such as employees, customers and suppliers.
However, Freeman’s so-called broad view of stakeholders has been criticised by 
proponents of the stockholder view of stakeholders (Friedman, 1970; Jensen,
2001). This perspective defines relevant stakeholder groups in terms of their 
direct relevance to the firm’s core economic interests. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, their view of a firm’s responsibilities to its stakeholders is limited to 
stockholders, with whom the firm has a fiduciary relationship.
Friedman (1970) and Jensen (2001) argue that corporate pursuit of total value 
maximisation makes society better off. They dismiss the premise of Freeman’s 
definition as fundamentally flawed on a number of grounds: Firstly, a broader 
perspective of stakeholders politicises the corporation and exposes its 
management to the risk of pursuing multiple goals. Secondly, Friedman (1970) 
and Jensen (2001) argue that multiple goals give unfettered power to management
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to exercise its own preferences in spending the firm’s resources. Third, they point 
out that engaging with the broader stakeholders of the firm represents a financial 
necessity, and the firm’s actions will be purely profit or value maximisation. 
From this perspective, stakeholder engagement adopts an instrumental 
perspective and, as Clarkson (1995) points out, managers recognise different 
groups of stakeholders and manage their firms accordingly. To this end, they 
focus on the strategic aspects of identifying which stakeholders matter to the 
organisation and how they should be dealt with in order for the organisation to 
achieve its goals. During the interaction with stakeholders, the rational choice 
perspective suggests that the interacting players have a choice in cooperating with 
each other, or not, based on the pursuit of their self-interest.
Scholars have defined legitimate stakeholders based on: their role in enabling the 
firm’s survival (Bowie, 1988; Freeman and Reed, 1983), whether they have 
stakes at risk in the firm (Clarkson, 1995), or whether they are participants in an 
exchange relationship (Freeman and Evan, 1990). Others have defined legitimate 
stakeholder groups on the basis of moral claims, arguing that the essence of 
stakeholder management should be the firm’s participation in creating and 
maintaining moral relationships (Freeman, 1994), or fairly distributing the harms 
and benefits of its actions (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Beaulieu and Pasquero 
(2002) argue that as a concept, legitimacy is an integral part of organisational 
existence, with early links to institutionalist accounts (Scott and Meyer, 1994; 
Pfeffer and Zalancik, 1978). They suggest that legitimacy is the result of a 
process in which behaviour is shaped according to prevailing beliefs and 
expectations.
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As discussed in section 2.4.2, legitimacy relies on the expectation that the firm 
will behave in a desirable and appropriate fashion within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995) as are required 
to maintain functional, long-term relationships with the various stakeholders on 
which they depend (Nasi et al., 1997).
The justification for stakeholder engagement and the firm’s quest for developed 
legitimacy rests on the realisation that the firm stands to benefit from it, or to lose 
without it. According to Prahalad and Hamel (1990), NGOs and other external 
stakeholders offer corporations access to a different set of core competencies than 
typically are available internally. As such, they suggest that forming partnerships 
that effectively use the resources of both corporations and NGOs can create 
opportunities to promote strong environmental management practices, while 
helping firms to earn profits. As such, the engagement process generates trust and 
legitimacy for all the parties involved.
Furthermore, Rondinelli and London (2002), examined the processes of trust and 
legitimacy building in stakeholder cross-sectoral environmental collaborations, 
and observed that whilst helping corporations abate increasing pressure from 
powerful environmental organisations, stakeholder engagement also had internal 
benefits (Kanter, 1999). Some of the benefits flowing to the NGO stakeholder 
include philanthropic contributions and other corporate schemes, such as 
employee participation in NGO activities, targeted project support and corporate- 
NGO marketing affiliations Rondinelli and London (2002, p.204). In return, the 
corporation can benefit from NGO certification o f corporate business practices, 
environmental awareness and education collaborations, and environmental 
management alliances (Ibid., p. 204).
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Rondinelli and London (2002) however, point out that cross-sectoral stakeholder 
engagement does not always succeed due to three main psychological factors, 
namely: mistrust, fear and loss of control, misunderstanding of the motivations 
and intent of each of the partners. Thus, it is argued that stakeholders must find 
ways of creating reciprocal value, learn from each other, establish legitimacy, and 
overcome distrust (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Rousseau et al. 1998 cited in 
Rondinelli and London, 2002).
What the above definitions have in common is the attempt to define stakeholder 
legitimacy based on fiduciary and/or moral claims, leading to lack of clarity with 
regard to who is a legitimate stakeholder in the firm. This problem has been 
tackled by distinguishing between normative stakeholders with an unequivocally 
legitimate relationship to a business, and derivative stakeholders who acquire 
legitimacy only through a capacity to adversely or favourably impact upon the 
attention an organisation should give to its stakeholders of the normative variety 
(Phillips, 2003).
Normative stakeholders as groups possess a morally legitimate claim to have a 
business directed towards serving their interests, as its ultimate objective 
(Mitchell et all. 1997). The influencer definition of stakeholders is based on the 
ability to aid or impede whatever strategic aims an organisation happens to have. 
Critics argue that there is a need to impose manageable limits on which groups 
are admitted as stakeholders of the organisation and not leaving it so open ended 
as to include anyone who might encounter the organisation. They reject 
combinatory definitions that view stakeholders as both claimants and influencers 
(Kaler, 2002a).
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Derivative stakeholders correspond to a broader definition of the firm’s 
stakeholders and are claimed to reflect the contextual reality of MNC operations, 
based on the argument that companies can be affected and can affect almost any 
one. The idea of and need to identify stakeholder types is to equip managers with 
the ability to recognise and respond effectively to this disparate set of 
organisational entities, which may or may not have legitimate claims but which 
may be able to affect or may be affected by the firm nevertheless (Freeman, 1984; 
Mitchell, et al., 1997).
Others have attempted to ground identification of stakeholders in a theory of 
organisational ethics, specifically the concept of justice and fairness, structured to 
apply to organisations rather than the entire societies o f its original application 
Kaler (2002a). While supportive of a stakeholder approach, critics disagree on the 
forms that the stakeholder approach should take. They argue that a stakeholder 
approach is good, but suggest a restricted version in terms of the groupings that 
are admitted to stakeholder membership and the firm’s responsibilities towards 
them (Kaler, 2002a; Jensen, 2002). The normative justification for stakeholder 
identification at the organisational level must follow a number of requirements 
for the purpose of business ethics. These include first, die possession o f a moral 
claim to have their interests served by a business that could be either strong or 
weak in the sense of being or not being backed by a corresponding right. Second, 
the requirement must be role specific in the sense of depending on a particular 
sort of relationship with the business as against being a claim arising from the 
duties towards people in general (Kaler, 2002a, pp.94-95); Third, satisfying 
requirements must be a fulfilment of the business purpose as its ultimate objective 
(Kaler 2003a; Jensen, 2002). Stakeholders must be closely and actively involved 
in contributing to the economic functioning of a business.
This view encompasses both ethics and strategy and thereby overcomes what is 
commonly presumed to be a dichotomy between the ethical and the commercial 
(separation thesis) (Freeman, 1994).
However, critics point out that the problem with any combinatory definition is 
that, while a claimant definition tells us what the role o f the company should do, 
namely serving the interests of stakeholders, the influencer definition does not. 
They argue that what is being recognised under the headings of influencer is 
simply the property of being able to positively or negatively impact upon the 
goals of serving the claimants. They constitute nothing more than being able to 
impede aid. The aid factor needs to be taken into consideration for the attainment 
of any sort of strategic goal whether it is dictated by the concept of stakeholder or 
by any other engagement. It has been argued that these are mere strategic factors 
like any other, under the heading of stakeholder, and point out that there is a 
confusing application of the same designation based on two very different 
relationships to a business (Kaler, 2002a, pp. 95-97).
Despite the above criticism, a combinatory approach to stakeholder engagement 
remains increasingly dominant. Its importance rests on the complex reality of the 
current business environment. Business operations are increasingly juxtaposing 
profit-making objectives with social responsibilities. More often than not, these 
responsibilities cannot solely be justified on ethical grounds. In addition, there is 
always a strategic intent, be it risk management or reputation building, behind 
most CSR endeavours.
Mitchell et al. (1997) sought to clarify the contentious debate over what 
constitutes a stakeholder, by proposing that the question of who or what matters
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to managers goes beyond the identification of stakeholders, and may better be 
answered via a theory of stakeholder salience. They argued that stakeholder 
salience “will be positively related to the cumulative number of stakeholder 
attributes -  power, legitimacy, and urgency -perceived by managers to be 
present” (p. 873). These attributes have been explained elsewhere, by other 
theories from economics and political science.
Firstly, stakeholders possessing power have the ability to exercise their will 
despite resistance (Weber, 1947). Power is explained using resource dependence 
theory, agency theory, and transaction cost economics (TCE). Resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) explains how an organisation’s 
dependence on a stakeholder for critical resources puts the organisation in a 
relatively more dependent position, warranting managerial attention. Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckiling 1976; Ross 1973) and TCE (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1975) both consider the potential for opportunism in a relationship - 
one party taking advantage of its more powerful position - increasing the cost of 
transacting (Jones, 1995). The potential for opportunism warrants managerial 
attention.
Secondly, the marketing organisation’s performance will be affected by 
stakeholders’ legitimate interest in its activities and outputs. Legitimacy is 
defined as, “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy can 
be explained using population ecology and institutional theory. Population 
ecology (Carroll and Hannan, 1989) argues that organisations not complying with 
the demands of the environment (e.g., the interests of stakeholders) will struggle
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to survive. Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 
1977) argues that organisational survival and effectiveness may depend upon the 
legitimacy acquired from conforming to the “prevailing rationalised concepts” in 
society (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p340). Conformance, or isomorphism, is 
rewarded. Legitimate stakeholders, therefore, warrant managerial attention.
The third attribute in Mitchell et al.’s (1997) framework is urgency or “the degree 
to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (p. 867). Mitchell et al. 
(1997) argue that urgency is “implicit in each” of the organisational theories 
already discussed (p. 864), although not a primary feature of any one theory. It is 
more explicitly referred to in the issues in the management and crisis 
management literatures. Mitchell et al. proposed that it is comprised of two 
attributes: the time sensitivity and the criticality of the claims of stakeholders. 
Urgent claims will demand immediate managerial attention.
As such, corporate stakeholder engagement is oriented towards “stakeholders” or 
people who affect or are affected by corporate policies and practices. Its central 
goal is to achieve maximum overall cooperation among the entire system of 
stakeholder groups and their objectives (Sturdivant, 1979; Emshoff and Freeman, 
1981). As such, the most efficient strategy for managing stakeholder relations 
involve efforts in simultaneously dealing with issues affecting multiple 
stakeholders. For example, stakeholder management tries to integrate groups with 
a stake in the firm into managerial decision-making, including topics such as how 
to determine best practice, and incorporate stakeholder relations and stakeholder 
salience in management (Bendheim et al., 1998; Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 
1997), and how managers can successfully balance the competing demands of 
various stakeholder groups (Ogden and Watson, 1999).
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Further theorisation of CSR and stakeholder engagement has focused on 
interactions and connections between business and society and how the power, 
the position, and inherent responsibilities of business are handled throughout its 
engagement with society. As discussed in the next section, this is of particular 
relevance in the study o f oil MNCs operating in a developing country context, 
where the power of MNCs has historically been associated with geopolitical 
pursuits (Jenkins, 1987). For example, in analysing the drivers of stakeholder 
engagement at Shell, Lawrence (2002) observed that the oil MNC embarked on a 
fully-fledged stakeholder engagement process that involved corporate managers 
and members of NGOs that had been vehemently critical of the oil company for 
its power, environmental and social responsibility, and human rights record. The 
engagement followed a number of corporate scandals involving Shell (see 
Chapter 5), that had shattered the company’s reputation, and contributed to a loss 
of trust and legitimacy. Lawrence (2002) examines the motivation to seek 
engagement, stakeholder goals in the engagement process, the organisational 
capabilities that they employed, and the dynamics of effective dialogue (p. 187). 
She highlights that stakeholders shared a number o f cultural affinities, recognised 
each other’s legitimacy, had considerable time to build trust through 
collaboration, and were all willing to accept incremental progress towards their 
goals (Ibid. 199). In addition, all parties had sufficient organisational capacity to 
engage stakeholders, in terms of expertise, financial resources, time, and political 
willingness to engage in each respective stakeholder organisation.
However, Lawrence documented the company-stakeholder engagement process at 
global level, with culturally homogeneous stakeholders and within a Western 
context. As such, her contribution leaves a gap in determining the drivers for
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successful stakeholder engagement in a developing country context such as 
Nigeria, a multicultural environment with limited capacity in terms of expertise, 
financial resources, and weak political support, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3.
2.5.2 Stakeholder engagement and corporate power
Davis (1960) introduced power in the debate over CSR. His argument is based on 
the view that business is a social institution and consequently, it must use power 
responsibly. He further noted that corporate power comes from both the firm’s 
internal as well as the external environments. He pointed out that these are 
unstable, and constantly shift in terms of their preferences, from the economic to 
the social and the political forums and vice versa. He asserts that business has the 
power to influence markets and the price equilibrium. He calls for business to 
exercise its power responsibly, if only to avoid losing it through social 
intervention: “The constituency groups define conditions for its responsible use 
and channel organisational power in a supportive way to protect other interests 
against unreasonable organisational power” (Davis, 1967, p. 68).
Donaldson (1982) and Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 1999) considered the 
business and society relationship from the social contract tradition. They assumed 
that a sort of implicit social contract between business and society exists. Social 
responsibilities come from consent at two levels. Firstly, at a theoretical macro 
level where a social contract appeals to all rational contractors, and secondly, at a 
real micro social level where a contract involves members of numerous localised 
communities. According to Donaldson (1982) and Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 
1999), this theory offers a process in which the contracts between industries, 
departments and economic systems can be legitimate. In this process, the
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participants will agree upon the ground rules defining the economic foundation 
that is acceptable to them. The macro social contract provides rules for any social 
contracting that are so fundamental and basic that they “are discernible in a 
convergence of religious, political and philosophical thought” (Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 2000, p. 441). The micro social contracts show explicit or implicit 
agreements that are binding within an unidentified community, whether industry, 
companies or economic systems. These micro social contracts generate authentic 
norms and are based on the attitudes and behaviours of the members of the norm- 
generating community.
Donaldson (1982) and Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 1999) deal with corporate 
power through this social contract perspective where engagement is regulated by 
a web of implicit and explicit norms, which may not be of much help in an 
environment such as Nigeria, where there are heterogeneous groups with, at 
times, erratic demands. The existing explanations are based on assumptions about 
the socio-economic and cultural contexts of developed countries (Habermas, 
1984; Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002; Lesourd, Schilizzi and Pearce, 2002; Porter, 
M. and van der Linde, C; 1995) which may not be relevant for explaining how 
corporate power is negotiated in a developing country context.
The increasing economic and social power that corporations have, more than 
most governments in developing countries, have led to further attempts to 
conceptualise the business-society relationship. The corporate citizenship concept 
was introduced to imply a sense of belonging to a community (Matten et al., 
2003; Altman and Vidaver-Cohen, 2000; Andriof and McIntosh, 2001).The 
theories and approaches to corporate citizenship are focused on rights, 
responsibilities and possible partnerships of business in society.
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The term corporate citizenship can mean different things. Matten et al. (2003) 
distinguish three views of corporate citizenship. The first, the ‘limited view’, 
which is used in a sense quite close to corporate philanthropy, social investment 
or certain responsibilities assumed towards the local community. The second 
view is equivalent to CSR and as such is more common. The third is the extended 
view of corporate citizenship (Ibid.) according to which corporations enter the 
arena of citizenship. This view arises from the fact that some corporations have 
gradually come to replace the most powerful institutions in the traditional concept 
of citizenship, namely government.
What is common to all approaches to ‘corporate citizenship’ is that most authors 
generally converge on some points, such as a strong sense of business 
responsibility towards the local community, partnerships that are the specific 
ways of formalising the willingness to improve the local community, and 
consideration for the environment. Subsequently, MNCs have seized upon the 
notion and language of corporate citizenship to address the issue of their business 
responsibilities in both the global and local context (Tichy et al., 1997). However, 
Wood and Logsdon observed that “business citizenship cannot be deemed 
equivalent to individual citizenship - instead it derives from and is secondary to 
individual citizenship” (2002, p. 86). In addition, Carroll (1999) pointed out that 
“Corporate citizenship” seems a new conceptualisation of the role of business in 
society and depending on which way it is defined, he observes that the notion 
largely overlaps with other theories on the responsibility of business in society.
Although the notion of corporate citizenship is cast as a framework for 
conceptualising the role of business in a developing country context, little is 
known about whether the local political and institutional context would readily
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provide an enabling environment for the MNC to responsibly use its power and 
influence as a citizen, in engagement with local stakeholders. Since power is 
pervasive in stakeholder engagement, the discussion shifts from business’s 
responsible use of power in society, to the deployment of power in a multi­
stakeholder engagement framework. Besides Mitchell et al.’s (1997) instrumental 
approach, other definitions of power and conceptualisations of its use have the 
potential to provide ways of making predictive statements about how and to what 
ends companies may instrumentally use their power through stakeholder 
engagement.
Giddens’ (1994) view on power and domination is a potentially useful and 
complementary approach that can be closely linked to the instrumental approach 
to stakeholder engagement. Giddens’ views of power in terms of agency 
distinguish between two senses in which we may usefully speak of power, one 
broad, the other narrow. Power in the broad sense can be seen as the 
transformative capacity of human agency, where such capacity refers to the 
capacity of the actor to intervene in a series of events to alter their course. This 
capacity mediates between intentions and actual realisations of outcomes sought. 
Power in the narrow sense is relational, a property of interaction, and may be 
defined as the capacity to secure outcomes where the realisation of these 
outcomes depends upon the agency of others (Giddens, 1984). Giddens describes 
social power as interactive, relational and concerted. He argues that where 
transformative capacity is dependent upon the agency of others, manifestations of 
power are so implicated with domination. He further asserts that dependency 
upon the agency of others promotes the pursuit o f domination and compliance, 
not mutuality and concert:
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The use of power in interaction can be understood in terms of the resources 
or facilities, which participants bring to, and mobilise as elements of its 
production, thus directing its course. These include the skills whereby the 
interaction is constituted as meaningful, but also...any other resources, 
which a participant is capable of bringing to bear so as to influence or 
control the conduct of others, who are parties to that interaction, including 
the possession of authority and the threat or use of force (Ibid., p. 112)
Giddens’ concept of social power follows from a fundamentally teleological 
conception of power, and is overwhelmingly strategic, preoccupied with the 
acquisition and utilisation of power (Layder, 1985; Clegg, 1989). This power is, 
according to Giddens, generated through the acquisition and use of resources or 
capabilities and expressed in struggles and subordination. He argues that power 
does not come into being only when it is exercised. It can be stored up for future 
use (Giddens, 1976). The conceptual scope of his concept of power can be related 
to the institutional processes of interaction as used to accomplish outcomes in 
strategic conduct, and to structural properties, which can be drawn upon and 
reproduced through the activities of participating stakeholders in systems of 
interaction. Hence, power as transformative capacity can be taken to refer to 
agents’ capabilities of reaching such outcomes (Giddens, 1979). By extending 
this teleological and strategic conceptualisation of power, as resources and 
capabilities deployed strategically to achieve desired outcomes, Giddens’ 
approach can be related to the concept of self-interested rationality, which is 
central to Mitchell et al.’s instrumental view of strategic stakeholder engagement 
perspective.
From the perspective of business ethics, this is unequivocally a consequentialist 
approach, and as this appears in Giddens’ definition of power as deployed in the 
structures and processes of stakeholder engagement, the moral judgement is 
based on the intended outcomes, the aims and the goals of a certain action (Ibid.).
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Therefore it can be argued that power as referred to by Mitchell et al.(1997), and 
as explored by Giddens (1979), manifests itself instrumentally throughout the 
processes and structures for corporate interaction with social stakeholders within 
the structures of the firm, or between the firm and the external stakeholders.
Drawing on Giddens’s (1994) arguments, and considering stakeholder 
engagement as a means to an end, the end being profit maximisation, it can be 
assumed that power, in the form of knowledge or truth may be purposefully and 
instrumentally deployed to promote particular interests. As such, stakeholder 
engagement processes may be a means to realise the outcomes desired, and that 
this may involve preference shaping through discourse or other strategies of 
persuasion.
Harvey (1996) further defined power as persuasive capabilities based on relative
financial strength, whereby those possessing this form of power are likely to
influence those without it. Harvey outlines his position as follows:
Money [financial strength] is the basic form of knowledge in our society; 
to speak in money terms is always to speak in a language that the holder of 
social power understands and appreciates. Money acquires its value as a 
measure of values by means of a social process, but money (financial 
power) has a certain asymmetry to it, namely the fact that those who have it 
can force those who do not have it to do their bidding (p. 150)
Biersteker (1987) links power to the issue of control, which he defines as the 
ability of an actor to determine outcomes in a regularised and not necessarily 
institutionalised manner, with a reasonable degree of certainty over matters of 
importance. To him, control is rarely absolute and is best described in relative 
terms. Having relative control of a firm, an economic sector or a national 
economy implies having the ability to exert a major or dominant influence over it. 
This means having the ability to block unwelcome developments or to act
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unilaterally in important instances, to determine outcomes in important matters. 
Biersteker points to the fact that not everyone wants to control the same thing, 
given significant differences in terms of tastes and cultural preferences, and that 
this tends to prevent conflict over many issues. However, every actor wants a 
discretionary space to control at least those things that most directly affect his or 
her material well-being. The uncertainty that comes from having only limited or 
tenuous control is disruptive for both the economies and other entities that rely on 
economic performance for survival (ibid).
Extending this argument and relating it specifically to the Nigerian context, a
Least Developed Country (LDC) where the capacity to engage in competing CSR
discourses will be limited, we expect that MNCs will deploy their discursive
powers and discretionary space to influence the design and implementation of
CSR policies, on the basis of their perceived self-interest. Under these conditions,
Flyvberg (1998: 25) observed that:
Power defines what is rational in CSR practices, and that related choices 
are expressive of corporate power. This power would be readily deployed 
instrumentally to ensure control of the process, with the penultimate goal 
of addressing the elements of uncertainty related to its business portfolio.
Accordingly, the choice of CSR policies and the practices of MNCs may be 
perceived as a rationalisation of the power relations between the firm and its 
global and local CSR stakeholders. Hence, the knowledge claims that support 
such rationalisation of distinctive CSR policy choices are also tied to stakeholder 
power relations, so that power defines what comprises knowledge in any 
situation. Foucault’s approach to power, discourse and knowledge is reflected in 
current MNC and globalisation debates, and particularly finds expression in the 
debates about the nature of the structural context of globalisation of trade, which 
constitute the primary context within which MNCs operate. Many CSR critics are
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also staunch critics of the current globalisation process, which they regard as 
unfair, denying poor countries the opportunity of equal access to rich countries’ 
markets, resulting in unequal outcomes in terms of well-being (Daly and 
Townsend, 1993; Nader, 1993). Paradoxically, the current trade regime remains 
intact,2 despite decades of debate, as it is a reflection of the prevalence of 
developed country discourses on international trade (Jenkins, 1987; Madeley, 
1995).
However, there are other forms of power that have generated heated debates 
among the critics of MNCs in developing countries in particular, and especially 
ideological power (Sklair, 2002; Korten, 1995). The starting point of this 
literature is the role of MNCs in the Third World, and the extent to which their 
investment helps or hinders development. As such, this critique is characteristic 
of the dependency school of thought, which has been in longstanding opposition 
to globalisation, and the role of MNCs in developing countries.
Its main contention, the so-called “global reach” argument (Barnet and Mueller, 
1974; Korten, 1995) is based on the notion that foreign investment is part of the 
strategy of globalising firms and not simply a resource flow. The main focus of 
global reach is the market power of MNCs. Theorists root this in an analysis of 
the oligopolistic advantages that MNCs possess, including access to capital 
(internal to the firm and external), control of technology (process and product), 
marketing through advertising, and privileged access to raw materials. The firm, 
because of its size and reach, is allowed more power at its discretion than smaller 
local companies and other stakeholders. MNCs are seen as global institutions that
2
See: UK Prime Minister Tony Blair Says World Should Tackle Trade Injustice, 10 Downing Street, and
21 November 2005.
http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show_ntl .asp?d=0&i= 10048&L 1 =&L2=&a=40391
69
actively and intentionally produce imperfect markets in order to extract the most 
profit from operations throughout the world. Therefore, there is no such thing as 
free competition. Instead of MNCs increasing efficiency throughout the world, 
they reduce it by making markets less perfect because of their own need to 
control, reduce or eliminate competition and maximise surplus acquisition.
Thus, there is increased concentration, i.e. smaller and smaller numbers of 
wealthier and more powerful corporations, in sectors where they are active. For 
example, since the 1950s there has been a concentration of power within the oil 
MNCs sector that controlled technology (expertise), access to capital and markets 
(Fee, 1988). Critics of this so-called concentration of power assert that the way in 
which MNCs amass wealth contributes to class polarisation, and produces 
development effects that mostly benefit the corporation and those connected with 
it (Sklair, 2001). However, given the current competition over access to resources 
such as oil, and the fact that technology and venture funds are available on the 
world market, this view gives a dated and distorted view of the current situation. 
Moreover, developing countries have gained more power and influence than was 
the case decades ago. As such, these views are unsubstantiated (Rwabizambuga, 
2008).
A key notion is the discursive power that MNCs possess over locals and the 
contention that reality is the product of contests over meaning between actors 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This perspective is historical in its approach and 
explains why certain phenomena are identified or ignored as social problems, in 
different periods. For Foucault (1980), discourse entails a power/knowledge 
dynamic, within which there are literally some things that cannot be thought, said 
or done. Such an approach to discourse is not limited to the poststructuralists. It is
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informed by the Marxist analysis of a dominant ideology, where the ruling classes
maintain their power through ideological means. For example, building on
Gramsci’s concept, Sklair (2001, 2002) declared that:
The historical bloc that TNC reformists have created is to ensure that 
development (almost entirely defined in terms of economic growth) and 
sustainability (heavily conditioned by the technical capacities of capitalist 
globalisation) are inextricably linked. All that is possible is done to 
distance global capitalism from the sources of environmental problems 
(Sklair, 2002; p. 276).
In addition, some radical authors have suggested that MNCs benefit from 
protection from their home countries, which might be compelled to go to war 
should their assets be threatened by the host country. They argue that the more 
powerful the home country of a MNC, the less likely the MNC is to be affected, 
since the home country may threaten to attack the foreign country for threatening 
its national interest. This can be accomplished, as in the case of Britain and its 
colonies in the interwar years, by military threats and promises of arms; or it may 
be accomplished, as in the case of the United States and Germany in the late 
1960s, by strong trade ties and a perceived mutuality of interest in preventing 
systemic collapse. In the hegemonic periods of Pax Britannia and Pax Americana, 
such coercive power and systemic control was important if not essential to the 
strength of their international currency (Strange, 1997); Bergsten, 1975, Epstein, 
1985). However, these attempts to frame the power of MNCs in terms of coercive 
power are not grounded in any empirical evidence. The only empirical evidence 
that exists refers to past colonial experiences.
Other critics of MNCs point out situations where MNCs have been involved in 
violent conflicts and severe human rights violation. For example, Shell was 
widely blamed for not intervening to prevent the murder of Saro Wiwa. The
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perception is that Shell wields a lot of power in Nigeria, and could have tempered 
the murderous drive of the then authorities.
However, other researchers have rejected the idea that MNCs are powerful and 
can shape preferences in developing countries. For example, Blanchard’s (2004) 
study, which focuses on pharmaceutical companies vs. developing countries 
engagement over HIV-Aids medication, refutes the globalist argument by 
showing that the developed countries triumphed even though tangible factors 
pointed to a different outcome. He argues that if  there is coercion in a MNC, it is 
less coercive power tactics - ranging from torture to death - than a subtle 
negotiation between a subsidiary and a parent company.
It is also argued that CSR practices of MNC subsidiaries at the local level have 
adopted similar practices as local firms in an attempt to compete more effectively 
in the local markets (normative isomorphism) or to “fit in” by imitating local 
practices (mimetic isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Instances of 
“coercive isomorphism” for legally stipulated behaviours are evident in local 
practices of the subsidiaries for example with regard to working hours’ regulation 
or training budgets for employees across global operations.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the controversial and multiple interpretations of CSR. 
The evolution of these debates has also been propitious for the active involvement 
of business in shaping the CSR discourse, particularly in formulating specific 
interpretations determining individual CSR policies and practices at firm level. In 
particular, business has actively promoted the business case approach to CSR, as 
this relates to the operational aspects of the corporations. Consequently, the
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chapter reviewed how CSR is explained from the RBV of the firm, and extended 
this perspective by linking it to notions of the licence to operate and corporate 
legitimacy. The combination strengthens the explanatory power of the RBV. 
Furthermore, the chapter discussed the stakeholder engagement perspective. 
Within this perspective, the notion of power and its different conceptualisations 
were discussed and related to corporate stakeholder engagement in the developing 
country context.
The RBV is useful in the present thesis, as a framework to consider how the CSR 
agenda (policies and practices) maps on to the company’s business operations and 
what the context and rationale for implementing specific CSR investments is, as 
outlined in section 1.4. It is used along with the stakeholder engagement 
perspective, which allows for the exploration of the motivations of the oil MNCs’ 
contributions in terms of addressing the potential social and environmental 
impacts of their activities, playing an affirmative role in terms of their 
development responsibilities through stakeholder engagement. Both perspectives 
provide the opportunity to examine corporate behaviour from both the internal 
(business value perspective) and the external (societal) perspective. The next 
chapter examines the literature on MNCs, CSR and development, with a focus on 
the oil sector in developing countries in general, and in Africa in particular.
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Chapter Three
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MNCs IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the discourse of CSR theory and practice, focussing on how 
the CSR agenda is translated into practical operational practices in the local 
context. Firstly, it critically explores the evolution of the discourse on CSR and 
the governance of MNCs. Secondly, it critically engages with the CSR and 
development discourse, where CSR practices in Africa are set against local 
development expectations. Thirdly, it reviews the current CSR and business 
strategy discourse at Shell with particular emphasis on understanding the 
influence of stakeholders - such as the government, and civil society - on the 
ways that CSR policies and practices are respectively formulated and 
implemented. The literature reviewed provides an analytical framework to guide 
the data analysis in subsequent chapters of the thesis.
3.2 CSR and the governance of MNCs
The governance of MNCs’ global activities is a major issue within the CSR 
movement that has been the subject of heated and polarising policy and academic 
debate. In particular, the pressing demands to regulate MNCs has gained 
momentum and mainstream credibility in the light of huge environmental
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disasters such as Union Carbide’s gas leak and explosion, which killed more than
3,000 people in Bhopal in 1984, the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the Alaskan coast 
in 1989, and the Ogoni crisis in Nigeria in 1996.
This has forced MNCs to centre stage in the CSR movement and has led to 
increased interactions with civil society, state and international organisations. The 
increasingly high profile of MNCs has essentially been based on the increasing 
recognition that environmental risks are not predominantly produced by MNCs, 
whereas the state has lost most of its regulatory power vis-a-vis the powerful 
MNCs, particularly in the developing world (Strange 1996, 1997). The standard 
argument holds that a globalising economy integrated only by the market and 
transnational capital is eroding the power of nation states to address problems of 
public concern adequately (Beck, 1995). In this view, the concept of sovereignty 
and the resulting national economic policies are being undermined while nation 
states have become unnatural and even dysfunctional as actors in a global 
economy (Ohmae, 1985).
It has been further suggested that the state-based system of global governance is 
struggling to adjust to the expanding reach and growing influence of transnational 
corporations (Ruggie 2007). States, in the organisational form of government, are 
less and less capable of regulating the activities o f business actors within their 
territories due to processes of de-nationalisation and de-territorialisation (Korten, 
1995; Hertz, 2001).
However, others have partially dismissed the above as sheer alarmism, while 
arguing that although the balance between states and transnational economic 
actors has shifted considerably, states still hold the fundamental powers to 
restrain business activities (Rugman, 2000; Weiss, 1998) and do possess the
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capacity to adapt to changing economic circumstances. Gilpin (2001) and 
Doremus et al. (1998) argued that the ‘global corporation’ is in fact a myth. The 
authors point out that just as the Pax Britannica provided a favourable 
international environment for the overseas expansion of British firms and 
investors in the late 19th century, so American leadership following World War II 
provided a similar favourable international environment for the overseas 
expansion of American and other capitalist firms. While MNCs depended on their 
home countries then, Doremus (Ibid.) argues that they still heavily depend on 
their respective home economies.
Other authors assert that what has changed is the advantage that corporations hold 
vis-a-vis states, created by the free-market environment, de-regulatory state 
policies, welfare state dysfunctional ties and the power structure within the inter­
state system (Bemauer and Achini, 2000; Scott 1997). Fuchs (2004) pointed out 
that there is a risk that undifferentiated claims of a global political rule of 
corporations may not capture the complexities of current developments in the 
political role of business. His study of the different dimensions of power that 
business actors possess in the global economy suggests that claims of a lack of 
business influence on politics or severe limits to such influence should be met 
with scepticism. As outlined in the next section, the above issues are also 
reflected in the heated debates over the governance of MNCs in developing 
country contexts.
3.3 MNCs in developing countries
The long standing debates about the role of MNC operations and their governance 
has re-emerged in the CSR debate, fuelled by the expansion of MNCs in
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developing countries. The contested role of MNCs’ CSR initiatives in developing 
countries is unfathomable unless we revisit the discourse on the role of MNCs in 
developing countries. Although a growing number of developing countries have 
embraced FDI as a route to economic development, there is a strong critical 
tradition that rejects the argument that the growth of FDI and the involvement of 
MNCs are beneficial for the socio-economic development of developing 
countries.
Whilst MNCs have played a critical role as vehicles of FDI flows to developing 
countries, this relationship has been clouded by decades of malpractice, such as 
the misuse of power and neglect of the social and environmental impacts of their 
operations in developing countries (Jenkins, 1987). Hence, critics of the 
dependency school and the anti-globalisation movement, consider the 
involvement of MNCs in the development process of developing countries as 
detrimental. They assert that it will possibly lead to increased social and 
environmental deterioration and conflicts between local forces and cultures, and 
the new forces of global capitalist production (Bamet and Muller, 1974; Pack and 
Saggi, 1997; Lall, 2000; Madeley, 1999; Jenkins, 1987; Sklair, 1995).
Advocates of the economic development perspective, however, dismiss the 
criticisms of the dependency school and argue that the involvement of MNCs in 
developing countries through FDI will boost local economic development leading 
to increased employment opportunities, infrastructure development and 
technology transfer (TT) (Dunning, 2002; French, 1997; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; 
Reuber 1973, Rugman, 1996). They view CSR as an opportunity for businesses to 
respond to their social and environmental responsibilities, and believe that 
significant changes in business practices are underway as a result of widespread
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adoption of CSR agendas by an increasing number o f MNCs (Dryzek, 1997; 
Holiday et al., 2002).
The underlying concern and ultimate objective of the regulation of MNCs in the 
CSR discourse focuses on how best to promote corporate responsible behaviour 
with regard to the social and environmental impacts of corporate business 
activities. As outlined in the next section, this has led to heated debates about how 
to ensure corporate compliance with required standards of behaviour, with the 
mechanisms for ensuring corporate accountability, transparency, participation and 
fair and equal access to opportunity for all stakeholders.
3.4.1 Evolution of MNC regulation and the emergence of a voluntary 
approach
The institutional forms of business regulation have shifted considerably in the last 
three decades. This shift is often analysed as a transition from state-led mandatory 
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, both at national and international levels, to 
corporate self-regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s, to cooperative rule- 
making between NGOs and business actors, in the last ten years (Utting 2004).
It is argued that new forms of private governance through self-imposed codes of 
conduct emerged at the intersection of two recent developments. First, the 
growing number of industry self-regulation and standards setting schemes 
(Gibson, 1999). Second, the predominantly confrontational relations between 
companies and civil society that led to the emergence of partnerships as a pos­
sible mode of interaction. Business (transactions) and NGOs (values) (Wadell, 
1999) engage in the development and subsequent implementation of voluntary 
regulation on a global scale.
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The earliest intergovernmental attempts after the Second World War to exercise 
some influence on the behaviour of corporations can be found in the 1948 Havana 
Charter of the International Trade Organisation (ITO). This document includes 
provisions on the policies of governments towards MNCs, as well as the conduct 
of MNCs themselves. But the United States’ withdrawal from die process in 1950 
and its support for an alternative General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) halted this early regulatory initiative (Bendell, 2004).
The debate on the international regulation of MNCs re-emerged in the 1960s 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2005) partly triggered by the new won independence of many 
developing countries and their resulting interest in maintaining control over 
foreign investment and the actual behaviour of foreign companies, while at the 
same time exploiting the economic benefits of foreign capital and innovations. 
The related debate on a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the 
resulting declaration that was adopted in 1974 by the UN General Assembly 
paved the way for a renewed discussion on regulating MNCs.
From the 1970s, a few international institutions emerged from these debates. In 
1974, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established a 
Commission on Transnational Corporations and the UN Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) as its permanent research bodies. In 1976, the OECD 
established a set of voluntary Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In the 
same year, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) produced the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. 
In late 1980, the UN General Assembly adopted a Code on Restrictive Business 
Practices drafted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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(UNCTAD) (Abrahams, 2004). It is argued that these regulatory initiatives mark 
the peak of international approaches to establish binding behavioural norms for 
transnational business actors.
By the early 1980s, these modest regulatory initiatives were already in retreat. 
One possible explanation for this development is the substantial shift in interna­
tional economic policy-making that accompanied the election to Prime Minister 
of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and to President o f Ronald Reagan in the USA. 
Classical economic liberalism highlights the unrestricted market as a mechanism 
to govern international trade and investment more efficiently. During the 1980s, 
only a few of the international codes envisaged in the previous decade could be 
implemented (Richter, 2001) and by 1992, the UNCTC failed to incorporate its 
draft on environmental regulations for MNCs in Agenda 21.
However, voluntarism may have seen its first appearance with the emergence of 
The OECD Guidelines, which according to Rowe (2005), were used to forestall 
the compulsory control being sought through the UN. 1976 thus marks the entry 
of the voluntary code of conduct into the business strategic repertoire. For 
example, companies and business associations began to devise and implement a 
range of self-regulatory systems to reassure the public of their social 
responsibility, triggered by several social and environmental catastrophes, such as 
the Bhopal accident and the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and supported by the 
economic orthodoxy of neo-liberalism. One example of such a self-regulatory 
system is Responsible Care (RC), the chemical industry’s international pro­
gramme on environmental, health and safety standards. Since its inception in 
Canada in 1985, RC has developed into a global initiative, covering more than
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85% of the world’s chemical production in 47 countries (European Chemical 
Industry Council, 2002).
Civil society has followed this trend through so-called civil regulation, which 
emphasises the strong role of external demands by civil society organisations in 
policing business behaviour by generating independent standards for corporate 
responsibility to affected communities (Newell 2001; Bendell and Murphy, 2002; 
Zadek, 2001), and by pressuring MNCs into compliance. Civil regulation 
involves collective processes often characterised by loose forms o f social 
organisation. According to Zadek (2002) and Beck (1992), these are 
manifestations of political acts capable of affecting business performance through 
their influence on market conditions and are capable of governing corporate 
affairs as non-statutory regulatory frameworks. Despite their controversial 
enforcement tactics, such as the use of direct action protests following corporate 
breaches of human rights or environmental standards in their home countries or 
abroad, civil society organisations have adopted cooperative modes of interaction 
with industry, through multi-stakeholder dialogue and public-private partnership 
forums, such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) to engage in and debate on CSR related issues.
Currently, in many contexts, many forms of CSR are based on self-regulation 
with the understanding that firms comply with self-imposed practices. However, 
critics of self-regulation reject the idea that MNCs can be trusted to self-regulate, 
which is seen as pure “green-wash” (Rowell, 1996). Critics point to the fact that 
much of the business activity has been around corporate opposition to regulation, 
including moves overseas, while their anti-regulatory dogma has grown into 
corporate moves to pre-empt international accountability. They point to the
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substantial gap between discourse and practice, with regard to virtually every 
code and standard, due to shortcomings in monitoring and enforcement and 
limited demand for responsibly produced products (Ibid.).
Critics argue that relatively little progress has been made in addressing most of 
the social and environmental problems that voluntary codes and corporate 
commitments have sought to ameliorate, and point to the fact that in sectors such 
as the extractive industries, investments continue to be associated with significant 
human rights and environmental abuses (Friends of the Earth (FoE), 2003). They 
argue that corporations should not be trusted and left to regulate themselves 
(Rowell, 1996; Hawken, 1994; Vogel, 2005).
In addition, there has been some scepticism regarding the effectiveness of civil 
regulation in developing countries (Bendell, 2004). The effectiveness and success 
of civil regulation in governing corporate behaviour is regarded as problematic in 
LDC settings, where local civil society, which is often weak, is generally lacking 
information, knowledge, know-how and mobilisation.
These shortcomings have prompted many to believe that society may still be far 
from entering a new era of responsible corporate management and has yet to 
approach a tipping point for CSR (Vogel, 2005). Moreover, it is further argued 
that although CSR may be in its early stages, the greater emphasis and efforts 
deployed in defining and implementing its new norms and standards might 
provide a solid foundation for better CSR performances in the future, if there is a 
growing public interest in this (Vogel, 2005). Despite the prevalence of 
voluntarism, there have been calls to impose a stricter regulatory framework for 
MNC activities, as outlined in the next section.
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3.4.2 Arguments for a strict regulatory approach to MNCs’ activities
The starting point for the corporate accountability approach is based on a number 
of considerations. First, those calling for the global regulation of MNCs’ 
activities have argued that the globalisation process has obfuscated state power. 
Within the current economic order - which is largely organised around 
transnational capital in terms of ownership, management and relevant 
stakeholders such as shareholders, suppliers and consumers (Ruggie 1982), 
MNCs have emerged as the new powerful actors in the era of globalisation, while 
they remain largely unrestrained by domestic regulation. There is sufficient 
empirical evidence supporting the assumption of the increasing power of MNCs.
Firstly, statistics on FDI show an increase in economic activities taken by large 
MNCs. Between 1981 and 1985, annual FDI flows equalled $50 billion on 
average and by 1990, and they had reached over $240 billion, and continued to 
rise steadily to a new peak of $612 billion in 2004. As a consequence, the stock of 
FDI in relation to world GDP doubled from 4.9% to 9.7% between 1980 and 
1994. The actual importance of transnational corporations in the world economy 
is even greater than these figures indicate, because FDI accounts for 
approximately 25% of total investment in international production. Foreign 
affiliates often finance their expansion through retained profits and borrowing on 
the domestic or international capital markets (Held et al. 1999: 246). Secondly, 
the substantial increase in MNCs is unprecedented. Their number has risen from
7,000 in 1970 to over 40,000 in 1995 (Karliner 1997: 5). Already in 2001, the 
number of transnationals had peaked at 63,312, controlling 821,818 affiliates 
abroad (UNCTAD, 2001: 242). Thirdly, the sheer size of MNCs’ operations is 
testimony to their powerful financial power. For example, the annual sales of
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General Motors (GM) exceeds the GDP of industrialised states such as Norway, 
Finland and Israel (Love, Hensman, and Rodrigues, 2000: 255). In addition, the 
$5 trillion sales annually generated by the MNCs’ foreign affiliates exceed the 
total volume of international trade. Consequently, only 49 of the largest 100 
economies are states (Love and Love, 2003). Moreover, the top 300 global firms 
account for one-quarter of the world’s productive assets. Fourthly, the realisation 
of the role of MNCs’ influence on world politics, which manifests itself on a very 
practical level. For example, critics point to the considerable ecological footprints 
of MNCs which consume huge quantities of resources such as water, energy and 
raw materials and produce enormous quantities of waste, and transform the envi­
ronment through resource extraction (Rowlands, 2001; Wackemagel, 1997). 
Fifthly, the legitimacy of MNCs’ local activities is often called into question. The 
depiction of the operational context of MNCs in developing countries is framed 
on claims that they faced difficulties in sustaining the legitimacy of their activities 
in contexts where there are legal and institutional gaps. It is generally argued that 
weak states may be unable to bring MNCs to internalise the costs of 
environmental externalities related to their activities (Lesourd, Schilizzi and 
Pearce, 2002). It is further claimed that given the rising power of corporations 
against the increasingly weak states, especially in developing countries (Korten, 
1995; Hertz, 2001) the latter will be unable to bring corporations to account (Gray 
et. al, 1997; Zadek et al. 1997; Korten, 1995).
The so-called regulatory gap left by failing traditional political institutions in 
developing countries has fuelled growing popular concern, and calls for stronger 
government regulation of MNCs operating in developing countries. 
Consequently, it is argued that the regulatory gap could be filled by civil society 
organisations as a promising new political arena of sub-politics, where civil
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society actors could promote efficient political regulation for critical issues such 
as social and environmental threats from the economic activities of corporations 
(Beck, 1992; Jenkins, 2001). For example, in 1992, the Office of the High 
Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) recognised that the international 
trading system has social, environmental, cultural and legal dimensions that affect 
human rights (OHCHR, 1999, art. 2). While a company is not legally obliged 
under international law to comply with these standards, those companies that 
have violated them have found, to their cost, that society at large condemns them 
(Frankental and House, 2000:23). Zadek (2001) suggests that the emergence of a 
normative code of conduct that is championed by CSOs is a step in this direction.
Advocates of a stricter regulatory framework for CSR draw on instances of 
corporate failure and abuse of power to suggest that CSR (which is based on 
voluntarism) is a weak alternative (Jenkins, 2005). As such, they dismiss the idea 
that corporations could voluntarily adopt socially and environmentally 
responsible behaviour, drawing on the history of grassroots protests against 
pollution and environmental harm associated with the activities o f big 
corporations (Grossman, 1994; Rowell, 1996). From this perspective, CSR is 
seen as a defensive tool against public criticism or simply as a Trojan horse used 
by business to colonise the environmental debate and pre-empt international 
accountability for purely economic reasons (Dowie, 1995; Rowell, 1996; Jenkins, 
2005; Lemer, 2005).
Proponents of the accountability school strongly advocate for increased 
regulation, and argue that the impact of voluntarism will be modest until the 
codes of conduct are binding (Zerk 2007; Zadek, 2001; Vogel, 2005). For 
example, Zerk (2007) argued that while international law has its limitations, it is
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also capable of supporting new regulatory opportunities that have the potential to 
improve the welfare of people and communities affected by multinationals’ 
activities, particularly in LDC. She further makes a strong argument for a 
traditionalist, state-centred approach to CSR.
The NGO community generally supports public policies that promote mandatory 
disclosure requirements and often accuses corporations of using CSR as a way of 
avoiding regulations. For example, Friends of the Earth’s criticism of British 
American Tobacco is an illustration of the above.3 Public regulation is 
increasingly viewed as the only way of ensuring compliance with environmental 
standards (Vogel, 2005; Zadek, 2002). This is based on the argument that MNCs 
are likely to comply with minimum standards, for fear of breaching statutory 
guidelines and incurring penalties. Proponents of the accountability perspective 
argue that government regulation is more effective than a voluntary approach to 
CSR, because it does not require that there be a business case for corporate 
expenditures to improve CSR performance. Compliance is easier to monitor, and 
misreporting and violations can be legally penalised which would result in far 
more rapid improvements than CSR.
However, the criticism that has been levelled at state-based regulation is the lax 
attitude of regulatory institutions, the risk of cooption and the suggestion that 
regulation prevents or inhibits MNCs’ propensities to adopt beyond compliance 
practices. In addition, this literature seems to ignore the fact that developing 
countries will be faced with challenges associated with regulatory enforcement. 
For example, previous research has highlighted the weakness of the Nigerian
3 See Friends o f the Earth’s comments about British American Tobacco’s CSR policies as “British American 
Tobacco report shows the truth behind Greenwash. Companies that have something to hide use CSR to deflect 
attention and discourage regulation. But such CSR should clearly be treated with a pinch of salt”. 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/british_american_tobacco_r_27042005.html
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regulatory framework in the country’s oil industry, and has highlighted its lack of 
enforcement capabilities. This casts some serious doubts on the effectiveness of 
stricter regulation for MNCs in the country. Moreover, increased regulation has 
often proved counter-productive and been associated with high transaction costs 
coupled with regulatory failure in the 1970s (Gouldson and Murphy, 1998).
Besides governance issues, the discourse on CSR in developing countries has 
highlighted a number of important issues that are specific to local contexts and 
that must be addressed by the CSR agenda of MNCs. These include community 
development, environmental protection and stakeholder relations -including 
government, communities and the civil society.
3.5 CSR and development
The emergence of CSR practices in developing countries is a relatively new 
phenomenon (Utting, 2002). However, Blowfield and Fiynas (2005) assert that 
there is a longstanding tradition that businesses are expected to, and do in fact get 
involved with activities that satisfy social obligations. It has also been argued that 
CSR practices vary according to location and context because moral, ethical and 
cultural traditions vary from place to place. Consequently, Hamann (2006) argued 
that this leads to recurrent tensions between universal expectations and local 
challenges and opportunities.
According to Fox (2004), the northern-centred nature of the CSR agenda risks 
being insensitive to southern priorities, while it may potentially harm or distort 
the prospects for sustainable livelihood in the south. As such, tensions may have 
emerged from the fact that CSR and the underpinning values and principles are 
largely driven by northern actors and stakeholders, while southern perspectives
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are not being adequately represented (Fox et al., 2002). Fox et al argued that 
southern perspectives are needed in order to better inform corporate policies and 
practices, leading to a better appreciation of how CSR can contribute to 
development in the south.
The criticism levelled against the mainstream CSR agenda is that it has been 
selective with regard to what it has chosen to address, leaving out important 
issues that should be an integral part of the CSR agenda. For example, it has been 
pointed out that issues of unsustainable development, structural issues of under­
development, and poverty reduction have not been addressed (Utting, 2003; 
Murphy, 2004). The omission of such priorities and realities in developing 
countries has made mainstream CSR irrelevant to local contexts and actors 
(Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Fox, 2004; Utting, 2003).
Fox (2004) and Newell (2006) further indicate that the necessary conditions 
underlying mainstream CSR in the north do not exist in a developing country 
context. For example, the business case approach is deemed problematic and 
misleading in terms of explaining the determinants of the CSR agenda in 
developing countries. Whereas the dominant view is that what drives the business 
case for CSR are the factors relating to efficiently functioning market institutions, 
pressures from highly informed and mobilised consumer groups, regulatory 
pressures, globalisation and local community pressures (Hoffman and Ventresca, 
2002; Lesourd, Schilizzi and Pearce, 2002; Porter and van der Linde, 1995), these 
conditions presume a developed country context where these conditions prevail. 
There is not always a business case for CSR in developing countries, because 
some drivers widely publicised in mainstream CSR are often irrelevant in 
developing countries, or non existent (Utting, 2003; UNRISD, 2003; Newell,
2006). Furthermore, critics of the mainstream CSR agenda, and developing 
countries point out that northern NGOs and northern MNCs, which seek to 
impose their own perspectives of what CSR is and does (Amalric et al., 2000) 
mainly drive CSR. Others assert that the CSR pressure from the north is borne out 
of a disguised self-interest (Utting, 2002; 2003).
CSR has also been criticised for resisting the demand for a broader scope in order 
to accommodate the concerns of local stakeholders. For example, issues that may 
threaten the business interests of MNCs but which are driving the CSR agenda 
are often ignored and instead countered with lofty goals driven by the concerns of 
western actors (Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
These criticisms highlight the importance of context and the need to adopt a 
pluralistic approach to CSR. For example, western and developing countries’ 
priorities may differ significantly in terms of the shape, nature and obligations 
MNCs can be expected to address in developing countries, and may affect the 
outcome of their initiatives to meet social obligations. As such, these debates 
have highlighted the significance of different institutional environments and their 
implications for CSR practices (Frynas, 2005). There have been recent calls for a 
south-centred (Utting, 2003), more critical (Jenkins, 2005), and more 
development oriented (Fox, 2004) CSR agenda.
As such, the emerging CSR agenda for developing countries has been shaped by 
the interaction between CSR practices and local contexts, as well as development 
issues. Some literature focuses on exploring the relationship between CSR and 
contextual issues (Moser, 2001), by attempting to determine the potential and 
limitation of CSR policies and practices in developing countries (Newell, 2006). 
This literature has emphasised the failure of the CSR agendas of MNCs
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originating from the north, which are underpinned with certain moral values that 
do not correspond to those of developing countries communities.
Others have attempted to reflect on southern priorities by focussing explicitly on 
the ways in which CSR may be linked to development and poverty reduction 
(Ward, 2004). They emphasise the role of government in providing the “enabling 
environment” as a necessary condition for CSR in the South. The state is not only 
an important role player in enforcing or motivating CSR, state institutions 
themselves have much to learn from the principles and practices associated with 
CSR, although they fall short of providing an enabling environment for CSR 
(Utting, 2002; Fox, 2004). In most developing countries, such an environment is 
mainly lacking or ineffective. As a consequence, some have argued that the 
developing country environment is hostile to CSR, while others highlight the 
need to develop a better understanding of the drivers of responsible business 
practices in the south, while seeking for ways to sustain and respond to them, and 
reorient CSR tools to address southern stakeholders’ concerns (Fox et al., 2002; 
Fox, 2004).
Despite these calls for a contextual analysis of CSR that encourages southern 
approaches and takes into consideration local needs, realities and cultural 
differences, there is a realisation that priorities vary from country to country and 
that it may therefore be difficult to establish a unique southern CSR agenda. 
Furthermore, there is also the realisation that the current mainstream CSR agenda 
that is centred on the business case for CSR does not allow for the appreciation if 
not space for other approaches informed by the wider institutional environments.
r
As such, some have called for a pluralist approach to CSR (Gond and Matten, 
2007).
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However, whether the indigenous CSR conceptions are not integrated in CSR 
agendas at the level of practice is an assertion, for which there is no empirical 
evidence. In particular, there is a need to address this shortcoming by exploring 
the ways in which local development may inform the priorities of stakeholders in 
negotiating the CSR practices of western-based MNCs.
3.S CSR practices in developing countries
The current state of CSR practices in developing countries is, according to Utting 
(2002) difficult to assess due to a number of shortcomings inherent in existing 
analyses of the relationship between CSR and development. The basis for 
measurements varies and remains contested, and depends on whom and for whom 
the evaluation is being made (Waddock and Smith, 2000; Greenfield, 2004). In 
addition, although there are some common features in developing countries, the 
CSR practice landscape differs from place to place.
Differences in the state of CSR practices were highlighted and attributed to the 
role that governments play in either hindering or enabling CSR practices 
(UNRISD, 2003). Utting (2002) argued that CSR practices were influenced by 
historical factors and cultural relationships. For example, factors such as the 
emergence of a strong civil society such as in South Africa following Apartheid 
(Visser, 2006), and the strong role of the church in some countries such as Brazil 
plays a big role in promoting CSR practices. The political changes towards 
democracy and redressing the injustices of the past have been a significant driver 
of CSR, through the practice of improved corporate governance (Visser, 2005a).
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It has also been argued that the socio-economic environment in which firms 
operate and the development priorities this creates influence CSR practices of 
MNCs. Amaeshi et al. (2006), for example, argues that CSR in Nigeria is 
specifically aimed at addressing the socio-economic development challenges of 
the country, including poverty alleviation, health-care provision, infrastructure 
development and education.
CSR is also seen as a response to governance challenges, a way to plug the 
‘governance gaps’ left by weak, corrupt, or under-resourced governments that fail 
to provide adequate social services (housing, roads, electricity, health care, 
education, etc.). Matten and Crane (2005) also suggest that companies enter the 
arena of citizenship where government has not as yet administered citizenship 
rights, for example, improving working conditions in sweatshops, ensuring 
employees receive a living wage, and financing the schooling of child labourers 
in the absence of legislation requiring this. However, Acutt et al. (2001) argue 
that CSR is an inadequate response to these governance gaps and that more 
proactive involvement in moving local governance towards accountability and 
inclusiveness is necessary. There are also serious questions about the 
dependencies this governance gap approach to CSR creates (Blowfield and 
Frynas, 2005).
There is in addition the issue of perceived complicity between governments and 
companies (Ite, 2004). Blowfield and Frynas (2005) see it as ‘an alternative to 
government’ (p. 502) which is ‘frequently advocated as a means of filling gaps in 
governance that have arisen with the acceleration of liberal economic 
globalisation’. Moon (2002a) argues that this is part of a broader political shift 
towards ‘new governance’ approaches, whereby governments are increasingly
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seeking to share responsibilities and to develop new modes of operation, whether 
as a result of overload or of the view that they do not have a monopoly of 
solutions for society. This is often in the form of social partnerships with non­
profit and for-profit organisations.
Furthermore, CSR is seen as driven by the need to access the market. This is 
based on the notion that CSR is driven by the urge to turn the 4 billion poor 
people in the world into consumers (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; London and 
Rangan et al., 2007). CSR is also seen as an opportunity for companies in 
developing countries to access markets in the developed world. For example, 
Baskin (2006) identifies competitive advantage in international markets as one of 
the key drivers of CSR. Visser (2005a) points out that there is ample evidence 
that industry codes and standards are a key driver for CSR in developing 
countries (Baskin 2006; Schrage and Ewing, 2005; Kolk and van Tulder, 2000). 
The involvement of these actors has contributed to changes in corporate reporting 
and corporate international association with international codes of conduct. 
However, critics pointed out that it remains questionable whether this has led to 
an increase in responsible practices at the operational level (Hamman, 2006; 
Welford, 2004).
Other drivers of CSR in developing countries include the pursuit of investment 
incentives (Baskin, 2006); requirements that are being imposed by multinationals 
on their supply chains, which began with various ethical trading initiatives 
(Blowfield, 2003, 2004); and the outcome of micro-level struggles between 
companies and communities over the distribution of social and environmental 
hazards which are created when global political and economic forces interact with 
local contexts around the world (Lund-Thomsen, 2004). As in the case of Nigeria,
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CSR has been driven by local community violence and international pressure 
(Rwabizambuga, 2007b). It has been suggested that civil society and its 
institutions are often too weak to drive CSR without external support in Africa. 
Consequently, as will be discussed in the empirical chapters (Chapter 7 and 8), 
international civil society organisations have been heavily involved in African 
countries, and have played a strong role alongside weak local NGOs in driving 
CSR practices (Utting, 2002). The twin effect of stakeholder salience and 
international reputation effect has largely driven CSR practices in some 
developing countries, whereas in other places such as South Africa (Visser,
2007), local and domestic actors have been the main drivers of CSR.
Heavy criticism has been levelled against MNCs’ CSR agendas in developing 
countries. The main criticism of CSR practices in developing countries includes 
the allegation of greenwashing and the claim that there are gaps between 
corporate rhetoric and practice (Christian Aid, 2004; Frynas, 2005). In addition, 
critics have pointed out that corporate contributions to social issues have been 
dismal especially when corporate charitable donations are pitched against 
corporate profits (Fig, 2005). Utting (2002, 2003) asserted that CSR practices in 
developing countries have generally been uneven, contradictory, and restricted to 
only some sectors.
3.6 CSR, development and the enabling environment
Many researchers in CSR and development have highlighted that the business 
case may not exist in some contexts, and hence the perspective lacks explanatory 
power for studying and understanding CSR policies and practices in developing 
countries (Holliday et al., 2002).
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Businesses have a series of internal and external drivers, which together may 
generate a business case for particular actions that can include the pursuit of new 
business opportunities through social and environmental innovation (Ibid.). The 
attempt to demonstrate a general business case for CSR as an undifferentiated 
whole has been misleading and counterproductive for three reasons. First, acting 
as a responsible company involves countless individual decisions, each of which 
may have a positive or negative impact. Even if  a company gains business 
benefits from responsible actions in one area of its activities, there is no reason 
that this will be the case across the board. The business case for CSR as a whole 
is therefore spurious. Secondly, the business case for particular actions differs 
according to various factors including the company’s visibility, location, size and 
ownership structure, and the sector and market segments in which it operates. 
Thirdly, the business case literature often underemphasises certain drivers. For 
example, adherence to legislation is often taken as a given, as many of the case 
studies relate to businesses operating within a strong regulatory environment, i.e. 
the Western context. However, where enforcement is weak, which is the case in 
many developing countries, compliance may be problematic. Thus, regulation and 
its enforcement should be treated as a potential driver. Some drivers based on 
cultural norms, for example in relation to philanthropic or paternalistic activities, 
also tend to be ignored (Visser, 2006).
Other researchers have pointed out that a business case-centred approach to CSR 
is based on certain assumptions based on the West that are irrelevant to a southern 
context (Jenkins, 2005, Newell, 2006; Frynas, 2005). Consequently, Fox et al.(
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2002) point out that these factors have contributed to an almost exclusive focus 
on the business case for large, high profile companies operating (or with 
stakeholders) in the North, much of which is irrelevant to the majority of 
companies in the South. There is therefore an urgent need to develop a better 
understanding of the drivers of business in the South, but also ways to build, 
broaden and sustain them where they currently do not exist. This inevitably 
implies a strong role of the state, not simply in its conventional mandating 
capacity, but also as facilitator, partner, and endorser (Fox et al., 2002).
The enabling environment perspective has emerged as an attempt to establish the 
conditions under which CSR policies and practices may succeed in addressing 
local issues. It is based on the attempt to emphasise the central role of 
government and government policy in creating favourable conditions for CSR 
initiatives in developing countries. Fox and Prescott (2004) emphasise the vital 
role of human and institutional capacity in generating localised support for CSR. 
They point out that in many countries in the South, where the drivers for 
responsible business are weak; the capacity o f public sector and civil society 
organisations to intervene to reinforce these drivers is also weak. They further 
point out that this needs to be addressed at a number of levels; they suggest a 
more active role of government agencies and public governance frameworks to 
strengthen the implementation of existing regulation and to understand and 
engage with the wider CSR agenda. In addition, they call for businesses and 
business associations such as chambers of commerce, progressive business 
leadership groups, and trade associations to engage business organisations that 
can support good practice in SMEs and domestic businesses within developing 
countries. They view the role of civil society, workers' organisations and 
specialist local intermediary organisations as essential for providing advice and
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support on CSR not only to companies but also to governments and other actors. 
This increases the relevance and sensitivity of the CSR agenda to the local 
context.
According to Ward (2004), the necessary conditions for developing the above 
capacities lie in capacity building efforts, and the establishment of supportive 
tools, that include legislation and regulation, labels and certificates, codes of 
conduct, partnerships, guidelines, management systems and awards. The priority 
here is to ensure that the tools are in line with the development needs of affected 
stakeholders in the South. In sum, this view calls for government playing an 
active role to facilitate the CSR agenda and generate maximum development 
benefits. Ite (2004) observed that while the role of government is vital, it requires 
that government plays an active role; instead of being passive and leaving 
development responsibilities on the shoulders of MNCs as has been the case in 
the Nigerian oil sector.
3.8 The role o f government in CSR
Guarini and Nidasio (2003) explored how governments should shape 
policymaking, performance measurement and reporting in order to facilitate 
interaction with responsible business practices. He concludes that the voluntary 
CSR practices of private firms are not and cannot be an effective substitute for 
good governance. Government also play a mandating role by defining minimum 
standards for business performance. Ward et al. (2007) pointed out that 
government could encourage the CSR agenda by supporting the debate over 
transnational legal risk management, compliance and enforcement issues. For 
example, the South African government recently intervened as a third party in
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favour of the claimants against a company, reinforcing the message that grossly 
exploitative investors are not welcome in the new South Africa.
Ward et al. (2007) further points out that in addition, government can drive 
mandatory requirements through voluntary CSR practices, for instance by 
requiring corporations to comply with child labour standards within their 
procurement contracts with suppliers. For example, the Thai Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare set up an Office on Labour Standards Development to address 
lack of enforcement on labour issues and to promote compliance with voluntary 
labour standards, because of the pressures that their producers were increasingly 
facing through supply chain demands.
Government can also play a facilitating, partnering or endorsing role, by helping 
to raise expectations about business behaviour in stakeholder groups including 
employees, consumers, investors and NGOs (Fox et al., 2002; Ward et al., 2007). 
This can help tilt the market so that socially and environmentally responsible 
products are more attractive to consumers. For example, The Philippines 
government has decreed by presidential decree that the first week in July should 
be “CSR week”; while Taiwan established the annual Green Business Award 
scheme in 1992 as a way of rewarding best, environmentally performing 
companies (Fox et al., 2002). Whereas it is a business initiative to achieve ‘win- 
win’ goals for all stakeholders, it is argued that government should help to ensure 
the compatibility of CSR policies with other public policies. This distinction is 
important because it underlines that it is the role of government to design and 
deliver public policy, to which business may contribute through CSR initiatives 
(Ibid.).
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Rowe (2005) further observed that the business case approach to CSR tends to 
view the public sector as independent, and not subject to other external factors, 
such as structural conditions that may affect government’s ability to assist in the 
emergence and sustenance of an enabling environment for CSR. Rowe argues that 
business and government have to get past the idea that the business-case is all that 
it is necessary to worry about, i.e. that if one can persuade business that it is in 
their commercial interest to be more responsible then this will be a sufficient 
incentive for better business practices. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the discussion 
of CSR in developing countries has been selective, in the sense that several main 
issues that are specific to developing countries were not included in the definition 
and conceptualisation of CSR (Jenkins, 2005; Newell, 2006). For example, 
structural issues are not taken into consideration despite their potential to hinder 
public policy. In addition, there are other factors not taken into consideration, 
such as the resource curse that has faced Nigeria in the last decades, and the 
prevailing necessity in most developing countries to attract FDI, forcing them to 
lower their regulatory standards.
Despite the limitations of the literature in terms of providing a conceptual 
framework for considering CSR and the role of government in developing 
countries, the above attempts to identify and classify government’s role may 
guide an investigation into the role of the government in Shell’s CSR agenda in 
Nigeria.
3.9 CSR practices and stakeholder engagement in Nigeria
99
National CSR agendas are generally the product of historical and cultural factors, 
and they often continue to mature according to the prevailing economic and 
political priorities of countries. In Nigeria, there has been proactive promotion of 
CSR initiatives, particularly in the oil sector. However, Ite (2004) points out that 
the implementation of CSR as a business strategy is new, whereas Frynas (2000) 
and Akpan (2006) claim that deception may be the most probable outcome of 
these CSR initiatives.
It is argued that CSR policies and practices are continually evolving, as most 
MNCs seek to tailor their corporate strategy for meeting CSR obligations, to meet 
the demands of their social environment (Obadare, 2006). For example, Shell’s 
CSR programme evolved from small-scale community assistance programmes in 
the 1960s, to community development in the 1990s, and sustainable community 
development in 2004 (SPDC, 2004). Manby (1999) and Frynas (2000) point out 
that while Shell’s community development budget was only a modest US $ 
30,000) in 1989, it rose more than 1,000% in 1998 after the Ogoni crisis, which 
led to communal clashes, hostage taking and kidnapping (SPDC, 2004). This 
dramatic rise in CSR investment was an attempt to respond to increasing 
community pressure to do more while improving the impacts of the community 
development assistance. However, critics argue that Shell’s CSR policies are in 
effect an exercise in public relations and will only have marginal impacts on 
community development (Christian Aid, 2004; Frynas, 2005).
What makes CSR practices in Nigeria somewhat different from other places is 
that the country’s business environment presents numerous challenges to oil 
MNCs’ business operations. There are issues of ethnicity, poor social, political 
and economic governance, and widespread corruption, all of which pose
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significant challenges for business and CSR practices in the country (Frynas, 
2005). CSR is stronger in the oil sector, since companies here are often under 
public scrutiny, and make the headlines in the national newspapers. However, Ite 
(2004, 2006) suggests that conflict in Nigeria and in the oil production regions of 
the Niger Delta makes CSR practices very difficult, and limits the positive 
impacts of CSR initiatives.
CSR is a useful framework for exploring corporate stakeholder relationships and 
a means by which businesses frame their attitudes, strategies and relationships 
with their stakeholders (Wheeler et al., 2002; Jenkins, 2004). In Nigeria, a 
number of local stakeholder groups are taken very seriously by the oil companies, 
which collaborate through different forms of relationships. The rise o f these 
groups as salient stakeholders in the oil industry is owed to a number of factors. 
Firstly, oil exploitation has left significant negative social and environmental 
impacts on the local community and the local environment. Secondly, the fact 
that these multi-billion dollar operations take place in a region that has been 
subject to abject and pervasive poverty has put the companies in the limelight of 
international and local scrutiny (Frynas, 2000). This has prompted mounting 
criticisms against the oil industry for their part in the social and environmental 
deterioration of the oil producing regions of Nigeria.
Humphreys (2002) noted that the oil companies’ alliance with local stakeholders 
gives a competitive edge in a sector where there are limited opportunities to gain 
competitive advantage from product and price differentiation. Consequently, 
stakeholder engagement has been elevated to centre stage in the strategic business 
thinking of oil MNCs in Nigeria. However, Jenkins (2004) argues that the 
significance of stakeholder engagement rests on the need for companies to obtain
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licences for continued exploration (on community lands) and the imperative to 
sustain legitimacy, reduce the costs of operation, and sustain a long-term 
beneficial relationship.
3.9.1 Stakeholder engagement in Nigeria
The presence of MNCs has been a persistent feature of the economic landscape in 
Nigeria. Today, there are five major oil companies including the Shell group, 
ExxonMobil, Chevron Texaco, Agip and TotalFinaElf. Critics of their CSR 
agendas, Shell’s CSR policies and practices in particular, point to the fact that 
these are essentially driven by the pursuit of the licences to operate in the face of 
ever-increasing community conflicts that cause delays in crude oil exploration, 
and associated costs (Christian Aid, 2004; Frynas, 2005). The notion of the 
licence to operate originates from earlier debates on CSR and the role of 
corporations as social institutions (Davis, 1960). It is based on the thesis that the 
company’s licence to operate defines what it can and cannot do. It draws on the 
so called “iron law of responsibility”, the capacity of stakeholders to undermine 
corporate activities in case the latter does not use its power responsibly. It also 
draws on Carroll’s (1991) pyramids of CSR combined with the notion of internal 
and external stakeholders in the firm. While companies obtain the licence to 
operate from governments, they also need to obtain the social licence to operate 
from local stakeholders, such as the local communities (Burke, 1999). According 
to Jenkins, the challenge facing the CSR strategy of MNCs is how to define 
relationships with stakeholders and respond to stakeholders’ rapidly changing 
demands (Jenkins, 2004). The idea that is emerging is that CSR should be built 
for the long term and emphasise mutual respect, benefit and trust, sustained 
commitment (Waddock and Boyle, 1995; Humphreys, 2000).
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In Nigeria, it is argued that, although CSR has led to some investment in the 
social infrastructure, the effectiveness of CSR as a vehicle for development 
(Frynas, 2005). For example, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) 
(2004) asserts that the social investment it makes towards community 
development has paid off, given the decrease in community conflict, whereas 
over 70% of projects funded by Shell are not functional, are unsustainable or do 
not address core community needs (Ibid.). As such, these debates suggest that 
there is a need for systematic research that looks at the role of stakeholders in 
negotiating CSR practices, and how stakeholder engagement can maximise 
MNCs’ contribution to development through their CSR policies and practices.
3.9. Concluding remarks
The chapter has explored CSR implications for MNCs’ operations in developing 
countries. It has examined the debates relating to the role of CSR in the global 
governance of corporations in developing countries, and the conditions under 
which CSR is most effective in terms of enabling sustainable development 
objectives, with reference to Africa, and most particularly the Nigerian context. 
The validity of the CSR agenda for developing countries and its potential for 
development was discussed, and the gaps in mainstream CSR literature were 
highlighted with regard to its inability to address specific conditions under which 
the CSR agenda is implemented in developing countries. In particular, the chapter 
considered legal and regulatory debates associated with MNCs’ international 
activities. In addition, it explored existing debates on the role of MNCs in 
developing countries through CSR policies and practices. The Chapter critically 
examined CSR and development, and how this link is hindered or facilitated by
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government. A framework for assessing the CSR practices of MNCs with regard 
to development and the role of government in CSR was explored, and will be 
instrumental in the data analysis later in the thesis. The next chapter outlines the 
methodological framework for the thesis.
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Chapter Four
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodological considerations and debates that guided 
the present research. It highlights and justifies why a case study approach was 
chosen and further outlines the research tools used. It explains how data 
collection and analysis were conducted guided by the research objectives and the 
research questions introduced in Chapter 1 and underpinned by the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 2 and 3. The Chapter concludes with a summary of 
retrospective remarks based on the researcher’s field experience.
4.2 Methodological issues and research implications
The debates on research methodology have led to long-standing disagreements 
between advocates of qualitative and quantitative methods (Sayer, 2000). The 
debates initially portrayed both approaches as irreconcilable, and in terms of the 
superiority of one method over the other (Sayer, 2000; Bryman, 1984). 
Conceptual differences at the level of data, method and theory were highlighted 
and strongly emphasised by those who advocated a clear distinction and 
separation between the two (Zelditch, 1962). These differences were considered 
so fundamental to research that any choice of a particular research method was 
seen as a reflection of epistemological and ontological orientations of the 
researcher towards research (Biyman, 2004).
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While acknowledging the different epistemological and ontological paradigms 
underpinning the two approaches, some researchers have downplayed their 
alleged differences (Bryman, 1988). They argued that existing differences were 
subtle, rather than major distinctions (Hammersley, 1992), and that suggested 
linkages between research methods and philosophy are not deterministic, but 
based on associations (Ibid.). Shared properties between quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Bryman, 1984) were highlighted, indicating their possible 
combination in research. It was further argued that the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative research limits the armouries at the researchers’ 
disposal, and as such, the idea of incommensurability (Kuhn, 1970) of research 
methods was questioned along with the supposedly inherent relationship between 
research methods and philosophical orientation.
Hammersley (1992) pointed out that since the connection between method and 
epistemology has not been demonstrated in social sciences, there is no reason to 
believe that there was a necessary connection between research methods and 
epistemological position. Sayer (2000) further suggested a shift towards a 
research strategy that combines both approaches, arguing that the emergence of 
critical realism as a philosophy of social sciences and a methodology that draws 
on epistemological and ontological orientation of positivism and interpretivism 
strongly supports arguments for combining the different research perspectives in 
research. However, others have warned that although quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be integrated technically, this does not presuppose that the 
epistemological issues pertaining to the two approaches are readily reconciled 
(Bryman, 1984).
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This thesis has applied qualitative research. Creswell (1998) further defined 
qualitative methods as an inquiry process of understanding that explores a social 
or human problem, and in which the researcher builds a complex, holistic 
picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the 
study in a natural setting (p. 15). According to Marshall and Rossman (1999), it 
enables the researcher to delve into complexities and processes in depth, by 
exploring where and why policy and local knowledge are at odds. This fits the 
interpretative tradition of qualitative research (Sayer, 2000), which seeks to 
understand a situation from the point of view of participants. The methods 
normally used are interviews, observation, and analysis o f documentary materials. 
As such, qualitative research was applied as the most appropriate strategy, based 
on the research questions posed (Section 1.3). As explained later in the chapter 
(section 4.3), the research questions in this study focus on the perceptions and 
meaning and understanding of individuals and groups (Shell executives and 
representatives of stakeholder organisations) in relation to their beliefs and 
preferences, and individual as well as group action.
4.3 Research tradition and case study approach
While adopting a qualitative research strategy, the research is based on a single 
case study of Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria. The choice of a case 
study approach was essentially motivated by its inherent qualities that make it the 
most suited methodological approach for this thesis.
According to Hamel et al. (1993), the case study methodology emerged from the 
early 1900s until 1935. However, throughout the 1930s the use of case study 
research was shrouded in controversial disputes between various epistemological
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schools of thought. Whereas the Chicago University department of sociology 
championed a case study research method, it was rejected by other schools of 
thought, and criticised for lacking scientific rigour as compared to quantitative 
methods. This led to a consequent decline in the use of case study as a research 
methodology. However, in the 1960s, researchers were becoming concerned 
about the limitations of quantitative methods. Hence, there was a renewed interest 
in case study, particularly used in conjunction with the emergence of the concept 
of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which mostly relied on the use of 
the case study methodology.
Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984, p. 23). According to Zonabend 
(1992), the key characteristic of the case study methodology is that case study 
research is conducted by giving special attention to completeness in observation, 
reconstruction, and analysis of the cases under study. The essence of a case study 
is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions in terms of why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what results (Schramm, 1971).
Yin (1994) further asserts that although the body of literature in case study 
research is limited in comparison to that of other research methods such as 
experimental or quasi-experimental research, case studies remain the only viable 
alternative in some instances. It enables the researcher to work with the situation 
that presents itself in each case, and is conducted in a way that incorporates the 
views of the actors in the case under study.
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Feagin et. al. (1991) suggest that the main characteristic of case studies is that 
they strive towards a holistic understanding of cultural systems of action, 
referring to sets of interrelated activities engaged in by the actors in a social 
situation. They further assert that multiple perspective analyses are preferred 
while conducting case study analyses, since the researcher would typically 
consider not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant 
groups of actors and the interaction between them. Since the problem in case 
studies is to establish meaning rather than location, the unit of analysis in case 
studies is typically a system of action rather than an individual or group of 
individuals.
Stake (1995) further argued that case study research is not sampling research 
whereby the researcher is held down to any minimum number of cases or to 
randomly select cases. Case studies have boundaries and tend to be selective, 
focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system 
being examined. However, Stake (1995) pointed out that selecting cases must be 
done to maximize what can be learned, in the period available for the study.
A frequent criticism of case study approach is that its dependence on a single case 
makes it incapable of providing a generalizing conclusion. Giddens (1994) 
critically pointed out that case methodology was“microscopic” because it ‘lacked 
a sufficient number’ of cases. However, Hamel (Hamel et al., 1993) and Yin 
(1984, and 1994) forcefully defended the case study, arguing that the relative size 
of the sample does not transform a multiple case into a macroscopic study. They 
argued that the goal of the study should establish the parameters, and then should 
be applied to all research. In this way, even a single case could be considered 
acceptable, provided it met the established objective. They maintained the
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argument that case studies can be single or multiple-case designs based on 
replication rather than sampling logic.
Furthermore, Snow and Anderson (1991) suggested that case study research is a 
triangulated research strategy that occurs with data, investigators, theories, and 
even methodologies. However, critics argued that the assumption underlying 
methodological triangulation, that combining methods ensures validity of data, is 
naive (Bryman, 1988; Brannen, 1992).
They pointed out that, on occasions, there are uncertainties when for example, 
qualitative evidence does not confirm quantitative results or vice versa, to which 
the researcher does know how to respond. However, Brannen (1992) minimised 
this concern by suggesting that data are considered in close relation to the 
questions and theories that generated them. Whereas the need for triangulation 
arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes, Yin (1984) 
asserts that in case studies, this is done by using multiple sources o f data. He 
further maintained that the generalization of results, from either single or multiple 
designs, is made to theory and not to populations (Yin, 1994).
4.4 Case study selection and implications for this research
According to Yin (1984), the main justifications for selecting a case study 
approach include firstly, when the single case represents a critical test of a 
significant theory; secondly, when the single case represents a revelatory case 
study where a researcher obtains access to a situation previously inaccessible to 
scientific observation; and thirdly, when the case being investigated is unique. 
Topics mentioned in connection with case study research are decisions,
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individuals, organisations, processes, programmes, neighbourhoods, institutions 
and events. According to Yin,
“We can identify some situations in which a specific strategy has a 
specific advantage. For the case study, this is when: A "how" or “why " 
question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the 
investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 1984 p 20).
1 In this research, an in-depth case study approach was applied based on its 
methodological suitability with the thesis’s main research questions. As 
mentioned above and in earlier sections of this Chapter, the properties of a case 
study approach make it the most appropriate methodology for this thesis. First, 
the study of CSR practices of Shell in Nigeria is considered a revelatory case. The 
company’s social and environmental performance is as contentious as its 
interaction with local stakeholders. sensitive issue needed further explorationT 
Shell’s CSR practices have not been directly investigated, and from such close 
proximity, since the company implemented its ambitious CSR programme in 
Nigeria. Second, the researcher was granted access to the organisation, which was 
not common. This access was a unique opportunity to research a single case study 
in seeking to understand organisational and managerial processes involving the 
company’s CSR agenda in Nigeria. (Thus, a single case study strategy is justified 
given that its aim is to illuminate a decision or set of decisions, why they were 
taken, how they were implemented. Furthermore, Shell’s operations in Nigeria 
have taken place within a unique context for the last 10 years, and the company’s 
CSR policies and practices in this context reflect that uniqueness. Thus, a single 
case study approach is compatible with the need to build theory in an area where 
little data and theory exist, and where controlled opportunism could be directed to 
responding flexibly to new discoveries made in the collection of new data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Third, the research questions posed led to an intensive
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investigation into the practices of MNC activities over which the researcher had 
no influence, and was conducted in the company’s real operational context in 
Nigeria. Lastly, the nature and content of the thesis’s research questions have 
steered the research towards the MNC’s organisational and managerial processes, 
context of changing neighbourhood/ institutional relations, global and local 
corporate-stakeholder engagement, and the nature of the oil industry’s CSR 
agenda in developing countries.
Consequently, a mixed methods strategy was adopted. For example, an online 
survey and elite interviews were both used in data collection. While the first was 
more appropriate for addressing the question of ‘what’, the second was useful in 
addressing the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’. Combination of both was good for 
exploring the different aspects of the research problem (Brannen, 1992). This 
multi-strategy was beneficial to the present research process in different ways. On 
one hand, the survey was used to respond to questions regarding what the interest, 
expectations, role, and occupation of the various stakeholders are. On the other 
hand, understanding how the various stakeholders’ objectives and negotiating 
strategies come into play during the stakeholder engagement process was well 
suited with interviews. As such, data analysis benefited from the insights 
generated from the different methods. For example, while the questionnaire 
survey allowed for the identification of the commonalities amongst stakeholders 
in terms of location, roles, and expectations, the data generated from interviews 
were helpful during the explanation of these observations. The thesis central 
research questions include:
1. What are the drivers of Shell’s CSR strategies manifested in policies and 
strategies?
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2. What are the main pillars of Shell’s CSR programme in Nigeria and what is 
the internal implementation process in terms of delivery, and how are the 
different elements of the programme justified?
3. How do CSR projects map on the company’s business operations and what 
are the context and the benefits for implementing CSR investments?
4. What is the geography of stakeholders of Shell in Nigeria? 
la. what are the interests they represent?
lb. what is the source of their legitimacy in engaging Shell’s CSR 
programme?
5. What is their understanding of CSR obligations and what are the 
assumptions/rationale underlying their claims?
6. How do they understand the role of Shell and their relationships to the 
company?
7. What are their distinctive expectations and claims from Shell?
8. What is the expectation of the company from stakeholders?
9. How does CSR address development in Nigeria, and how does this fit with 
the country’s resource curse problems (Governance, accountability, 
corruption, over-consumption, structural problems)?
10. What are the ways in which the government is participating in CSR 
(Facilitating, endorsing and partnering), and what is the relationship between 
the government and Shell?
These research questions led the thesis’s investigations towards three main 
objectives. Firstly, to establish what determines MNCs’ CSR policies and 
practices in a developing country context. Secondly, to provide understanding of 
the role of stakeholders in negotiating MNCs’ CSR policies and practices in a 
developing country context. Lastly, the role of government in facilitating CSR 
initiatives and in creating an enabling environment for CSR, in order to achieve 
optimal development outcomes.
I would agree with Punch (1994) in his description o f the politics of fieldwork 
that the nature of the research topic, the researcher’s competence, status, 
institutional background, and personality, the sympathy of the gatekeepers and 
the organisational expectations in terms of feedback from results, all played a role
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in negotiating access. In selecting the company and negotiating access, a number 
of factors created enabling conditions for the researcher: Firstly, the business 
sector selected was one with which I was familiar through previous training and 
operational experience in energy management. As such, the experience with oil 
exploration and production business generated interest amongst some gatekeepers 
in the organisation who were interested in the outcomes of the research.
Secondly, my experience as a business consultant and a UN employee in West 
Africa was a valuable preparation in negotiating access and establishing a 
positive rapport with Shell Nigeria’s gatekeepers, while forging trusting 
relationships with them. Thirdly, the thesis supervisors facilitated access to some 
part of the Shell Nigeria personnel and those in other stakeholder organisations 
whose members were interviewed during field research. Finally, the researcher 
benefited from the assistance of some LSE Alumni who held senior positions in 
Shell Nigeria.
4.5 Case study design, analysis and validity issues
After selecting the case study company, the case study protocol was developed. 
Firstly, the thesis’s research questions and propositions were re-stated to direct 
attention to the phenomena to be examined, while appropriate units of analysis 
resulting from the primary research questions were selected to establish the logic 
linking the data to the propositions, and to relate several pieces of information 
from the same case to some theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975). Secondly, 
the criteria for interpreting the findings were established. As Yin (1984) suggests, 
it is expected that in the case study protocol, statements will be made to clarify 
what is to be explored, the purpose of the exploration, and the criteria by which
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the exploration will be judged successful. As such, the theoretical framework is 
the level at which the analytical generalisation of the case occurred. In studying 
the organisation, embedded units might be process units - such as meetings, roles 
or locations. The following sub-units were considered in the light of the 
objectives, research questions and propositions outlined in Table 4.1. These 
include:
• Stakeholder engagement processes (identification, stakeholder 
consultation, stakeholder relations).
• Corporate CSR management (policy planning, internal content and 
process management, operational guidelines, reporting and assurance).
• Government policies, and the regulatory framework for the oil sector in 
Nigeria,
• Existing social and environment pressures
• CSR and business strategy at Shell in Nigeria, business strategic factors 
and operational constraints vs. stakeholder demands.
In a case study, the analysis focuses on the perceptions of the participants, and 
how they experience and give meaning to a particular phenomenon or the lived 
world (Creswell 1998). This interpretative approach is further reflected in Kvale 
(1996) as follows:
“The conception of knowledge as a mirror of reality is replaced by a 
conception of the social construction of reality, where the focus is on the 
interpretation and negotiation of the meaning of the social world (...) the 
multiplicity of meanings in local contexts; knowledge is perspectival, 
dependent on the viewpoint and values of the investigator”(p.41).
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which
there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and causal
complexity (Ragin, 1987) where the direction of influence between two variables
depends on the third variable and may be difficult to determine. In this case, Yin
(1994) suggests that the propositions can be evaluated in terms of explanation
building, which is based on narratives, in which the final explanation may not
115
have been fully stipulated at the outset of the study. The result relies on multiple 
sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulated fashion, and 
on a prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 1984).
In order to maintain the quality of the research, the research followed Yin’s 
(1984) recommendations about ensuring that the research observes the criteria of 
construct validity, internal and external validity, and reliability. Table 4.3 presents 
these criteria, the caveats provided by Yin (1984), and the way in which these 
quality assurance issues were dealt with in this research.
Table 4.1 Dealing with Validity Issues in this Study
Issue Definition Suggestion Case study
Construct
validity
Establish correct 
operational measures for 
concepts studied
Use multiple sources of 
inquiry (Test convergence of 
multiple lines of inquiry).
• Use of reports from Shell and other 
stakeholders including NGOs, Academia, 
the media, government documents, and 
market research.
• Elite interviews and audio recordings of 
stakeholder engagement proceedings.
• On-line survey of Shell’s stakeholders in 
Nigeria.
Internal Differentiate from Data triangulation See above
validity spurious relationships o
<
Theoretical 
tri angulation
Use of three main perspectives
u
1
2H
Methodological 
tri angulation
• Use of document analysis;
• Elite interviews
• Online survey
External 
validity or 
theoretical 
validation
Establish domain to 
which study findings 
can be generalised to in- 
depth study to validate 
theory.
Pattern matching 
Explanation building 
Time series analysis
They are applied through coding and analysis of 
text around themes from interviews, 
documentary analysis, and online survey.
Reliability Operations of the study 
can be repeated with 
same results
Analytical generalisation 
Define object of study
Elite interview transcripts and questionnaire 
were prepared. They are stored on audio and 
video cassettes, as 111 as PCs.
4.6 Data collection methods, process and tool
Data collection was based on multiple sources. I followed Yin’s (1984) advice 
regarding the strategies of data collection that are mostly used in case study 
research. As presented in Table 4.3, Yin (Ibid.) makes some recommendations 
about the sources of evidence and their strengths and weaknesses. I primarily
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collected data through semi-structured elite interviews, and drew on documentary 
sources including corporate annual reports and position papers, UN and an on­
line survey of Shell’s stakeholders. To maximise the benefits of the various 
sources of evidence, Yin’s (1984) principles for data collection were applied by 
using of multiple sources of evidence, creating a case study database, and 
maintaining a chain of evidence. The rationale for using multiple sources of 
evidence in a case study is that it allows the investigator to address a broader 
range of historical, attitudinal, and behavioural issues. It enables the researcher to 
develop converging lines of inquiry, so that findings or conclusions are likely to 
be more convincing and accurate.
Data triangulation allows the potential problem of construct validity to be 
addressed, because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon (Yin, Bateman, & Moore, 1983).
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Table 4.2 Research objectives, questions and propositions
Research objective Research questions Research propositions
1. Examine of how Shell implements its CSR 
programmein Nigeria, both in light of strategic 
objectives associated with the company’s business 
operations, and the oil company’s social 
responsibilities and environmental liabilities. 
Understanding of the link between corporate 
objectives and CSR initiatives and the role 
stakeholders play in negotiating CSR initiatives.
1. What is the nature of Shell’s CSR strategies manifested in 
policies and strategies?
2. What are the main pillars of Shell’s CSR programme in 
Nigeria and what is the internal implementation process 
in terms of delivery, and how are the different elements 
of the programme justified?
3. How do CSR projects map on the company’s business 
operations and what is the context and rationale for 
implementing specific CSR investments?
The CSR agenda of MNCs in developing countries and in Nigeria are aimed as:
1. As a defensive strategy, a form of assurance against any potential, business- 
related negative impact.
2. A long-term value maximisation through the pursuit of:
o The legal licence to operate, in a context where there is intense
competition for access to oil resources, and where bad publicity may have 
business and political implications, 
o As a social licence to operate, given that social communities have
increasingly demonstrated that they can defy the government as well as the 
MNC oil companies, to disrupt business operations, 
o The pursuit of legitimacy as important for mending damaged reputation in 
Nigeria and abroad, 
o The economic licence to operate, as dictated by the economics of 
petroleum exploration and production. As such, in a capital-intensive 
business, time and local politics are crucial variables that affect the 
performance of such business.
2. Explore forms of stakeholder relationships with the 
oil company, as well as identify the different contexts 
within which the different categories of stakeholders 
make sense of their relationship with the oil 
company. Addressing how stakeholders’ relationship 
with the company may influence its CSR policies and 
practices, and how the dynamic interaction between 
the company and its stakeholders affects their 
engagement.
1. What is the geography of stakeholders of Shell in 
Nigeria and what are the interests they represent, and 
the source of their legitimacy in engaging Shell’s CSR 
programme?
2. What is their understanding of CSR obligations and 
what are the assumptions/rationale underlying their 
claims?
3. How do they understand the role of Shell and their own 
relationships to the company?
4. What are their distinctive expectations, and claims 
from Shell?
5. What is the expectation of the company from 
stakeholders?
1. Strategic stakeholder engagement at Shell Nigeria is mostly aimed to pacify 
stakeholders that potentially represent a business threat.
2. CSR policies are implemented in ways that vary in scope and substance 
according to the strength of the local society in terms of access to information, 
resources, capacities, and capabilities to engage with and possibly mobilise 
against the oil company’s operations.
3. CSR policies are implemented in ways that vary in scope and substance 
according to the strength of the local society in terms of access to information, 
resources, capacities, and capabilities to engage with and possibly mobilise 
against the oil company’s operations.
4. A weak institutional context in Nigeria has enabled Shell to pursue its value 
maximisation agenda through its CSR policies.
3. Exploring forms the interaction of CSR programmes 
and the host country’s development framework. In 
particular, the role of the state as enabler, vs. that of 
multinational companies and their CSR initiatives in 
the development policy agenda for developing 
countries.
1. How does CSR address development in Nigeria, and 
how does this fit with the country’s context resource 
curse problems (Governance, accountability, 
corruption, over-consumption, structural problems)?
2. What are the ways in which the government is 
participating in CSR (Facilitating, endorsing and 
partnering), and what is the relationship between the 
government and Shell?
1. The government has weak regulatory institution and unable to regulate the 
sector adequately
2. Shell is much stronger than the government, has more resources, and is better 
organised. By benevolently engaging in the supply of social services.
3. Shell’s position is an opportunity for the company to actively engage the 
government. Shell may avoid being perceived as being close to the 
government, especially as the latter is struggling to mend its long damaged 
reputation because of its dictatorial regimes, corruption, and weak governance, 
and lack of transparency in the matters of national oil revenues.
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A case study database was created, as data was systematically stored on 
computer disks, audio and video cassettes. The fieldwork notes, tabular 
material and other narratives relevant to the case study were stored as separate 
interview notes and all material is available on request. Finally, research 
reliability was ensured through the case study protocol outlining the 
methodological procedures that were followed. More specifically, the 
evidence collected was consistently linked back to the research questions and 
citations to the relevant portions of the case study database, and referencing 
specific documents, interviews and observations that were made.
Table 4.3 Sources of Evidence
Sources of 
Evidence
Strengths Weaknesses
Archival 
records and 
documentation
• Stable-can be reviewed 
repeatedly
• Unobtrusive-not created as a 
result of the case study
• Exact-contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event
• Broad coverage-Long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings
• Retrievable-Can be low
• Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete
• Reporting bias-reflects(unknown)bias of 
author
• Access-may be deliberately blocked
Interviews • They are targeted and 
focussed directly on the case 
study topic.
• They provide insights about 
perceived causal inferences
• There is a risk of bias associated with 
poorly constructed questions
• Inaccurate response due to poor recall.
• Risk of reflexivity, for example when the 
respondent says what the interviewer 
wants to hear.
Participant
observation
Reality-Covers events in real 
time
Contextual-Covers context of 
events
Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives
• Time consuming
• Selectivity-unless broad coverage
• Reflexivity- event may proceed 
differently because it is being observed
• High costs
• Bias due to investigator’s manipulation of 
events.
In addition, different portions of the case study were cross-referenced to the
methodological procedures and to the resulting evidence, in such a way as to 
draw out the chain of evidence collected as described in the following 
sections.
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4.6.1 Using semi-structured elite interviews
As mentioned above, semi-structured interviews were the main source of 
primary data. What characterises semi-structured interviews is that although 
the main interview questions are specified, the interviewer can seek both 
clarification and elaboration on the answers given, and record qualitative 
information about the topic. This allows the interviewer latitude to probe 
beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee (May,
1997). It is believed that semi-structured interviews allow people to answer on 
their own terms, and are useful in situations where the researcher has a 
specific focus for the interview. The context o f the interview is an important 
aspect of the process, compared with the structured method. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted as the main data collection methodology because 
of the need to understand the different perceptions and perspectives of the 
actors involved in CSR policy planning and implementation within the 
organisation. The respondents were ‘elite’ members of the organisation. The 
elites are usually well informed and they played a key role in the policy 
subsystem (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). According to Richards and Smith 
(1999), elites are by definition: “less visible and are more conscious of their 
own importance. The interviewee has the power (in Sabot, 1999, pp330). A 
preliminary list of respondents from various stakeholder groups (See Table 
4.4) was drawn up through the snowballing method. As Herod (1999, p. 316) 
points out:
“[The researcher] often found that being able to use someone’s name or 
having a letter of introduction and /or business card has given [him] access to 
high level officials in other organisations that might otherwise have ignored 
my request for help”.
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Table 4.4 Stakeholder groups, role and location of respondents
Stakeholder group Respondents (role and location)
Shell • CSR executives at the headquarters and in Nigeria
• CSR middle managers and employees at the headquarters and in 
Nigeria
• Members of the SPDC joint-venture in Nigeria
Civil society • Representatives of environmental and human rights NGOs
• Representatives of community groups
• Representatives of development agencies in Nigeria and the UK
Public/government • Representatives of the local governments in oil producing regions
• Regulatory agencies
Other • Members of academic institutions
• Competitors
On some occasions, respondents wanted to see which other members of the 
same organisation the researcher had interviewed, and eventually agreed to 
attend the interview. The respondents from Shell included current and former 
gatekeepers in the organisation. They responded positively and expressed high 
expectations about the outcome of the research. They generally claimed that 
academic researchers were an important stakeholder group for the 
organisation. The information provided was very useful in documenting 
changes in the organisation’s CSR agenda over time. Issues related to CSR 
and stakeholder engagement have received special attention by Shell 
management since the mid 1990s. Moreover, as Rhodes and Marsh (1992) 
stated, “it takes 5 to 10 years for effects of a policy to emerge. Any 
comparison must take place over time” (cited in Ward and Jones 1999, p. 5).
There are a number of risks associated with the interview process. First, the 
researcher was aware of reaction to various constraints (such as time, content, 
reluctance of corporate executives and advisors) to discuss what might be 
perceived as contentious questions, and the scepticism among respondents 
based on previous experience with researchers. These risks were minimised 
through negotiated access, and careful interaction and communication with the
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stakeholders to be interviewed. I was granted access to the organisation in 
order to conduct interviews. Third, there is often a risk that the cases might go 
against the conceptual categories that the researcher has constructed, calling 
for a re-assessment of their validity. In addition, the information provided 
might be non-existent or misleading. In this case, it suggested that it is 
worthwhile to assess the information in terms of the meaning of the negative 
case. According to Thomas Kuhn (1970): “if counter-evidence is found to 
falsify a theory, then it will be the competence of the researcher which is 
called into question” (cited in May, 1997), p. 35). However, evidence that 
does not support theories can be regarded only as a temporary problem to 
which future research is directed (ibid.).
4.6.2 Document analysis
In addition to semi-structured interviews, document analysis was conducted in 
two complementary ways. First, a review was made of the primary 
documentation produced by the different stakeholders. In addition, press 
material from the relevant periods was analysed as a complementary source of 
information for events or views presented in the interviews. The analysis of 
news items and the language used by different stakeholders allowed 
categorisation by textual themes and sub-themes (Forrest, 1995). This analysis 
was based on analysis of the actual discourses - that is the examination of 
argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken statements - 
and provided insights into the interplay between Shell and its stakeholders 
(Hajer, 1995). This analysis was important because the media reflect ongoing 
debate during the period studied (1996-2004). Thus, an important aspect of
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the study was to compare clusters of meaning against the research questions
posed. During the elite interviews, historical facts were confirmed or rebutted
though analysis of supplementary sources of data such as newspaper reports,
debates and press material. I also drew on archival documentary data
including company archives, media accounts, published material, consultancy
reports and corporate annual reports from regulatory agencies, and corporate
operating agreements on sustainable development issues. Archival data were
reviewed to provide confirming or refuting data and provided the official
corporate view of CSR. The researcher was aware of the caution necessary in
using these documents and sources, especially those documents generated by
the organisations to be researched:
“They should never be taken at face-value. In other words, they must be 
regarded as information, which is context-specific, and as data which must 
contextualised with other forms of research. They should, therefore, be used 
with caution” (Forrest, 1995, p i49).
I took the necessary steps to ensure the authenticity, credibility, and 
representativeness of documents (Cullen and Calvert, 1995). With regard to 
media sources, Erickson et al. (1991, p.5) point out that: “New representations 
are symbolic in the sense that they embody, stand for or to persons, events, 
processes, or states of affairs being reported. New representations involve 
authorisation of who can be representative or spokesperson of a source 
organisation, of what sources are authorised to the knower.”
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Table 4.5 Research Interviews’ List of Respondents
Interview Nbr. Name Organisation Organisation and date and 
location for interview
[11] J.R. Udofia Ex- Deputy MD Shell Nigeria
[12] Precious Omuku Director of external relations Shell Nigeria
[13] Basil Omiyi Director of operations Shell Nigeria
[14] Derry O ’Regan Manager o f Health, Safety and 
Environment Department
Shell Nigeria
[15] Emmanuel Ogbu Manager of community 
development and sustainable 
development
Shell Nigeria
[16] Erika Renolds Corporate Environmental Advisor 
SAPREF
Shell Nigeria
[17] Noble Pepple Liaison officer for sustainable 
development
Shell Nigeria
[18] Anonymous Consultant, Global Pollution 
Response Ltd
Shell Nigeria
[191 YadaNyenke Change advisor Shell Nigeria
[110] Bola Afolabi Head of contracts/major contracts Shell Nigeria
[111] E Roger Elmore EP Advisor Shell International
n i2 i Richard Sykes Group Sustainability Advisor Shell International
[113] Mark wade Group ex-sustainability Advisor Shell International
[114] Helen Sullivan Group NGO advisor Shell International
[115] Chukwu (COPE) Issues manager Shell International
[116] Yaabari Uebari Nigeria Liaison Officer Shell International
[117] Murray Jones Social performance manager Shell International
[118] Odd Godal CSR Statoil Statoil
[119] Christine Nesset CSR Statoil Statoil
[120] Anthony Abolarin Country Analysis and CSR TotalFinaElf
[121] Dr. Domenico D’ippoli Social Manager Nigerian Agip Oil Co. 
Limited
[122] Dr Jamari Ex- planning officer NNPC
[123] Emmanuel Gbangton Local advisor Friends of the Earth
[124] Alice Ukoko Managing Director Niger Delta Women
[125] Dawn M. Liberi Managing Director USAID
[126] Prof. Abafemi Ajibola Managing Director New Nigeria Foundation
[127] Prof. Bernard A. Onuej Agricultural Commissioner Rivers State Government
[128] Andrew Levin Regional Advisor USAID
[129] Anonymous Corporate advisor Friends o f the earth
[130] Anonymous Development Amnesty International
[131] Sonya Maldar Researcher/Nigeria Human Rights Watch
[132] Jonas Moberg Director, Business Leaders Forum The Prince o f Wales
[133] Alex Wines Analyst Human Rights Watch
[134] Bronwen Manby Deputy head o f African Section Human Rights Watch
[135] Hammond Managing Director Live Earth
[136] Alice Ukoko Managing Director Women o f Nigeria
ri371 Matt Loose Consultant Sustainability
[138] Rory Sullivan Director of social investment Insight Investment
[139] Andrea Bohnstedt Economics analyst Global Insight
[140] Struan Simpson Nigeria Expert Independent Consultant
[141] Anonymous Commissioner of Agriculture Bayelsa state
[142] Henrietta Unegbe Representative Naija Community
[143] Michel Peel Associate Fellow Royal Institute of 
International Affairs
[144] Anonymous Chief Delta state
[145] Anonymous Advisor Environmental Rights Action
[146] Uwem Ite Academic Consultant Lancaster University
[147] Ciril Ogbu Director Enterprise for Development 
International
[148] Prince Lekan Fadina Chairman Cisme Consulting
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4.6.3 Online survey
According to Yin (1984), surveys can be used in an embedded case study, 
whenever there is a secondary analysis of certain topics ( such as participation 
in services) and may be based on many case studies, that are not the result of a 
single study, but represent a literature of numerous studies (Yin, Heald & 
Vogel, 1977). This may occur when there is a need to collect numerous data 
points, used in conjunction with other data collection techniques. I conducted 
an online survey of 120 stakeholder organisations that had engaged with 
Shell’s CSR agenda at various levels since 1996. These were selected from a 
database of stakeholder organisations that have consistently engaged with the 
company over CSR issues in Nigeria. A website was established on which the 
questionnaire was posted. It remained on the web for six weeks and during 
this period, emails were sent every two weeks reminding respondents to fill 
out the online questionnaire. Altogether 17 organisations responded, giving an 
overall response rate of 14.1%. The collective data generated were tallied and 
analysed. The results were mainly quantitative. The survey was used as a 
supplementary tool. I was aware of its limitations namely; that neither 
statistical nor theoretical generalisations were possible because the case 
survey was a secondary and not a primary technique. The selection of the 
individual cases was beyond the control of the researcher and was not based 
on any sampling logic (Yin, 1984). In this study, the survey was primarily 
conducted to synthesise the existing case studies on some topics, and to 
collect supplementary information on stakeholder engagement and CSR in 
Nigeria.
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4.7 Negotiating access, building trust, and ethical dilemmas
Fieldwork is a unique experience to every researcher. However, I had a 
number of experiences while conducting this field research in Nigeria and the 
UK that had been documented in the research methods textbooks. The first 
key lesson is that what is important to successful field research is the ability to 
establish, maintain and sustain good relationships with people who in 
everyday life one would be unlikely to encounter.
According to Wax (1971), the researcher is continually exercising the most 
fundamental technique of all - alleviating suspicion. As such, it was important 
that the emotions should not influence the data collection. Morgan (1992) 
further suggested that alleviating suspicion involved learning how to inveigle 
one’s way into the life of a group, build up contacts with key actors and retain 
one’s emotional balance to achieve acceptance and allow continuous 
collection of research material. The researcher was aware that to a certain 
extent contention could arise in areas where politically sensitive issues are 
exposed by research.
Secondly, there are extant factors that could influence outcomes, such as the
personality of the researcher, which can help to determine the selection of
topics, intellectual approach and ability in the field (Clarke, 1975). In
addition, one feels that much is left unsaid and that there are restraints on
being completely open. According to Clarke (Ibid.),
“there are difficulties of writing frankly and honestly about what 
actually happens before, during, and after research. On the other hand 
perhaps one should even be wary of the status of accounts of research, 
for they are themselves none other than one particular version of 
events” (Ibid.: 19).
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According to Gans (1962), “If the researcher is completely honest with the 
people about his activities, they will try to hide actions and attitudes they 
consider undesirable, and so they would be dishonest” (p. 46).
The main reasons for selecting this case study were geographic proximity and 
prior experience and training. The nature of the research project helped me 
gain unusually open access to the organisation. The company had recently 
adopted a transparency policy aimed at communicating the achievements of 
its CSR policies since 1994. However, I was constantly aware that the 
organisation was sensitive about the research activities being conducted. I was 
conscious of the fact that the conduct of the research and success in the field 
would be influenced by many factors such as my age, sex, status, ethnic 
background, over-identification, rejection, factionalism, bureaucratic 
obstacles, accidents, and serendipity. None of the above obstacles hindered 
my field research activities.
As Argyris (1969) suggests, the gatekeepers were crucial in helping gain
access. The company invited me to a four-day annual stakeholder consultation
workshop held in 2003.1 was cleared to approach anyone for interview during
the workshop. This was pivotal to the research as it provided an opportunity to
establish relationships of trust, which significantly contributed to the
successful completion of my fieldwork.
The research. As Klein (1976) indicates:
“Social science is not engaged by industry or organisations, but by 
individuals in gate keeping or sponsorship or client roles. The outcome 
of fieldwork is mediated through the needs, resources, and roles of such 
individuals” (p. 225).
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In terms of the moral dilemmas associated with the degree of openness 
required with regard to the purposes and objectives of the research. Both 
views were considered, which, as Gans (1962) suggests, led to the realisation 
that:
“Some measure of deception is acceptable in some areas where the 
benefits of knowledge outweigh the harms and where the harms have 
been minimised by following convention on confidentiality and 
identity. One need not be always brutally honest, direct, and explicit 
about one’s research purpose...one should not break promises made to 
people (p. 47).
It was argued that there is no answer to the moral dilemmas in research On the 
one hand, the so-called conflict methodology that includes covert research has 
been criticised for fostering suspicion and undermining trust in the integrity of 
the researcher, and hence doing bad service to the research profession. On the 
other hand, there is methodological predilection and preoccupation in the 
social sciences whenever the researcher is systematically denied information 
to crucial facets of the research process. Hence, I adopted a middle way and 
communicated enough to win the trust of the respondents and the 
constituencies I interacted with during the fieldwork, while systematically 
shielding the research project from the risks outlined above, by carefully 
presenting the project in a way that did not reveal the underlying research 
propositions being tested. Although there is no consensus on the key ethical 
questions raised by research, the present research activities were confined 
within the ethical limits of standard research. The next Chapter 
introduces the case study considered.
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Chapter Five
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS, THE NIGERIAN OIL 
SECTOR, AND CSR AT SHELL
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to locate the Nigerian case study with respect to 
a wider series of environmental and social controversies that Shell faced during 
the last few decades. It discusses the emergence of a CSR agenda at Shell that it 
situates within the context of environmental regulation debates and the rise of 
environmentalism and the environmental justice movement over the last 3 
decades. The chapter reviews in brief some of the high profile incidents and 
resource conflicts that implicated Shell and prompted widespread anti-Shell 
protests which have attracted so much adverse publicity against the company 
both in the West and in developing countries, particularly Nigeria. It argues 
that, as a direct consequence of recurrent corporate-society incidents, Shell 
responded with an ambitious CSR agenda that aimed to restore its credibility 
and legitimacy amongst global and local stakeholders.
5.2 The context for the rise of corporate environmentalism and CSR
The discussion in the previous chapters (section 2.1 and 3.3) has traced the 
origins of the CSR concept back to the turn of the 20th century. Several drivers 
have played a role in the emergence of CSR, as corporate and societal
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relationships have evolved to encompass a wide range of social responsibilities 
over and above the legal and economic responsibilities of a business enterprise. 
Such drivers include the increasing power of corporations, the negative impacts 
of corporate activities, the globalisation process and regulatory pressures. 
However, by mobilising and focusing public pressure upon industry and 
individual corporations, different major currents of thought have played 
determining roles in forcing industry to accept the CSR agenda,. The next 
sections outline two such key movements, and highlights how they are linked 
with the emergence of CSR in its modem form.
S. 2.1 the rise o f environmental movement
The ecological crisis in modem society is a well-established topic in academic 
and policy debates (Yearley, 1992). The rise of environmental politics in the 
1960s was largely driven by environmental movements and a resurgent global 
civil society.
According to Jamison (1996), the movement focussed on creating awareness 
throughout the 1960s. For example, the publication of Rachel Carlson’s Silent 
Spring (1962), Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) and Garrett 
Hardin’s Tragedy o f  the Commons (1968) called public attention to the issue, 
and popularised the idea of ecological limits. This period also saw the 
establishment of environmental NGOs focusing on the protection of the 
environment such the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). In the 1970s, the environmental 
movement became established as a political issue and entered the phase of 
organisation and institutionalisation (Jamison, 1996). For example, one of the
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outcomes is the implementation of the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) after the Stockholm conference, and the creation o f the 
transnational environmental group Greenpeace. There was also a proliferation 
of alternative holistic visions of the nature-society relationship, such as 
Goldsmith’s Blueprint fo r  Survival (1972). This was underpinned by the 
growing recognition of the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). In the 
early 1970s, the oil crisis became a turning point in the history of environmental 
movement (Murphy and Bendell, 1997). The ecological limits turned into a 
permanent topic of public debate, which was shrouded in political disputes over 
possible remedies, especially as the oil crisis hit Western economies. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the environmental movement entered a phase 
of professionalisation. For example, Greenpeace and other environmental 
NGOs focused on lobbying and grew in capacity and reach. They also gained 
more momentum through the publication of the Brundtland Report (WCED, 
1987), which established the concept of sustainable development and thereby 
sought to reconcile the antagonism between growth and environmental 
protection.
However, critics of environmentalism (Martinez-Alier, 2002; Rowell, 1994; 
Szasz, 1994; Bowen, William, 2002) point out that it exclusively privileged a 
conservation and preservation ethic - where nature was seen as a beautiful 
wilderness to be protected from man - while neglecting the human dimension. 
Critical voices were later channelled through the environmental justice 
movement discussed in the next section.
5.2.2 The rise o f the environmental justice movement
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Leaders of the environmental justice movement have argued that mainstream 
environmental organisations, and in turn environmental policy, have 
demonstrated a greater concern for preserving the wilderness and animal 
habitats than addressing health hazards to humans. These arguments represent a 
backlash against embracing the so-called save the earth perspective at the 
expense of saving peoples’ lives and protecting their homes and backyards.
The environmental justice movement emerged in the 1980s because of the 
confluence of events and reports that brought the terms ‘environmental racism’ 
and ‘environmental justice’ into the public sphere and into policy discourses. 
Proponents of environmental racism described the disproportionate balance 
between the high levels of pollution exposure for people of colour and the low 
level of environmental benefits they enjoy, and argued that there is unequal 
distribution of environmental benefits and pollution burdens based on race. 
Subsequent reports, for example, Toxic Wastes and Race (1987) by The United 
Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice, documented the ‘unequal 
protection’ from environmental pollution by local, state and national regulatory 
agencies.
Other events that gave impetus to the environmental justice movement include, 
for example, a series of environmental pollution scandals in corporate America, 
which brought corporations into dispute with highly mobilised grass-root 
communities. Such disasters included toxic waste dumping into Love Canal in 
New York, the Bean v. South-Western Waste Management Corp lawsuit in 
1979 against the location of a waste facility, and the Warren County (North 
Carolina) protest resisting a polychlorinated biphenyl dump in their community.
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These events and the protests that followed led to research into the connection 
between race and pollution (Bullard, 1994a)
The repression of these initially limited protests exploded the popularity of the 
movement, which went from strength to strength. The environmental justice 
movement went beyond NYMBISM (Not in My Back Yard) to become a fully- 
fledged movement, that often blurs the distinction environmentalism and social 
justice causes. What was a local issue in the 1970s became a new very social 
movement in the 1980s. While in the 1970s before Love Canal, local 
organisation was sporadic and isolated with a total lack of contact among local 
groups, in the 1980s, networking began and a dynamic social movement was 
bom. For instance, the citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes grew out 
of the Love Canal experience. In 1984, there were 600 local groups and this had 
increased to more than 4,687 by 1988. The national Toxics Campaign and 
Greenpeace stated that they worked with about 2000 of these local groups.
When in 1991, a multiracial group of more than six hundred met in Washington 
DC for the first National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit, 
it issued the following statement of Principles of Environmental Justice:
“To begin to build a national and international movement of all peoples 
of colour to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and 
communities...”, and among other goals to “secure our political, 
economic and cultural liberation that has been denied...resulting in 
poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our people” 
(Grossman, 1994, p 272.).
Environmental racism became an issue as some in the movement sought to
connect class and race, while others saw racism as the main culprit.
“ Our movement started as Not In My Backyard(NYMB), but quickly 
turned into Not In Anyone’s Backyard(NIABY) which includes Mexico 
and other less developed countries’^  p 45).
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As such, local communities have resisted the siting of hazardous wastes 
facilities in their midst because they are being asked to shoulder the hazardous 
waste burdens of others. This radicalised and internationalised the antitoxic 
agenda (DiChiro, 1996). What emerged was, according to Szasz, a radical 
environmental populism that connected to the larger tradition of American 
Radicalism, rather than an outgrowth of the modem environmental movement 
(Szasz, 1994). Protests spread across the United Nations through Environmental 
and health groups and other informally organised bodies as the most effective, 
if not the only viable avenue available to community and environmental groups. 
As such, local, issue-oriented, citizen-based groups proliferated in the 1980s 
(Gottlieb, 1993).
The environmental justice perspective differs from traditional environmental 
philosophies in that it seeks to combine a concern for the natural world with a 
consciousness of ethnicity, class and gender discrimination (Di Chiro, 1996). In 
effect, the environmental justice movement has shifted environmental priorities 
away from what is perceived as a traditional emphasis on eco-centric themes 
(global warming, ozone depletion, nature protection), towards human centred 
concerns for individual health (pesticide control, community protection, etc.). 
This has been framed around a concept of rights constructed in part by the 
actions of and rhetoric of previous social justice movements, most notably the 
civil rights movements (Capek, 1993).
The emergence of the environmental justice movement was based on direct 
action protests linked to pollution, waste and habitat destruction issues. The 
arguments that underpin the environmental justice movement include, firstly, 
the claims that there are marked and increasing disparities between those who 
have access to clean and safe resources and those who do not (Szasz &
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Meusser, 2000). Secondly, the argument that often poor and minority 
communities bear a disproportionately large burden of toxic contamination and 
suffer the health problems that result from it, while the elite and powerful tend 
to control the valuable resources (Clapp, 2001). As such, some authors have 
argued that disparities of this nature may be the result of historical 
circumstances, contemporary economic and trade relations, and inadequate or 
inappropriate governmental regulation (Di Chiro, G. 1996; Markowitz & 
Rosner, 2002). Others argued that they might also be the result of deliberate 
targeting of disenfranchised communities or weak nations to bear the burden of 
unsustainable consumption patterns of powerful communities and nations 
(Rowell, 1996). Critics have further suggested that minority and low-income 
communities or nations are targets as sites for dumping of toxic waste and 
environmentally hazardous substances because they are perceived as “paths of 
least resistance (Adeola, 2000; Clapp, 2001; Anderson, et al., 1994).
The environmental justice movement has stimulated heated debate over the 
extent to which race and class should become central concerns of modem 
environmentalism (Markowitz & Rosner, 2002; Di Chiro, 1996; Pulido, 2000; 
Klinenberg, 1999). In the 1970s and into the 1980s, a growing interest in 
questions of environmental equity gained attention in academic circles, 
especially among social scientists and philosophers. A small body of literature 
appeared on the equity of municipal service provision (Bullard, 1993; Dobson,
1998).
The underclass hypothesis postulated that the quality and quantity of service 
delivery was directly related to the socio-economic status of the area receiving
135
the service (Bullard, 1993). Hence, poor neighbourhoods received services that 
were inferior because they were not politically strong enough to resist or to 
voice their demands. The major issue was the impact of the distribution of risk 
through various forms of pollution (race, class, income). The discourse and 
research on equity and distributional conflicts helped to take environmentalism 
beyond the more class-neutral rhetoric that solely focuses on saving the planet. 
According to Schnaiberg et al. (2003), the discussion of the redistributive 
element (such as a windfall-profit fund to provide cost offsets for the poor) had 
been mostly absent from the most of the history of environmental movements, 
which had not tended to be welfare oriented.
The environmental justice movement has shifted environmental priorities away
from what is perceived as a traditional emphasis on eco-centric themes (global
warming, ozone depletion, nature protection), towards human centred concerns
for individual health, pesticide control, community protection, etc.) (Capek,
1993). In early 1990s the environmental justice advocates made a bid to
internationalise the movement. There were statements linking American
grassroots experiences with toxic wastes, and those of other grassroots
communities facing similar issues around the world. For example, Heeten
Kalan, Director of Global Environmental Health and Justice Fund of the New
World Foundation in New York City declared:
“Environmental and human rights have no boundaries, because pollution 
has no boundaries... Environmental justice organisations are starting to 
understand that that they are working in a global context...Communities 
all over the world are finding commonalities in their experiences and 
goals in seeking environmental justice4”(Environews, 2007, p. 501).
4 http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7151665/Standing-on-principle-the-global.html. Visited on 09.05.08
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In particular, this resonated with the Nigerian Niger Delta, where grassroots 
movement led by Ken Saro Wiwa led an uprising against the government and 
the oil companies, Shell in particular. The anti-pollution protests marshalled 
grassroots environmental protests on a large scale in Nigeria, as will be 
explored later in this chapter.
Besides environmentalism and the environmental justice movement, another 
influential context for the emergence of the corporate environmentalism and 
corporate social responsibility of MNCs, and Shell in particular, is the 
sustainable development discourse.
According to Redclift (1987), the sustainable development agenda has to appeal 
to both environmental and economic interests and thereby tread a potentially 
contradictory terrain while trying to establish a positive agenda. This discourse 
addresses the problem of how environmental protection might be combined 
with a reasonable development option for the less advanced countries in the 
developing world. The offer of the Brundtland Report was to reconcile the 
objectives of environmental protection and social development by 
amalgamating them into the two-pronged strategy o f sustainable development. 
Development, i.e. economic growth, would remain possible and necessary, but 
it would be constrained by the imperatives of environmental protection. As 
such, environmental protection has to be compatible with the overall objectives 
of development, while development must include criteria to make it sustainable.
Whilst the sustainable development paradigm has led to heated debates and 
controversies over whether economic development and sustainability are 
compatible or not, with different schools of thought advancing opposing
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arguments, business figures have seized on this opportunity to draw out an 
agenda for business and sustainability (WSSD, 2002).
5.3 Corporate environmentalism and corporate social responsibility
In 1960s, industry in general, and the oil industry in particular (Skjaerseth & 
Skodvin, 2003) can be seen as being in denial that its activities harmed the 
environment, rejecting the scientific integrity of the evidence presented by civil 
society activists, particularly environmentalist groups (Hoffman, 2000).
According to Bendell (2000), industry groups generally elaborated their own 
definitions of what were believed to be relevant environmental problems and 
possible technical solutions to deal with them (Ibid)5. However, as this 
opposition between industry and civil society raged during the 1970s, a wide 
range of agencies devoted to standard setting and clean production sprang up.
As a result, industries in developed world contexts faced strong regulatory 
action. In response, corporations established environmental, health, and safety 
departments to deal with these issues, although environmental issues often 
remained marginalised and separate from their core businesses (Ibid.).
The corporate approach to compliance was often based on end-of-pipe 
technologies (Bendell, 2000). For example, in the United States (US) and 
Europe, the debate remained highly contentious and regulation failed to achieve 
its objectives due to a lack of sufficient funding regulatory agencies and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies in handling increasing litigation (Bendell, 2000; 
Skjaerseth & Skodvin, 2003).
5 Competing science is part of this discourse, and is often witnessed in current debates on global wanning, where 
certain scientific views close to industry positions challenge the science of anti- global warming campaigns 
that target industrial activity.
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In the 1980s, corporate attitudes gradually changed as public opinion turned 
against perceived industry responsibility, partly as a result of a series o f high 
profile incidents such as the Bhopal gas plant explosion and the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill. These were instrumental in exposing the environmental and social 
malpractices of large MNCs to a wider constituency both in home and host 
countries (Hoffman, 2000; Visser, 2005a).
Moreover, because this was accompanied by growing pressure from consumers, 
NGOs and regulatory agencies, corporate leadership was alerted to the fact that 
the environmental and social performance of their subsidiaries in developing 
countries could affect their reputation and, hence their competitiveness (ibid.). 
Corporations began to take a more proactive approach to business-related 
environmental problems, by establishing self-regulatory codes of conduct and 
standards and by embracing collaboration instead of confrontation with 
regulatory agencies, communities and other civil society stakeholders. The 
business community gradually began to adopt a precautionary stance (Visser, 
2005; Murphy and Bendell, 1997). It had become apparent that environmental 
and social factors should be acknowledged as a strategic challenge to the 
bottom-line, and as a reputation risk in the form of brand image. Industry 
representatives actively participated in the elaboration of business sustainability 
principles in collaboration with leading environmental organisations and set out 
to devise comprehensive socio-environmental strategies of their own, aimed at 
dealing with the perverse impacts of business activities (Ibid).
5.3.1 The emergence of corporate social responsibility at Shell
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The recent history of Shell offers the opportunity to study the conflict between 
environmental and social development groups and a multinational corporation. 
Royal Dutch Shell is one of the largest multinational corporations in the world, 
generating revenues in 2007 of US$ 318,845 million (Fortune Magazine, 2007). 
The companies in this group operate in 135 countries and employ over 108,000 
people as well as hundreds of contractors (Shell, 2007). The company has 
existed for more than 90 years, generally founded as an alliance between a 
Dutch and a British company, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the 
“Shell” Transport and Trading pic. In 1907, they merged their interests on a 
60/40 basis, and operated as two holding companies until 2005 when they 
merged to form one group holding company, ‘The Royal Dutch Shell’ pic. The 
parent company thus owns the shares of the individual operating countries 
around the world.
Shell, alongside other oil companies, initially enjoyed a good reputation at the 
turn of the last century, as they were seem as providing the fuel for progress. 
During the 1982-92 period, Shell International played an important role, first in 
the development of the ICC’s Business Charter on Sustainable Development, 
which was launched in 1991, and then in the ICC’s participation in the Rio 
Conference. Agenda 21 contains no fewer than 32 provisions pertaining 
specifically to MNCs or of direct relevance to MNC operations, although very 
few require specific MNC commitments on environmental matters (See 
UNCTAD, 1996, p2). UNCTAD nevertheless considers Agenda 21 to be an 
appropriate benchmark against which to evaluate progress in achieving goals 
set for environmental improvements. Governments, through a democratic and 
participatory process, which included major group representation from both 
business and NGO communities, adopted agenda 21.
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However, a succession of crises in the 1980s through to the 1990s forced Shell 
to consider its communication policy and business objectives. For example, the 
Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989 led to the formation in the USA later that year of 
the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), and the 
so-called Valdez Principles. CERES is a member organisation that includes 
representatives of national environmental organisations, social investment 
leaders, public interest groups and unions. They created an environmental ethic 
with criteria by which investors and others could assess the environmental 
performance of companies.
The petroleum industry responded with a number of self-regulating alternatives. 
In 1990, the American Petroleum Institute (API) launched its Environmental 
Mission and Guiding Principles, and the UK’s Institute of Petroleum followed 
suit in 1992 with its Model of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry. Also in 
1992, the API introduced Strategies for Today’s Environmental Partnership, an 
umbrella programme encompassing industry-sponsored environmental 
initiatives and individual company programmes.
However, a succession of scandals put Shell in the limelight and the company 
came head to head with the environmental justice movement. Although Shell 
has often faced major public relations controversies, such as the company’s 
controversial role in Vietnam (during the Vietnam war) and its decision to keep 
operating in Apartheid South Africa, the defining moments were the Love 
Canal incident, the Brent Spar rig, and the uprising in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria also known as the Ogoni disaster. Shell came to represent the global 
and the local bete noir of environmental protests. The following section reviews
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the three incidents and explores their links with the emergence of Shell’s CSR 
agenda.
5.4 Shell scandals and the rise of environmentalism at Shell
As mentioned earlier, there have been successions o f major incidents involving 
Shell that gradually undermined the company’s reputation and led to 
widespread civil society protests around the world, and those new forms of 
collaboration between the civil societies in developed and developing countries 
that further threatened the company’s reputation and legitimacy.
In the 1970s Shell faced public criticism for the company’s role in Vietnam. 
Between 1972 and 1975, the last three years of the Vietnam War, Shell Vietnam 
(the local ‘operating company’ of the Shell Group) controlled half of Vietnam’s 
oil supply. A book by Louis Wesseling, the President of Shell Vietnam during 
that period, revealed that Shell failed properly to control the oil shipments 
which flowed through indirect channels to the Vietcong (Wesseling, 2000).
In the 1980s, anti-apartheid activists accused Shell6 of supporting and 
sustaining the apartheid regime while pursuing business opportunities in the 
Republic of South Africa. Annual General Meetings of the two Group holding 
companies were disrupted by protesters and Shell was also accused of breaking 
sanctions. Shell always argued that unlike other multinationals who withdrew 
(e.g. Mobil); it could be more of a force for good by staying in the country than 
by leaving. As the largest global company remaining active in South Africa, 
Shell became the figurehead scion of big business tied to the Verwoerd and De
6 Royal Dutch Shell - Environmental and reputational issues: Encyclopaedia II - Royal Dutch Shell - 
Environmental and reputational issues. http://www.experiencefestival.eom/a/Royal Dutch Shell 
Environmental and reputational issues/id/5459688.Visited 0 8 .0 5 .0 8
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Klerk administrations. Anti-Shell activists went as far as a moonlighting 
terrorist group RaRa (Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action, but also Dutch for 
'Guess Who') raiding gasoline pump stations and cutting through filler tubes 
and setting them on fire.
Shell also has a refinery located in Diamond, a small town located in Louisiana, 
situated along the shores of the Mississippi River. The community faced highly 
risky exposure to poisonous gas from pollution, and was a regular victim of 
recurrent explosions that killed a lot of people and inflicted extensive damages 
to property belonging to fence line communities. The first explosion happened 
in 1973 and took the lives of two Diamond residents. Another major explosion 
occurred on May 5th 1988 and killed six people, and injured 42 people (Lemer, 
2005). The blast shattered windows up to 30 miles away and damage was 
sustained on both sides of the mile-wide Mississippi river. Following the 
incident about 159 million pounds of toxic chemicals were spewed into the air, 
requiring the evacuation of 4,500 people. Diamond residents faced recurrent 
emergencies that forced them to evacuate their homes eight times in 12 years. 
Shell was later forced to pay out $172 million in damages to some 17,000 
claimants (Ibid.).
In the 1990s Shell faced a full-scale environmental protest concerning the 
disposal of its Brent Spa, an oil storage and tanker loading buoy in the Brent 
oilfield, operated by Shell UK in the North Sea. Although the rig was located in 
the UK, and the issue was a domestic problem from a UK point of view, it was 
internationalised, with the involvement of environmental campaign 
organisations such as Greenpeace, and quickly became a symbol of cross- 
border importance despite the fact that it was located in UK waters and subject
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to clearly defined national regulation (Anderson, 1997). Greenpeace activists 
seized the platform to prevent deep sea disposal. The Brent Spar conflict was 
blown out of proportion and its implications extended far beyond its immediate 
context, involving a variety of societal actors. Although Greenpeace never 
called for a boycott of Shell service stations, thousands of people stopped 
buying their petrol at Shell. Greenpeace activists occupied the Brent Spar for 
more than three weeks. Shell’s disposal plans were legally sanctioned by the 
UK government (Nutt, 2000). However Shell abandoned its plans to dispose of 
Brent Spar at sea, in the face of public and political opposition in northern 
Europe (including some physical attacks and an arson attack on a service station 
in Germany). Shell companies were faced with increasingly intense public 
criticism, mostly in Continental northern Europe. Many politicians and 
ministers were openly hostile and several called for consumer boycotts. There 
was violence against Shell service stations, accompanied by threats to Shell 
staff. The power of public pressure was experienced at first hand, whereas 
Shell’s defeat marked a significant shift in corporate attitudes towards societal 
pressure, the increasing power of global stakeholders and their capacity to 
undermine corporate operations. It represented a shift of symbolic importance 
in corporate-society relations. It was argued that the Brent Spar demonstrated 
that corporate power was relative, while highlighting the vulnerability of MNCs 
due to the exposure to multiple jurisdictions (Yearley and Forrester, 2000).
In the early 1990s, Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led a non-violent campaign against 
environmental damage associated with the operations of multinational oil 
companies, including Shell and British Petroleum, in the Ogoni homelands of 
the Niger delta. In January 1993, MOSOP organized peaceful marches of
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around 300,000 Ogoni people -  more than half of the Ogoni population -  
through four Ogonicentres, drawing international attention to his people's 
plight. That same year, Shell ceased operations in the Ogoni region. Shell's 
involvement in Nigeria came to the fore again in October 1990 when a peaceful 
protest in Umeuchem escalated. Eighty people were killed by the police and 
495 homes were destroyed. Shell states that it merely asked for police 
protection. In 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others were executed. Ken Saro- 
Wiwa had implicated Shell during his “treason” trial and the company was 
accused of providing money and supplies to the Nigerian military. When Saro- 
Wiwa was executed, some of the world-wide condemnation of the act was 
aimed at Shell. In February 2002, a United States District Judge ruled that a 
case brought against Royal Dutch Shell by close relatives of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
could proceed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act 
and RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations) Act.
Shell has continued to be condemned by bodies such as Christian Aid, who 
reported that despite Shell claims of ‘honesty, integrity and respect for people’ 
it had ‘failed to use its considerable interest in Nigeria to bring about change in 
the Niger delta’. The report also found evidence of failures to clean up oil spills, 
pollution of rivers and water courses, and non-completion of promised projects 
for community improvement. In 2001 a study into the community projects was 
leaked to The Economist. It reported that of 81 projects visited by the reviewers 
of the scheme, 20 did not exist, 36 were partially successful and 25 were 
working in Nigeria.
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When in 1991 a multiracial group of more than six hundred met in Washington
DC for the first National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit,
its statement of Principles of Environmental Justice were:
“to begin to build a national and international movement [...] to fight the 
destruction and taking of our lands and communities..., secure our 
political, economic and cultural liberation that has been 
denied...resulting in poisoning of our communities and land and the 
genocide of our people”(Grossman, 1994, pp 272.).
Protests spread across the nation through environmental and health groups and
other informally organised bodies as the most effective if not only viable
avenue available to community and environmental groups. As such, local,
issue-oriented, citizen-based groups proliferated in the 1980s (Gottlieb, 1993).
For those articulating the goals of environmental justice, grassroots resistance to
environmental threats is simply the reaction to more fundamental injustices
brought by long-term economic and social trends. This resonated with the crisis
enfolding in the Nigerian Delta, and the Ogoni uprising, whose manifesto is an
extension of the environmental justice movement in search of redress from rich
multinational companies.
The environmental justice movement has shifted environmental priorities away 
from what is perceived as a traditional emphasis on eco-centric themes (global 
warming, ozone depletion, nature protection), towards human-centred concerns 
for individual health, pesticide control, community protection, etc.). It was 
framed around a concept of rights constructed in part by the actions of and 
rhetoric of previous social justice movements, most notably, the civil rights 
movements (Capek, 1993). The environmental justice movement nevertheless 
raised the issue high on the political agenda in the US, which led to the creation 
of the Office of Environmental Justice within EPA’s Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, in 1992.
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Box 6.1 First National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit: Principles of Environmental Justice. 
PREAMBLE
WE, THE PEOPLE OF COLOR, gathered together at this multinational People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to 
build a national and international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and communities, do 
hereby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate each of our cultures, 
languages and beliefs about the natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to insure environmental justice; to promote economic 
alternatives which would contribute to the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic and 
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities
and land and the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental Justice:
1) Environmental Justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all species, and the
right to be free from ecological destruction.
2) Environmental Justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free from any form of 
discrimination or bias.
3) Environmental Justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the 
interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.
4) Environmental Justice calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and disposal of toxic/hazardous 
wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food.
5) Environmental Justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of all 
peoples.
6) Environmental Justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and 
that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point 
of production.
7) Environmental Justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making, including needs 
assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation.
8) Environmental Justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment without being forced to choose
between an unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the right of those who work at home to be free from
environmental hazards.
9) Environmental Justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and reparations for 
damages as well as quality health care.
10) Environmental Justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international law, the Universal 
Declaration On Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on Genocide.
11) Environmental Justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to the U.S. government 
through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants affirming sovereignty and self-determination.
12) Environmental Justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural areas 
in balance with nature, honouring the cultural integrity of all our communities, and provided fair access for all to the full range 
of resources.
13) Environmental Justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the testing of 
experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations on people of color.
14) Environmental Justice opposes the destructive operations of multi-national corporations.
15) Environmental Justice opposes military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, and other life
forms.
16) Environmental Justice calls for the education of present and future generations which emphasizes social and environmental 
issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural perspectives.
17) Environmental Justice requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother
Earth’s resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and make the conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our 
lifestyles to insure the hearth of the natural world for present and future generations.
Washington DC October 24-27,1991
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5.5 Environmental justice and Globalisation in the Nigerian oil industry
This global-local dimension of environmental justice linked the expansion of 
MNC activities to local conflicts, inequities, repression, and escalating conflict 
(Nabiro, 1997). Critics of the oil companies and Shell in particular, led by some 
NGOs such as Friends of the Earth( FoE), Christian Aid, and academics such as 
Cyril Obi (1999), Kayode Soremekun (1995), Bierstekker (1987), and many 
others, linked MNCs and oil production to rights violations, environmental 
degradation and abuse of power. As such, local protests have contributed to a 
global awareness of the Niger Delta confrontations between Shell in 
collaboration with the Nigerian government against the local community’s 
activism. The local activists reach out to the global (Environmental justice 
movement, international civil society organisation) in order to empower local 
claims to certain rights, resources and entitlements (Obi, 2006). For example, 
the struggles of the Ogoni against Shell, the Ijaw against Shell, Chevron and 
Agip, and the Ilale against Chevron are all local, as the site of conflict, and 
global, as the platform of expressing grievance and gaining support. The 
environmental justice movement in the US had strong resonance in Nigeria. 
Links were established, particularly driven by the fact that the US movement 
was eager to internationalise their campaign, whereas the Nigerian activists 
were eager to bring their local protests against Shell in Nigeria to a global 
platform. For example, there are striking commonalities between the Ogoni Bill 
o f  Rights in Box 6.1, and the Principles of Environmental Justice as enacted by 
the First National People o f  Colour Environmental Leadership Summit, in Box 
6.2. There is a strong commonality between the environmental justice 
movement and the local protests in terms of arguments, language, and style.
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The previous sections in this chapter provided the background of Shell’s CSR 
agenda, by briefly outlining the company’s encounter with the global 
environmental movement and the environmental justice movement. The next 
section gives a background to the Nigerian case study, by briefly outlining the 
context of the relationship between oil MNCs and oil producing countries, since 
the thesis partially links the CSR agenda of oil MNCs to the business rationale 
underpinning their presence in the oil producing state.
S.6 Nigerian oil industry and state-company relationship
The origins of the oil industry are often traced back to its rapid international 
expansion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As exploration and 
production activities expanded to Latin America, Russia and Central Europe, 
the Dutch East Indies became a producer in its own right. Production from there 
laid the foundation for the emergence of Royal Dutch Shell as a major force in 
the oil industry (Fee, 1988). The early relations between the state and the 
companies were based on the colonial experience of the previous century (Fee, 
1988; Khan, 1994; Biersteker, 1987; Frynas, 2000). It is under the above 
conditions that Shell acquired its exploration and production licence in Nigeria. 
In 1938, a joint venture between BP and Shell took over from the Nigerian 
Bitumen Corporation, a Nigerian subsidiary of a German company, and was 
granted the licence to explore for oil across the entire territory of Nigeria. The 
joint venture commenced commercial oil production activities in Nigeria in 
December 1957 (Frynas, 2000).
5.6.1 The Nigerian oil sector and its importance to national development
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Generally, oil exploration and production is intimately associated with the 
industrial revolutions of the last two centuries, as a vital factor of production 
that fuels modem industrial development. Therefore, its costs and supply have 
been given due weight in the plans of economic managers and national policy 
makers at all levels. At the core of the search for, production and supply of 
petroleum lies the multinational oil company (oil MNC) as one of the most 
important factors in the establishment of the hydrocarbon potential of a country. 
This is due to its access to and ownership of technology and finance. Hence, an 
oil producing state needs to develop a relationship with an oil MNC, 
establishing a series of policies relating to licensing, taxation, royalties and 
general legal instruments, in order to ensure the orderly development of oil 
exploration and production (Fee 1988; Khan 1994). A distinctive driving force 
behind national oil strategies is to develop indigenous petroleum resources and 
make this part of an overall industrial development plan. Accordingly, each 
country faces a unique combination of circumstances that govern its choices of 
strategy for oil exploitation and selects a coherent oil exploitation strategy that 
is consistent with its own circumstances, in order to ensure that the balance of 
goals set by the state is achieved. Strategic success in oil exploitation is 
assumed to enable the state to maximise its financial, as well as the attendant 
socio-economic development goals (Fee, 1988).
Three phases of Nigeria’s oil policy development are often identified. The first 
phase is marked by the colonial period up until the end of the 1960s. During 
this period, there was little state participation in the oil industry. The role of the 
state was reduced to the collection of tax, rent or royalties from the oil 
companies. The old concession system established a 50-50% share of net 
revenues, after the companies removed their operating costs, because of which
150
the state’s real revenues were less than the 50% (Soremekun, 1995). After 
independence, in 1962, Nigerian intervention in the oil industry was minimal. 
The then Tafawa Balewa Government7 maintained the status quo, until it 
amended the Petroleum Profit Tax Bill in 1967, this time under General Yakubu 
Gowon’s Government8. The Bill gave Nigeria the legal basis to modify the 
existing fiscal regime to increase its rent taking, and establish a relationship 
with, and later joined OPEC as soon as the organisation was established. The 
interim phase enabled a learning process and joining OPEC in 1971 helped the 
newly independent country gain in terms of capacity building, political 
assertiveness and leverage vis-a-vis the oil companies.
The second phase began in 1970, as the Gowan government policy gradually 
changed, mainly in response to the civil war. The state came to rely on oil 
revenues for economic development and acquired an understanding of the 
strategic importance of oil for Western countries. Oil became the main source 
of revenue and main export, while the export of other commodities fell to 
insignificant levels (Sala-I-Martin and Sabrahamanian, 2003). The civil war 
required stricter control of the oil industry, as Government revenues relied on 
oil revenues more and more and as oil production expanded dramatically from 
20,000 b/d in 1962 to 540,000 b/d in 1969 (Pearson, 1970). According to 
(Soremekum (1995), the state started to be involved in the oil industry in the 
1970s, moving from the collection of oil rents to direct intervention in the 
running of the oil industry. While joining OPEC marked Nigeria’s own 
indigenisation policy, which was encouraged by OPEC.
7 Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain on October 1st, 1960. However, there was a 3-year
transition, and it was not until 1963 that an independent government for the newly independent Nigeria was 
established under Tafawa Balewa.
8 General Yakubu Gowon’s Government lasted from July 1966 -  Ju ly  1975.
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Box 5.2. Important Dates in Shell Nigeria
■ November 1938 Shell D'Arcy granted Exploration licence to prospect for oil throughout Nigeria
* January 1956 First successful well drilled at Oloibiri by Shell D'Arcy
April 1956 - Changed name to Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company o f  Nigeria Limited
- February 17, 1958 - First shipment o f oil from Nigeria
April 7, 1961 - Shell's Bonny Terminal was commissioned
- September 1971 - Shell's Forcados Terminal was commissioned
• April 1,1973 - First participation agreement; Fed. Govt, acquires 35% shares in the Oil Companies
- April 1, 1974 - Second Participation Agreement; Federal Government increases equity to 55%
July 1, 1979 - Third Participation Agreement (through NNPC) increases equity to 60%
* August 1, 1979 - Fourth Participation Agreement; BP's share holding nationalised; NNPC =  80%, Shell = 20%
* December 1979 - Changed name to Shell Petroleum Development Company o f  Nigeria (SPDC)
* August 1984 - Agreement consolidating NNPC Shell Joint Venture
■ January 1986 - Signing o f Memorandum o f  Understanding (MOU)
- June 30, 1989 - Fifth Participation Agreement; (NNPC =  60%, Shell =  30%, E lf =  5%, Agip = 5%)
July 11, 1991 - Signing of Memorandum o f Understanding & Joint Venture Operating Agreement
April 19, 1993 - Production Sharing Contracts signed - SNEPCO
- July 1993 - Sixth Participation Agreement; (NNPC = 55%, Shell = 30%, E lf= 10%, Agip = 5%)
- SNEPCO starts drilling first Exploration well
■ November 1995 - NLNG Final Investment Decision taken
March 30, 1998 - Shell Nigeria Gas Company established; Shell Nigeria Oil Products established
■ Dec. 2002 - Commencement o f production from EA field.
* October 5, 2003 - Achievement o f 1 million + barrels o f oil per day production from SPDC operations.
■ 2004 -A restructuring exercise; Nigerians placed in top positions o f Management.
■ January 1,2005 - New SPDC launched, Basil Omiyi appointed first Nigerian MD.
■ September 1, 2005 - Basil Omiyi became Country' Chair, Nigeria; oversees all Shell Companies in Nigeria as 
well as Shell interests in NLNG
This phase is also characterised by acceleration in the increase o f  government 
profit tax and profit intake. In the post-colonial period, the Petroleum Profit Tax 
increased from 50% to 55% in 1973, to 67.75% in 1974, and to 84% in 1975. 
Royalties increased from 12.5% to 16.6% in 1974, to 20% in 1975 (Khan 
1994). This policy o f  indigenisation o f the oil industry was accelerated in the 
1970s (Turner, 1980), and by 1979; the state had acquired a 60% ownership in 
all major foreign oil companies. During this period, Nigeria embarked on 
developing the state’s institutional capacity and indigenisation policies were 
accompanied by a restructuring o f the state oil administration through the 
creation o f  the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) in 1971, which joined
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foreign companies in the exploration, prospecting and production of oil directly, 
or through its subcontractors or subsidiaries. The NNOC merged with the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources9 in 1977 to become the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The NNPC also combined the functions of an 
oil company with the extended regulatory powers of a ministry. This peculiar 
role enabled NNPC to issue licences to its so-called competitors. Its ambitious 
goal was to eventually control the entire oil industry in Nigeria, including oil 
exploration and production (NNPC, 1986b).
From the policy point of view, the creation of NNPC strengthened the 
government’s negotiating power, in its engagement with the oil MNCs. 
However, this changed little in the oil production itself as Shell continued to run 
the joint venture on behalf of the government and retained control over venture 
operations (Biersteker, 1987, 241). Despite the government’s apparent political 
advantage, the balance of power had not considerably shifted, as the country 
depended hugely on oil revenues by 98%. The most prominent cause of this 
increased dependency is the fall in production of other export commodities that 
Nigeria used to produce, as depicted in Fig. 5.2. According to Frynas (2000), 
both the government and the oil companies neglected social and environmental 
impacts.
The third phase of the Nigerian oil policy involves the 1980s and 1990s and 
beyond. The energy conservation policies of the 1980s coupled with low energy 
prices saw a considerable decrease in exploration by foreign companies. This 
forced the government into a more accommodating tone toward the oil 
companies, to the extent that, between 1983 and 1997, the fiscal incentives for
9 The Ministry o f  Petroleum Resources was re-established in 1986.
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foreign oil companies were improved 4 times (Alii 1997). Faced with the 
immediate problems of falling oil revenue and political crises during the 1980s, 
the government further improved the fiscal terms of oil company operators in 
order to woo investors. For example, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
was introduced in 1986 (Soremekun, 1995) and subsequently reviewed in 1991, 
that offered increased financial incentives to oil MNCs (Adepetun and Segun, 
1996). Two years later in 1993, new incentives were introduced for exploration 
in offshore deep-water areas, including low royalty rates, and higher cost 
recovery allowances (Barrows 1995). In 1999, the deep offshore and inland 
Basin Production Sharing Contracts Decree was passed for the development of 
offshore areas, which included fiscal terms that are favourable to the industry. 
The government continued its policy of diversification and indigenisation by 
granting a large number of licences to indigenous oil companies. While 12 
companies had oil prospecting licences and oil mining leases in 1986, their 
number had risen to 50 by 199810. In 1999, at least 11 oil-prospecting licences 
were allocated to indigenous companies (Guardian Lagos, May 18th, 1999). The 
total concession area rose from 118,156 sq. km in 1966 to 225,444 sq. km in 
1998 and it has expanded further since 1998.
10 A large proportion of licenses were held by NNPC and its subsidiaries, and its joint ventures.
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Fig. 5.1 Growth of Nigeria’s oil Export, 1963-1966
G ro w th  o f  N ig e ria 's  Oil E x p o r ts , 1963-1996
(Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbooks)
 % of oil exp
O ther expo
Fig. 5.2 Nigeria’s Crude Oil Production, 1958-1997
2500
2000
I
e  1500
-Q
S
§
c
I  1000
a
1
CL
500
Nigeria, C rude  Oil P ro d u ctio n , 1958-1997
155
The next two sections embark on an examination of the oil exploitation business 
in an attempt to locate social and environmental issues of oil production within 
the business movement vs. Oil MNC engagement. This will help contextualise 
the research findings on Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria, within 
the local operational business framework.
5.6.2 Goals, objectives and interests of an oil producing state
According to Fee (1988), the petroleum exploitation strategy and development 
process is a systematic process, planned and executed by successive 
governments in order to ensure that a number of pre-selected socio-economic 
benefits accrue to the state from the exploitation of its petroleum resources. 
Whilst, under the influence of ruling political parties or government ideology, a 
host country may adopt various strategies and means of maximising the benefits 
of the state, the overarching goal of the state is the maximisation of benefits and 
control of oil production operations to ensure an orderly development of the 
industry. The state ensures that its goals are complementary and consistent, 
enabling the maximisation of state revenue as well as state participation. It is 
also important to ensure that oil MNCs’ interests are protected in order to ensure 
continued investment (Fee, 1988). This is however predicated on the 
assumption that the state has stable and effective state institutions. Although all 
oil-producing states pursue similar objectives, they differ in terms of 
implementation, as they do not possess similar institutional, technological and 
financial capabilities.
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Map 5.1: Shell’s oil production installations in Nigeria: Overview o f licensed blocks, oil fields and
pipeline networks. Source: EM S Gip.
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According to Fee, developing countries are more dependent on the oil MNCs that 
developed ones (Soremekum, 1995). The petroleum development process consists 
o f many steps, which include the establishment o f goals and objectives, industry 
diagnosis and an understanding o f the context o f worldwide exploitation and 
production o f oil and related challenges and methodologies applied by the industry 
at large. To maximise the above interests and stated objectives, the state must also 
understand and establish the fiscal and legal arrangements that define the 
relationship with the oil companies involved in the oil exploitation process. These 
mechanisms are the type o f exploitation agreement, type o f licensing policy and 
negotiated levels o f loyalty and taxation policy (Fee, 1988). Another important 
feature o f  state-company relations is the need to maximise their control over the 
operations o f the oil companies, particularly ensuring that the exploration and 
development programmes entered into by these companies are carried out according
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to the best oil field practice. The level of participation in oil operational activities is 
essentially determined by the reality of the exploration and producing situation 
existing in each country. According to Fee (1988), the key strategic factors that 
govern the state’s petroleum exploitation strategy selection and ensuing decisions 
are the levels of oil reserves, access to capital and the level of technological 
advancement.
Fig.5.3 Basis for State and Oil Companies’ Engagement (Adapted from Fee, 1988; Frynas, 2002)
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On this basis, Nigeria offers low operating costs and high profit potential. 
According to Frynas (2000), Nigeria was considered attractive to oil managers 
thanks to the size and number of unapprised discoveries, most of which are 
suspected to be in the Niger Delta and in the adjacent offshore areas, which 
covers 240,000 sq. km, of which 31% is onshore (Ashton-Jones et al., 1998) in 
Frynas, 2000, p.22). The Niger Delta (both onshore and offshore areas) is 
particularly geologically conducive to the formation and accumulation of oil 
and gas. Accordingly, the key advantage of Nigeria for oil companies is the high 
rate of success in drilling operations, judging from the number of successful oil 
and gas well discoveries in relation to the total number of drillings11. On this 
basis, Nigeria appears to be attractive for investment in oil exploration and 
production, as the risk of loss is limited compared to the majority of 
alternatives. We will later come back to this after we examine what drives oil 
MNCs’ investment decisions, in the next section.
5.6.3 Goals, objectives and interests of oil MNCs
The oil industry has its own set of strategic goals. From a strategic management 
vantage point, all patterns of decisions and actions related to oil exploitation are 
aimed at improving or maintaining the firm’s survival, profitability, and growth. 
Therefore, since the resources are limited, each company ranks exploitation 
ventures according to their profitability potential, and possesses various 
methods for assessing the present value of all exploration ventures, which 
include subjective and objective costs. While exploration and production costs 
can be estimated accurately, estimates of potential reserves made from seismic
l l  According to Frynas (2 0 0 2 ), the total number of dry wells, which was 5 .0 0 7 % in Nigeria, compared
with 2 2 .0 1% in the US, 7 .81  in Indonesia, 17.8 6 % in Vietnam and 15 .2 4 % in Peru?
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data are highly subjective. In general, factors influencing corporate investment 
decisions of oil MNCs include a relatively good probability of locating 
sufficient reserves to warrant production, and an acceptable level of political 
risk; and the legal framework by which the search for oil is regulated should be 
firmly based to ensure stability and predictability (Fee, 1988; Lax, 1984). This 
is depicted in Table 5.1. Factors that influence the maximisation of oil company 
profits are petroleum prospectivity of the area, securing sources of crude in 
order to ensure the future existence of the company, technical and political risk. 
While the fears of expropriation or fiscal risk are expected to be high in 
developing countries, this is offset by the dependency of these countries on 
resource extraction projects, so that they cannot afford to make MNCs 
uncomfortable (Fee 1988, p 30).
Table 5.2 Drivers of investment in oil exploitation.
I. Economic elements II. Political elements
Profitability Criteria 
Rate of Return
Pay Back period on Investment
The profit to investment
The rate of return on investment
The net present value profit
The discounted profit-to-investment
ratio
Fiscal svstem 
Exploitation agreement 
Licensing policy 
Royalty payments 
Bonus payments 
Taxation system 
Market factors 
Price o f oil 
Development cost 
Cost o f technology
D. Institutional conditions
Access to high level o f technology 
Access to capital
Linkages with local industry via NOC 
International aid institution involvement 
Condition o f fiscal regime 
Official Depletion policy 
Government ideology
III. Physical/ environnemental elements
Geological Drosnectivitv 
Size of reserves
Amount o f geological uncertainty
While technology, oil price and development costs are determined by 
international markets and hence are beyond the influence of the host
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Government or Oil MNC, the latter remain aware of the effect on profitability 
of changes in the fiscal system, including other issues in the operating country 
context that may potentially raise the costs of operations such as CSR related 
matters. Where political risk is high, companies either stop investing or raise the 
capital required for investing in a politically risky country, requiring a higher 
return on investment (Lax, 1983).12.
5.7. Summary
The purpose of this Chapter was to locate the Nigerian case study with respect 
to a wider series of environmental and social controversies that Shell faced, the 
context from which the CSR agenda at Shell emerged. To this end, the chapter 
discussed the emergence of a CSR agenda at Shell that it has situated within the 
context of the rise of environmentalism and environmental justice movement in 
the last three decades, largely driven by a resurgent global civil society. The 
environmental justice movement emerged in the 1980s as a result of the 
confluence of events and reports that brought the terms ‘environmental racism’ 
and ‘environmental justice’ into the public sphere and into policy discourses. 
The events that gave impetus to the environmental justice movement include the 
series of environmental pollution scandals in corporate America, which brought 
corporations into dispute with highly mobilised grassroots communities. This 
resonated in Nigerian Niger Delta, where the grassroots movement led by Ken
12 The assignment of risk premium is arbitrary. The company demanding high RoR may exclude itself from 
profitable investment opportunities. Risks, whether geological, political, and technical are an inherent feature 
o f the international oil industry. Improvements in technology can lead to a reduction in geological and 
technical risks associated with oil and gas developments. Similarly, improvements in the techniques employed 
in assessing political risks may lead to the utilization of mechanisms, such as home country or international 
financial institution involvement in resource development projects, which can allay the fears of the company 
without penalizing the host country. In the international oil industry environment, MNC avoid any risk 
associated with ownership o f resources; risks to oil company personnel and installations.
161
Saro Wiwa led an uprising against the government and the oil companies, Shell 
in particular. The recent history of Shell offers the opportunity to study the 
conflict between environmental and social development groups and a 
multinational corporation. A succession of scandals put Shell in the limelight of 
both the media, but most importantly, the company came head to head with the 
environmental justice movement in Nigeria as well as in the United States. Shell 
represented the global and the local bete noir of environmental protests. The 
chapter also outlined the nature of state vs. oil MNC relationship in an attempt 
to locate subsequent analysis in the context of the oil exploitation business. As 
such, all the issues discussed in the previous chapters (2 & 3) concerning 
MNCs, such as power, environmental impacts, social impacts, regulations, run 
across this chapter, and provide the setting for the empirical part of the thesis in 
the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter six
EM ERGENCE OF SH ELL’S CSR AGENDA IN NIGERIA
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter aims to understand the nature of Shell’s CSR agenda as 
manifested in its policies and strategies in Nigeria. It also presents the findings 
of my field research. The information presented is based on elite interviews 
conducted between February 2004 and March 2005. Respondents were 
executives from Shell International, based in London, Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), development and environmental 
NGOs based and operating in Nigeria, and those based and operating from the 
United Kingdom. The chapter also draws from extensive use of archival sources 
that were systematically collected and analysed. Drawing from these findings, 
the chapter first outlines the main drivers of Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria. 
Second, it describes the main pillars of Shell’s CSR programme and outlines 
how the different elements of the programme are justified and the internal 
delivery processes and implementation strategies. Lastly, the chapter outlines 
how CSR projects map on the company’s business operations and what is the 
context and rationale for implementing specific CSR investments.
6.3 The drivers of Shell’s CSR policies in Nigeria
6.3.1 Social protests, environmental disasters and reputation crisis
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In Nigeria, community protests against oil MNCs, and Shell in particular have
been long-standing. Societal activists and campaigning groups have often
deemed the company’s policies on some high profile issues ethically
problematic, which has increasingly provoked controversial reactions.
According to a Shell official:
The external world’s influence on the corporate way of thinking about the 
merit of stakeholder engagement has been increasing since the 1960-70s, 
for instance with Vietnam, which put tremendous public pressure on 
Shell. In the 1980s, South Africa was a big issue. There was a big 
campaign, pressing for regime change. Shell management decided to 
maintain its operations in South Africa against the anti-apartheid 
movement of the 1970-80s on the basis that Shell could offer a useful 
influence by staying. Shell thoroughly engaged with the pressures, 
successfully making its case. [117]
Throughout the 1990s, problems reached a critical level, with major incidents
and protests threatening to undermine Shell’s reputation. Rights-based groups,
environmentalists, and campaigning civil society organisations gradually
resented Shell. Protests grew more and more in intensity, while support for the
oil MNC plummeted. According to a Shell executive:
What happened is that, with Brent Spar as with Nigeria, we did not 
engage. The senior management made a decision that this was not a risk. 
As it turned out, this was an error of judgement. We looked around for 
support, but we did not have anybody to help in order to address the 
critics. The academics were not there, friendly NGOs were not there. It 
was a mistake. Engagement is as much about bringing the supporters on 
board, as it is trying to address the critics. [17]
It was in the mid-1990s that the Shell management openly and officially 
recognised that the company was being affected by negative social perceptions 
and may have lost touch with social expectations. This followed a series of 
social and environmental disasters associated with the oil MNC’s operations, as 
indicated by the following comments by a Shell external relations executive:
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At Shell, we often think that the watershed was the mid-1990s when we 
had the Brent Spar and the Ken Saro Wiwa incidents. These are key 
watersheds particularly, I think, for senior management to realise that our 
social responsibilities were much bigger than they had imagined. [117]
Hence, the Ogoni crisis can be seen as a major driving force for Shell’s CSR
agenda in Nigeria. The incident awakened the management to the need to
actively manage its social and environmental impacts in Nigeria. By this time, it
was obvious that corporate reputation had reached its lowest level, and that
social protests had become a serious threat to the corporation’s long-term
commercial interests. The loss of reputation undermined the company’s licence
to operate and long-term access to the country’s oil resources. There were fears
that Shell could lose business to its competitors when bidding for new projects,
on the ground that it had little capacity to manage its projects responsibly.
According to a Shell executive, the realisation that this could be a major
business risk mobilised Shell’s management for change.
The important need to change was captured at the Committee of 
Management Directors’ level. That is why it took effect. These people 
suddenly woke up, and recognised almost in a catastrophic manner that 
the incidents were business threatening. It was not just being good, nice 
and careful. This was now becoming a key business risk. If you do not 
manage these kinds of issues properly, you are simply not going to win 
future projects. [113]
6.3.2 The impact of local community pressure
As mentioned earlier, the Brent Spar and Ogoni incidents exposed many social, 
environmental and other human rights problems associated with the oil MNC. 
There were negative reactions from all directions in Nigeria as well as 
internationally, affecting both the external and the internal context of Shell’s 
operations. These conflicts represent the tipping point of what was locally 
acceptable in terms of social and environmental deterioration in Nigerian oil
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producing regions, and remain a landmark for popular opposition to 
multinational oil companies and to Shell in particular.
As a direct consequence, Shell’s operations were systematically and 
increasingly being threatened at site level due to community protests, sabotage 
of pipelines, kidnapping of Shell personnel, and other actions. Shell executives 
reported that these practices were becoming more widespread and the CSR 
programmes were introduced in part to deal with them. According to a Shell 
executive:
The impact of this context on business is not negligible. Community 
protests and blockade of oil facilities financially undermine company 
operations, where on-time project delivery is an important constraint with 
serious financial implications. Companies make decisions about how to 
carry out their day-to-day operations that have impacts on local 
communities. [117]
The losses related to community sabotage and the company as depicted in
Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, quantifies oil thefts. According to a Shell executive,
these losses had far-reaching implications in terms of insurance costs and
revenue projections:
Field development is capital intensive and as such, any project delays 
have considerable financial implications. The sooner you get the oil out 
of the ground and off to the market the better. If you add the risk to 
personnel and the losses due to theft and sabotage, you are talking of a 
major business risk to us and to the Nigerian states. [II]
It was suggested that communities considered that attacking Shell was their best
means of negotiation and the best way to provoke a government response to
community grievances. As Shell produces 49% of Nigeria’s total oil production
and oil revenues represent 98% of national export revenues, an attack on Shell
inevitably received government attention. Under the existing operating
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agreement between the government and the MNOCs, security in the operating 
regions is the responsibility of the state.
The state has often responded to community protests through violence rather
than seeking dialogue and peaceful resolution. The succession of dictatorial
military regimes did little to appease these conflicts, but consolidated its
reputation for violence. Human Rights Watch concludes that the police are
ineffective in controlling the high crime rate and that the inadequate size of the
force, low morale, poor working conditions and insufficient training all
encourage corruption and brutality within the force and reinforce its lack of
respect among the population (HRW, 2002). The failure of government security
forces to curb crime has been attended by the formation of vigilante groups and
gangs across Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2002c). These gangs represent
ethnic groups. For example, the O’odua Peoples Congress (OPC) was
established to promote Yoruba interests in the Southwest; the Movement for the
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biaffra (MASSOB) to represent the
Igbos; and the Egbesu Boys represent the Ijaws o f the Delta (Ibid.). Despite
regional differences, communities share the common elements of poverty,
identity, corruption, crime, and frustration. These frustrations take ethnic and
religious dimensions. Conflicts arose between communities themselves or
between communities and the federal government, but they were all centred on
the allocation and redistribution of national resources and oil revenues and
ownership in particular. According to Charles Alao:
Each individual conflict mutates into different types of conflicts and sub­
conflicts at different levels of society. There are at least 13 different types 
of conflicts in Nigeria, most of which are intertwined to the extent that 
attempts to solve one erupts into the other, the different parties to the 
conflict engage in shifting alliances. They could be deadly enemies today
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and allies against a common enemy tomorrow; they constantly defy any 
effort to pacify the Nigerian society. [52]
Ethnic, religious, and geographical boundaries dissect the Nigerian political 
scene. These boundaries have overlaid immense oil wealth and entrenched 
patronage networks. Because of Nigeria’s political geography and years of 
ethnicity-based patronage, ethnic identity has become deeply entrenched and 
politicised. This overcomplicates Shell’s relationship with local communities, 
which is vital to maintain a stable operational context. At the heart of these fears 
and the associated ethnic conflicts is the highly political issue of access to 
scarce resources. It is widely speculated that although conflicts break out 
between local ethnic groups, this is often instigated by wider regional 
resentments between the commercial hub of the south-west and the politically 
dominant north, and the plundered oil fields of the southeast (BBC, 2002). The 
geography of conflict in Nigeria as depicted in Fig. 6.4 shows regional conflicts 
over oil exploration, conflicts over territorial boundaries and ownership of 
resources, and political-military conflicts, most of which are located in the oil 
producing regions of Nigeria. These conflicts started as clashes between local 
communities and the federal government, over the fact that oil revenues were 
not flowing back from the federal government via the regional government 
through to the local government.
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Since the introduction o f civilian rule in 1999, most Nigerians contend that 
there has been an increase in levels o f criminality. According to Amnesty 
International:
Nigerian citizens see themselves confronted with one o f  the most serious 
spirals o f violence in decades, in the shape o f  increasing crime rate and 
inter-communal clashes. The majority o f the population perceives crime 
as the main problem facing society. So much so that a large degree o f  
human rights violations and abuses are justified in the context o f a 
campaign o f law enforcement against crime (Amnesty International, 
2002c :1).
Map.6.1 the Geography of Conflict in Nigeria: Violent Conflicts by Region13 (1973-2003)
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In this context o f government repression o f violent conflicts, Shell was accused 
o f being a government accomplice in the repression o f  the protesting 
communities.
'3 The Nigerian territory was previously subdivided in six regions, namely the Northern, Northeastern, Southern, 
Southwestern, Western, and Central regions.
1 7 0
According to an NGO executive:
In the absence of a federal government department to which grievances 
could be addressed, and given the historically close collaboration between 
the Nigerian State and Shell, the latter was increasingly perceived as an 
accomplice of the government and its violent tactics against communities. 
As such, an attack on Shell was justifiably seen as an attack on the 
Nigerian Government. [35]
In all, the trust between Shell and communities in the oil producing region had 
been seriously undermined by violent incidents, the impacts of oil production 
and the company’s association with a government of Nigeria that was perceived 
as insensitive to the plight of rural communities.
6.3.3 The impact of international scrutiny of Nigeria Shell operations
In an integrated supply chain, the local practices of a multinational company’s 
business units in the international context cannot go unnoticed. In addition to 
the operational risks posed by local conflicts and community pressures, Shell’s 
Nigerian operations were receiving considerable international media and 
political scrutiny. As Table 6.1 shows, Nigerian oil producing regions were 
receiving frequent visits from journalists and diplomats from Nigeria’s major 
export markets. Between 1997 and 2001, there were 19 diplomatic visits and 6 
media visits from the US to Nigeria, and 28 diplomatic visits and 40 media 
visits from the EU during the same period. While these areas were the main 
destinations of Nigerian oil exports, they were also the major targets of 
environmental and social rights activists, who exposed the issues of community 
grievances in Nigeria to the world. This generated tremendous pressure on Shell 
from international as well as domestic consumers.
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This research established that many international stakeholders were familiar 
with the problems being experienced by the communities in the oil producing 
regions of Nigeria due to the media coverage in their respective countries.
Table 6.1 Media and Political Interest in Shell Nigeria Operations: 1997-2001
Region Number of 
diplomatic visits 
(1997-2001)
Visits from foreign 
journalists 
(1997-2001)
Destination of Nigerian 
exports 
(1997, % of total)
North America 19 6 (USA only) 38%
Europe 29 40 37.8%
Africa 6 8 4%
Asia 12 2 4.3%
North America 3 4.3%
(Source: SPDC, 2005)
As depicted in Fig.6.2, Shell developed its CSR policies at a time when its
Nigerian operations were under increasing media scrutiny and pressure, and
when part of this reporting was conveying a highly negative image of corporate
practices. Shell was faced with a series of crises concerning its global and local
reputation. Increasingly, negative responses from the global civil society, the
media and public scrutiny, combined with the operational risks because of
community sabotage of oil production installations. The company’s
management knew that it was culturally out of touch with social expectations
with regard to human rights, which was increasingly important, especially
during the democratic movement that swept developing countries in the 1980s
and 1990s. A Shell report recognised this as follows:
Shell’s economic contribution to society, technology leadership, and 
product quality are recognised, but on human rights and environmental 
care, both the general public and opinion leaders (The Shell Report, 1999) 
rate Shell poorly.
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Fig. 6.4 -  M edia Report Analysis.
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The next section explores the relations between Shell’s CSR programmes and 
corporate objectives and examines whether, and how, these objectives have 
affected Shell’s stakeholder engagement and the design and structure o f its CSR 
programmes.
6.3.4 The impact of corporate culture
The succession o f high profile incidents in the 1990s and the popular outrage 
against Shell led to low employee morale. One Shell Group external relations 
executive describes the internal loss o f morale among the work force, as 
follows:
I had been working for Shell for 15 years by then, and if  somebody would 
have said to me before 1995, which organisation you worked for, I would 
have been proud to say that I work for Shell. By the end o f the summer of  
1995, if  someone asked whom you worked for, I would say I was in the 
energy industry. There was a genuine emotional reaction, and that was 
felt at the very top o f the organisation right through to anybody who had 
given any thought to it at other levels. [113]
The internal structures and processes were however not fit to enable adequate 
and prompt response to the new challenges. Shell was decentralised, and most 
management roles and responsibilities were largely devolved to the Group’s
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operational businesses. The organisational structure was complex and Shell’s 
decision-making was such that the headquarters had little direct control of the 
company’s constituent companies.
According to Neale (1997:96), from 1959 to 1995, Shell was organised
“according to an unusually complex matrix structure, where most of the
decision-making was concentrated at the level of more than 100-odd local
operating companies”. Shell’s matrix structure was no longer effective. It was
increasingly bureaucratic and not sufficiently entrepreneurial. Shell was
managed in such way that there was little decentralised coordination, which
made the company vulnerable to external shocks. The company’s pre-1996 anti-
Kyoto stand is illustrative of Shell’s structural weaknesses. This did not
necessarily correspond to views held at the headquarters at that time, for reasons
that a Shell executive blames on the weakness and the complexity of the
company’s organisational structure and culture:
The decision to become a member of the Global Climate coalition, an 
anti-Kyoto industry coalition, was because the US branch of Shell group, 
which had been one of the key constituencies within Shell, became a 
member of the coalition, hence committing the whole group. Our 
operation in the USA was a member of that organisation [GCC]. Our 
operations that were very large in the USA were not wholly owned by 
Shell until 1997. It remained culturally removed, and there was a bit of 
legacy of the old way of thinking. It was through the US operations that 
we were party to this coalition. When we were establishing a Shell-wide 
policy, the local position was inconsistent with the Group’s policy on 
climate change. We withdrew from that. [113]
Shell was not well equipped for internal communication and coordination, and 
ultimately had little capacity to make use of information generated through 
monitoring. As a response to this situation, Wade elaborates on the pressing 
changes that were initiated on the following terms:
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We had to have an underlying [environmental] management system that 
gave accurate information on which to make decisions, better tuned, and 
verified down to operational level. [113]
Shell executives indicated that the Brent Spar and the Ogoni crisis demonstrated 
that the company had grown out of touch with societal expectations, and that the 
previous ethical principles were useless, as they were rarely, if ever 
implemented, for reasons elaborated above. Based on the recommendations of a 
1994 Mackenzie study, Shell embarked on a major reorganisation process, 
leading to a stronger degree of centralisation. Although the new organisational 
transformation plans were not entirely driven by the oil company’s awakening 
to corporate social responsibility, the company’s management regarded social 
and environmental challenges as new forms of risks that must be managed. As 
such, the new corporate reorganisation was an opportunity towards the 
formulation and the formalisation of Shell’s CSR agenda. A Shell executive 
explained:
This reorganisation had more important business reasons behind it, other 
than the new sustainability agenda. The Shell Group was in financial 
crisis, and the reorganisation was envisaged to enhance its 
competitiveness. It provided the opportunity to review the company’s 
sustainability policies among other business-organisational strategic 
considerations [].
The evidence points to the fact that social and environmental issues have forced 
their way into the heart of the business strategic objectives o f Shell’s 
reorganisation.
As such, corporate social responsibility became an essential addition to a 
broader agenda of corporate transformation, which was mainly motivated by
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business imperatives. This is highlighted in the comments of another Shell 
executive:
In 1994, we had kicked off a process of inquiry about the way we 
managed ourselves. Profitability was reducing compared to competitors; 
return on average capital employed was sleeping. We looked at our 
organisational structure business portfolio, our leadership qualities and 
our relationships, both internally and externally. Given the way we 
governed ourselves, we could not have anticipated, nor better managed 
the incidents that were later to unfold [such as the Ogoni incident] [113].
Social pressure accelerated internal changes in terms of CSR policy content, and
in establishing processes and structures to manage the issues, despite the fact
that the prospects for any future settlement of social and environmental
problems facing Nigeria’s oil producing regions were daunting. According to a
researcher from HRW:
There have been obvious historical instances of injustice. On the other 
hand, reversing the engineering is not an option, given the costs involved, 
which can only mean that the company is likely to remain exposed to 
recurrent protests by communities and the civil society. [137]
In addition, the pressure that Shell was under led to an elaborate attempt by the
company to re-cast itself as a social organisation, open and engaging, as
demonstrated in its stakeholder engagement practices.
We had to make it clear, both internally and externally, that we had the 
message, and that we were serious about responding to these words 
[pressures]. So, after a period of real deep reflection internally, the events 
of Nigeria and Brent Spar were utterly unacceptable to Shell people; we 
felt terrible in an emotional sense that we should be seen as failing in our 
responsibilities to the environment. The entire management was 
mobilised. [113 & 117]
Shell embarked on elaborate plans to establish structures and processes for 
implementing its CSR policies, as reported in the following section.
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6.4 The pillars o f Shell’s CSR programme in Nigeria
6.4.1 Policies, guidelines and implementation processes at the Group level
As mentioned in previous sections, Shell responded to its deteriorating image 
and reputation by launching a large-scale CSR programme in Nigeria. Shell 
undertook a process for establishing its CSR agenda, firstly by a widespread 
consultation both globally and in Nigeria, a re-formulation of Shell’s business 
principles, and outlining the company’s CSR policies and strategic guidelines. 
The aim of the one-year “society changing expectations” project that ran from 
1995 to 1996 marked the launch of a thinking process designed to rally the 
organisation behind a change agenda that was in the making, but also to get a 
true picture of how Shell was perceived at the time. According to Wade:
Shell conducted a major survey in several countries on the topic of its 
reputation. In addition, the company conducted a series of workshops and 
roundtables involving a wide range of organisations, including critics, 
where the latter could voice their views. This broad inquiry marked the 
beginning of Shell’s systematic strategy for engaging with its external 
stakeholders. The outcome was the realisation that we had to change our 
past practices, review its business principles and its positions and policies 
for sustainable development, and implement various policies including a 
major review of the internal and external reporting system. [113]
Shell’s sustainability advisor reports the perceptions that Civil Society 
Organisations held about Shell as follows:
People’s trust has been reduced and as trust diminished, the demand for 
openness and transparency grew and the implication has been the 
increasing request for independent verification from trusted third parties. 
That was the key piece of learning. We had to earn people’s trust this 
time. People here spent a lot of time talking to Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, to really get hold of human rights issues and try to 
answer questions such as - what could we have done in Nigeria ?[I17].
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Hence, the documentation and dissemination of the company’s practices
became the key to corporate engagement. The company therefore established
reporting mechanisms relating to its social and environmental performance, and
systematically collected data for its corporate social and environmental reports,
published and disseminated amongst the company’s stakeholders. To ensure the
credibility of the information reported, Shell has established auditing of its
reporting processes, by well-established auditing firms14. While the company
was often portrayed as conservative and as less than forthcoming in terms of
transparency, it embarked on an extraordinary transparency crusade, inviting
external stakeholders into its premises for CSR related meetings or secondments
programmes, and endorsing new reporting standards for transparency and self-
regulatory accountability schemes, as depicted in Table 6.2. In addition, new
business principles (See Box 6.1) were established to reflect this new thinking.
According to a corporate advisor:
The general responsibility for codes is the Group’s External Relations. In 
terms of reporting, it is the Reporting Team. The External Relations and 
Policy team manage public policy and social issues such as human rights, 
bribery and corruption. We also have an environmental team with 
dedicated advisors for climate change and biodiversity. The External 
Relations team manages the voluntary codes we support. For example, 
the Extractive Industry’s Transparency Initiative (EITI) is linked with 
Exploration and Production (EP) business. We usually have a focal point 
based in Exploration and Production. He would, for example, advise the 
External Communications director in the Exploration and Production 
business and the top executive committee on the support for EITI 
principles. They make a supporting statement, as a means by which we 
declare that we are supportive of the code. Usually, a sponsor of the code 
and a focal point seeks support from within the company’s business units, 
as well as from external partners such as NGOs. Progress with a specific 
code varies, depending on whom you would have involved, and the 
salience of the issues addressed by the code. [114]
*4 KPMG has been auditing Shell’s environmental performance in Nigeria.
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Table 6.2. Codes of Conduct adopted by Shell
Code Yr.
Adopted
Implementation guidelines
1. United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights
1948 Business and Human Rights- A management 
primer
Human Rights Dilemmas- A Training 
Supplement
Business and Child Labour- A management 
primer
2. Statement of General Business Principle; 1997 Declaration statement-external, communication 
oriented- no management guideline.
3. Environmental management standard 
Risk and internal control policy
1997 Biodiversity standard 
Health management standard 
Animal testing standard 
Security standard
4. 1JLO Declaration on the Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work
1998
5. Diversity and inclusiveness Standard 1999
6. Global Sullivan Principles of Social 
Responsibility
1999
7. ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat 
Extortion and Bribery in International 
Business Transactions
1999 Dealing with Bribery and Corruption- First and 
second edition
Bribery and Corruption-Dealing with dilemmas
8. United Nations Global Compact 2 0 0 0 Business and Child Labour- A management primer
9. ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy
2 0 0 0 Competing Fairly- An antitrust primer for Shell 
Staff
10. Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights
2 0 0 1
11. OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises
2 0 0 1
12. Transparency International Business 
Principles on Countering Bribery
2 0 0 2 Dealing with Bribery and Corruption- First and 
second edition
Bribery and Corruption-Dealing with dilemmas
13. Global Reporting Initiative 2 0 0 2 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines
14. TRACF The High Cost of Small Bribes 2003 Dealing with Bribery and Corruption- First and 
second edition
Bribery and Corruption-Dealing with dilemmas
15. Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative
2003 Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions
16. ICC Business Charter on Sustainable 
Development
2003 Contributing to Sustainable Development -A 
management primer
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Box 6.1 Shell’s Business Principles (SBP) 1
Shell's Business Principles1 are clearly laid out in its 2002 Shell Report. They are broken into 9 
Principles:
Principle 1 -  Objectives
The objectives of Shell companies are to engage efficiently, responsibly and profitably in the oil, gas, 
chemicals and other selected businesses and to participate in the search for and development o f other 
sources of energy. Shell companies seek a high standard of performance and aim to maintain a long­
term position in their respective competitive environments.
Principle 2 -  Responsibilities
Shell companies recognise five areas of responsibility:
To shareholders:
To protect shareholders’ investment, and provide an acceptable return.
To customers:
To win and maintain customers by developing and providing products and services which offer value in 
terms of price, quality, safety and environmental impact, which are supported by the requisite 
technological, environmental and commercial expertise.
To employees:
To respect the human rights o f their employees, to provide their employees with good and safe 
conditions of work, and good and competitive terms and conditions of service, to promote the 
development and best use of human talent and equal opportunity employment, and to encourage the 
involvement of employees in the planning and direction o f their work, and in the application of these 
Principles within their company. It is recognised that commercial success depends on the full 
commitment of all employees.
To those with whom they do business:
To seek mutually beneficial relationships with contractors, suppliers and in joint ventures and to 
promote the application of these principles in so doing. The ability to promote these principles 
effectively will be an important factor in the decision to enter into or remain in such relationships.
To society:
To conduct business as responsible corporate members o f society, to observe the laws of the countries 
in which they operate, to express support for fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role 
of business and to give proper regard to health, safety and the environment consistent with their 
commitment to contribute to sustainable development. These five areas o f responsibility are seen as 
inseparable. Therefore, it is the duty of management continuously to assess the priorities and discharge 
its responsibilities as best it can on the basis o f that assessment.
Principle 3 -  Economic principles
Profitability is essential to discharging these responsibilities and staying in business. It is a measure 
both of efficiency and of the value that customers place on Shell products and services. It is essential to 
the allocation of the necessary corporate resources and to support the continuing investment required to 
develop and produce future energy supplies to meet consumer needs. Without profits and a strong 
financial foundation it would not be possible to fulfil the responsibilities outlined above. Shell 
companies work in a wide variety of changing social, political, and economic environments, but in 
general they believe that the interests o f the community can be served most efficiently by a market 
economy. Criteria for investment decisions are not exclusively economic in nature but also take into 
account social and environmental considerations and an appraisal of the security o f the investment.
Principle 4 -  Business integrity
Shell companies insist on honesty, integrity, and fairness in all aspects o f their business and expect the 
same in their relationships with all those with whom they do business. The direct or indirect offer, 
payment, soliciting, and acceptance of bribes in any form are unacceptable practices. Employees must 
avoid conflicts o f interest between their private financial activities and their part in the conduct of 
company business. All business transactions on behalf of a Shell company must be reflected accurately 
and fairly in the accounts of the company in accordance with established procedures and be subject to 
audit.
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Principle 5 -  Political activities 
Of companies
Shell companies act in a socially responsible manner within the laws of the countries in which they 
operate in pursuit of their legitimate commercial objectives.
Shell companies do not make payments to political parties, organisations or their representatives or 
take any part in party politics. However, when dealing with governments, Shell companies have the 
right and the responsibility to make their position known on any matter, which affects themselves, 
their employees, their customers, or their shareholders. They also have the right to make their 
position known on matters affecting the community, where they have a contribution to make.
Of employees
Where individuals wish to engage in activities in the community, including standing for election to 
public office, they will be given the opportunity to do so where this is appropriate in the light of local 
circumstances.
Principle 6  -  Health, safety and the environment
Consistent with their commitment to contribute to sustainable development, Shell companies have a 
systematic approach to health, safety and environmental management in order to achieve continuous 
performance improvement.
To this end Shell companies manage these matters as any other critical business activity, set targets 
for improvement, and measure, appraise and report performance.
Principle 7 -  The community
The most important contribution that companies can make to the social and material progress of the 
countries in which they operate is in performing their basic activities as effectively as possible. In 
addition Shell companies take a constructive interest in societal matters which may not be directly 
related to the business. Opportunities for involvement -  for example through community, educational 
or donations programmes -  will vary depending upon the size of the company concerned, the nature 
o f the local society, and the scope for useful private initiatives.
Principle 8  -  Competition
Shell companies support free enterprise. They seek to compete fairly and ethically and within the 
framework of applicable competition laws; they will not prevent others from competing freely with 
them.
Principle 9 -  Communication
Shell companies recognise that in view of the importance of the activities in which they are engaged 
and their impact on national economies and individuals, open communication is essential. To this 
end, Shell companies have comprehensive corporate information programmes and provide full 
relevant information about their activities to legitimately interested parties, subject to any overriding 
considerations of business confidentiality and cost.
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Public policy, social and environmental issues are also assessed globally. A
social performance manager at Shell explained the processes as follows:
There was a group called issues and crisis management. They analysed 
the situation and recommended that we need to change, we need new 
policies and practices and new ideas in place. Then specialists in the area 
would come in, based on experience, and suggest what could be done 
successfully. Then you began to document the practice. Say what made 
go right, what made go wrong...how could we convert our practices into 
something, which is generically useful across the company? Therefore, 
the experiences in earlier projects, along with looking outside of Shell, 
engaging with others and finding out what they were thinking. [117]
The assessment of issues emerges from the business units, and is aggregated
and assessed globally, and the assessment is passed on to the business units
along the supply chain.
The practices that we adopt in different countries, of course, we will show 
whether we have been able to cascade that we believe in our activities in 
those countries. However, in terms of managing that process, it is more or 
less coordinated from the HQ. We pitch it at that level. What then you 
devolve to those countries depends on the peculiar issues that exist in 
those countries, the situation, and the discussions that take place. In doing 
that, there is a lot of interaction between themselves and the HQ, with 
regard to what is going on locally. [17]
6.4.2 Implementation of Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria.
As we said earlier, SPDC, which is the Shell-run joint venture in Nigeria, is a 
major portfolio for Shell Group. It has generated up to 13% of total Shell’s 
revenues. SPDC’s CSR performance has also created a lot of acrimony as 
discussed in the preceding chapters. Hence, Shell Group has established a 
permanent representation of SPDC at headquarters, where liaison officers serve 
as a link between local operations and global management in an advisory 
capacity.
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In Nigeria, there is a close relationship and interaction between the Shell
Group’s global, national and local levels in the implementation of CSR policies
in the local context. According to a Shell executive:
At Shell Nigeria, the group provides a framework for action, and overall 
operational guidelines. At the business unit level (national), the 
sustainable community development group manage the process of taking 
stock of the global guidelines, and developing operational plans and 
programmes to meet the targets established at the group level. The 
business case for committing resources to CSR issues, such as 
compensation for land use or environmental damage and community 
development programmes is developed at the field level where the 
operational business is taking place. [17]
There is a permanent Nigeria team at the Group level (Shell International), 
which serves as a link to Shell Nigeria. According to a Shell external relations 
advisor:
This is not the same for every country. Instead, it is because of the size of 
the portfolio, and the risks existing in Nigeria. Most of the things are 
handled at the Headquarters in association with SPDC. This is because 
the issues need local contributions, but are not entirely localised. These 
issues concern Shell as a multinational company. [16]
According to SPDC Liaison Officer based at Shell International:
For the Nigeria team at headquarters, their reporting line follows a special 
route. We are a specialist team, looking at the Nigerian issue because of 
the interest and the sensitivity of the portfolio. The EP external relations 
manager therefore has high profile in the organisation due to the 
importance and the significance of the [Nigerian] portfolio at risk. The 
Nigeria group is a two-way channel. They do not make decisions, they 
advise Nigeria, instead. They support them, advise them about what is 
going on internationally, what the audience, and stakeholders are 
interested in. [116]
Based on the above, Shell’s CSR policy implementation benefits from 
stakeholder engagement. However, do stakeholders have any significant bearing 
on corporate CSR policy objectives, and do they have any significant influence 
on how the company’s CSR is structured locally? This is examined in the next 
chapter.
183
6.4.3 CSR issues in oilfield development planning
During our interviews, we established that CSR related issues are now
considered at the start of every oil field development project. The board is
interested in the adjusted Net Present Value, a key indicator of expected return
on a portfolio. CSR is clearly considered as a bottom-line issue as this is
reflected in field development projects put forward for investment. A senior
Shell Nigeria executive explained:
It is the responsibility of each [oil] field engineer outlining a field 
development plan to factor in all potential risks, such as the risks related 
to community protests and environmental damage. There are many issues 
considered which weigh in the decision criteria when deciding to invest 
in oil exploration and production. These may for example include: 
whether there is high demand in local community development and the 
level of enforceability of local suppliers. If the latter is low, then you 
expect that there should be some delays in the project. Experts developing 
the project estimate how much it would affect the project. Other elements 
consist of factors such as the cost of corruption, crime, transferability of 
funds, fiscal issues that for example include corporate taxes and import 
and export taxes. Acknowledging these factors as risk factors to the 
project, the project manager identifies areas where there is likely to be 
problems, and trains project personnel accordingly. The way it has been 
done, is that you consider incidents, say ‘x’ percentage of probability that 
incident ‘y’ happens, and then you have to consider the risk for each 
incidence and a mitigating factor for each type of risk you expect. It is 
compulsory that you go through this process as early as possible before 
going into negotiations and of course, it is compulsory that this process 
has been done before it goes to the board for sanction. If the board sees 
that we have not discussed country risk as associated, they will not 
approve the project. Therefore, this process secures our role in business 
decisions. Country risk is a bottom-line issue, and it is a key decision 
making issue. You conduct a sensitivity analysis, in case it goes up. You 
want to establish what it would mean for the company, financially. The 
next process, is to input these factors in the capital budgeting process, 
where they are considered along with other input factors in the project 
balance sheet, such as: capita expenditure, capital inflow, and hence the 
net present value of investment and earnings, is adjusted by country risk.
[II]
Hence, Shell has developed tools enabling the company to assess the impact of 
CSR related issues on each oil business project. These assessments establish the
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basis for designing and structuring the company’s CSR programme and for
developing specific corporate CSR policies as mitigating factors. An executive
from Statoil, a competitor of Shell in the Nigerian oil sector, was interviewed in
order to establish whether the inclusion of social and environmental issues in
the business plan was common practice. The executive we interviewed at Statoil
corroborated the comments of the Shell executive as reported earlier in this
section on the same issue:
The tools and the process of country risk assessment provide a more 
correct value of the project, it shows that these will have a direct effect on 
the earnings of the project, and it also gives a natural opportunity to 
discuss specific risks with project management, hence you get a better 
understanding. It is systematic. Having the possibility of strikes and 
blockades in mind, the discussion is then about whether we should get 
involved. In case we are involved, then reputation risk and potential 
project delays are expected and taken into consideration in project 
development. [120]
However, these issues are not addressed specifically at the negotiation level
with the host country, since they may not have priority, but they are raised at the
local level where the investment in the CSR programme may sometimes be
reported as business risk expenditures.
In many cases, reputation risk is looming, especially from the voluntary 
sector. There are huge pressure groups that can almost push us out of 
business. Being owned by the government, we are very sensitive. You 
also must show that you have at least tried to do something, in the event 
that something bad happens. In the beginning, funding CSR programme 
came from the business. The country managers have their own budget, or 
additional budgets come from existing resources used for such issues as 
reputation. [120]
Although CSR policies are cascaded from the Headquarters to business units 
down the supply chain, the scope and reach of CSR programmes are decided at 
the business unit level, where each business unit considers the risks and 
opportunities involved in each portfolio, and draw from existing project budgets 
to fund CSR programmes [I 20].
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6.4.5 Reporting and assurance
Hence, the documentation and dissemination of the company’s practices 
became the key to corporate engagement. The company therefore established 
reporting mechanisms about its social and environmental performance, and the 
data set the bases for corporate social and environmental reports, published and 
disseminated amongst the company’s stakeholders. To ensure the credibility of 
the information reported, Shell has established auditing of its reporting 
processes by well-established auditing firms15. Shell reports were originally 
intended for corporate shareholders and potential investors; the company 
changed its initial reporting approach. It defined a much broader audience 
including all social constituencies interested in corporate activities and 
published its reports for this larger audience. Shell started publishing 
sustainability reports that broadened coverage to include social and 
environmental issues and performance.
Table 6.3 Shell Environmental Reports (1998-2007).
Year Theme
1998 Profits and Principles-Does there have to be a choice.
1999 People, planet and profits: An Act of Commitment
2 0 0 0 People, planet and profits: How do we stand
2 001 Meeting the energy challenge
2 0 0 2 Meeting the energy challenge
2003 Shell Sustainability Report: Meeting the energy challenge. Our progress in 
contributing to sustainable development
2004 Shell sustainability Report 2007 The other Shell Report 2004
2005 Meeting the energy challenge: Our progress in contributing to sustainable 
development 2005
2006 The Shell Sustainability Report: Meeting the Energy Challenge
However, critics claim that the purpose of the reports was mainly an attempt at 
explanation and justification of corporate decisions based on a broader set of 
corporate objectives. What is certain is that there has been an incorporation of
15 KPMG has been auditing Shell’s environmental performance in Nigeria.
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environmental and social criteria into Shell’s self-presentation, as reflected in 
processes of monitoring and accounting. Here the company portrays itself as a 
unitary actor, while the critics advance counter-claims. For instance, while 
reporting is central, and is claimed to build bridges to wide social 
constituencies, critics link it to the concern for corporate reputation, since it is 
widely recognised that corporate reporting aims to protect and enhance good 
corporate image and reputation. However, our finding is that Shell’s reporting is 
both instrumental and reflects moral, and ethical pursuits as well. Despite the 
non-mandatory aspect of corporate reporting, the drive to ensure the credibility 
of its content testifies to the fact that the company has internalised the sense of 
‘the just’ and the ‘unjust’, ‘the good’ and the ‘bad’ in the domain of business 
practice. The reporting process is also instrumental as it seeks not only to 
inform society of its new practices, but also to inform and persuade its target 
audiences, in order to be perceived in a new light, with its newly constructed 
image.
6.5 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has explored the influence of external pressures on Shell 
operations. While public pressure mounted on the global level and targeted 
‘dirty’ industry in general and the oil industry in particular, the pressures 
trickled down to the local spheres of multinational oil companies’ operations. 
Pressures also arose from the local context to become the subject of board level 
discussion within MNCs. Shell, which has been in Nigeria since the early 
1930s, was perceived as the main offender, and therefore became the prime 
target of protests and pressures in Nigeria and abroad. The main reason behind
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these pressures is, firstly the negative impacts of oil production on communities 
that has undermined their health, way of life and civil and human rights. With 
concessions covering areas of communities’ ancestral land, this was conceived 
as a breach of customary property rights. The company owed the legitimacy of 
their operations to the existence of the Federal State, which in turn is perceived 
as an artificial creation by the Nigerian elite and the colonial powers, as a cover 
to disenfranchise communities. Other sources of pressure also originated from 
the fact that the engineering model adopted exposed the population to 
significant amounts of pollution. This is perceived because of an unregulated 
industry taking advantage of the weakness of the state they helped create in the 
first place. A great deal of criticism and pressure has been levelled at Shell, 
especially due to the company’s historical role and positioning in Nigeria, as 
well as its size and omnipresence there. Nevertheless, the pressures that built in 
Nigeria, as well as globally, forced the company to change. Respondents 
specifically explained that Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria was designed to deal 
with mounting societal problems. The company’s CSR policies were 
particularly designed to address and regain the trust of communities, which is a 
vital and primary enabling condition to pursue operations, operate on time and 
maintain the safety of employees. A large-scale development programme was 
established and provided welfare services to communities in oil producing 
regions angered by government violence and neglect of abject poverty and dire 
environmental conditions because of oil production activities. Responsive 
community development programmes went along with a broad-based 
stakeholder engagement programme in Nigerian oil sector. This is covered in 
the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven
SHELL’S STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEM ENT  
PRACTICES IN NIGERIA
7.1 Introduction
The chapter details the field research relating to Shell’s CSR agenda regarding its 
stakeholder engagement dimension. It will seek to establish the geography of Shell’s 
stakeholders in Nigeria and the interests they represent, and the source of their 
legitimacy in engaging with Shells’ CSR programme. In addition, it will present 
findings relating to their understanding of Shell and their relationships to the company, 
its CSR obligations, and the assumptions underlying the respective claims and 
expectations they may have. It examines the facts relating to Shells’ CSR policy 
objectives in Nigeria, and the interrelations of corporate objectives and CSR policies as 
they affect the corporation’s stakeholder engagement in the design and structure of 
CSR programmes. A typology of Shell’s stakeholder involvement is provided and the 
role of each stakeholder group examined based on the dynamics of the cooperation 
developing between the company and its stakeholders. This chapter highlights the 
various interdependencies that become established between stakeholder groups and the 
company and enhances understanding about the dynamics of Shell’s stakeholder 
engagement in Nigeria. The data in this chapter is drawn from 48 individual and semi­
structured interviews with Shell executives and stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector 
and from an online survey conducted in 2005 on Shell Nigeria’s stakeholders.
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7.2 Shell’s CSR policy objectives in Nigeria
As outlined in chapter 6, Shell’s CSR policies in Nigeria have two main objectives, 
namely restoring corporate reputation, which had been tainted by incidents in the 
1990s, and securing a licence to operate by reducing societal hostility to the company 
and its operations in Nigeria. These two objectives shaped the implementation of 
Shell’s CSR policies and determined stakeholder engagement through social and 
environmental reporting, stakeholder consultation and engagement, financing 
community development. Shell launched an ambitious CSR programme in Nigeria, and 
expenditure on CSR has increased hugely since 1996. By 2000, the company had more 
than 100 employees engaged in local CSR related roles (Shell, 2001). Interviewees 
advanced three main reasons for the expansion in this programme: the operational 
context was increasingly conflictual, which increased the operational risks for Shell. 
The media, political and civil society scrutiny of Shell’s operations in Nigeria was 
increasing, and resulting in negative publicity, which was damaging for the Shell 
Group as a whole. Finally, relentless community pressure was threatening site 
operations in the oil producing regions.
7.3 Responding to pressure through stakeholder engagement
According to a Shell executive, a process of stakeholder consultation was launched
soon after the Ogoni crisis of 1996:
We launched a major consultation operation, sending community liaison officers 
into all communities with the intention of listening to their grievances and ideas. 
This was important for us to understand what the main issues were, define the 
problems, and understand who the main stakeholders were and their 
expectations. [115]
The outcome of these consultations enabled Shell to establish a local stakeholder 
engagement strategy. Although the consultation was broad based, Shell was mostly
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interested in those issues relating to the main business risks outlined earlier, namely 
corporate reputation, and operational risks, according the following comments by a 
Shell executive:
We consult broadly, but have in mind that we are not the government. We 
initiated consultation processes at the national level, as well as the community 
level, and people brought the views forward, and often made wish lists in terms 
of their respective needs. These were shared with our partners in Nigeria. 
However, by the end of the day, what is done has to be business relevant. [17]
However, Shell adopted a broad view of who corporate stakeholders were. According
to a Shell Corporate Advisor:
If you have been affected by Shell’s operations, or can affect Shell’s operation, 
you are considered as an eligible stakeholder. Obviously, we are more interested 
in those with major pressing issues, and the ability to affect us. For that matter, 
we are interested in NGOs, the media, academia, government, competitors, 
communities...etc. We keep an open mind as long as there is a business 
rationale to engage. [116]
From the analysis of the interview data, it also seemed that depending on the kind of 
relationship they have established, stakeholders of Shell Nigeria could be categorised 
according to their levels of access to the firm’s internal context as insiders or outsiders, 
based on whether they have volunteering, employment and sponsorship arrangements 
with Shell. Hence, Table 7.2 outlines a typology of stakeholders of Shell in Nigeria 
identified during the course of field research in Nigeria. A typology for understanding 
Shell’s engagement with its stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector is developed in the 
next section, based on the analysis of the empirical data. The typology reflects the 
nature of company stakeholder relations, such as sponsorship, employment and other 
forms of collaborative relationships within the CSR domain. This is followed by a 
consideration of the dynamics of the cooperation developing between Shell and its 
stakeholders based on the collaborative ties in the CSR domain. From the analysis of 
the interview data, it seemed that, depending on the kind of mandate they are given, 
stakeholders of Shell Nigeria could be divided in the following categories:
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Table 7.1 Typology of Shell Stakeholders in Nigeria’s Oil Sector
REACH/
LOCATION
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS
INSIDERS OUTSIDERS
Mandated outsiders Influential partners Advocacy groups Influential Claimants
Internationa]
Level
Contractual/
contractual
relationship
i.e. consulting firms;
contracting NGOs
i.e.
Operate globally; reach out to 
wider global audiences. Are 
friendly and establish 
collaborative relationship with 
Shell. E.g. HRW; Amnesty 
International
Advocacy NGOs. 
Hostile stand, no direct 
engagement. 
Confrontational.
E.g. FoE; Christian Aid; 
Global Witness
Grassroots 
organisations, 
community activists. 
Claimants on the 
basis of due 
reparations 
e.g. MOSSOP
National
Level
Local consulting 
firms, local NGOs
Local Chapters of global NGOs. 
Such as HRW, Amnesty 
International
Local Chapters of Global 
NGOs Such as FoE; 
Christian Aid
Community/ 
site level
Local businesses 
Local NGOs
Local NGOs funded and 
supported by Shell to implement 
certain development projects
MOSSOP
Mandated outsiders are friendly with a clear mandate, hired or compensated to solve a
particular problem, or to develop specific tools that can be deployed by business 
operations. This type of involvement is akin to contracting or partnership. They may 
include individuals who formerly worked for Shell, specialist-consulting firms, or 
individual experts hired on secondment arrangements. The latter have specific skills or 
experience needed within the firm and are often drawn from friendly organisations. 
This group of stakeholders also includes NGOs and research and academic institutions 
(or single researchers or academics acting on their right without necessarily implicating 
their respective institutions). This stakeholder group interacted with the company in 
different capacities throughout the different processes of the CSR policy cycle. They 
are knowledgeable about the various CSR issues and have influence in their respective 
constituencies. They often set up collaborative arrangements with Shell as part of the 
company’s partnership programme and act as either overseers or implementers of the 
company’s development programmes. They operate from inside out, and have special 
access to the internal environment of the firm. For instance, USAID Nigeria entered 
into a US$25 million partnership with Shell to supervise a five-year project for the 
development and promotion of cassava being implemented by the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria.
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Explaining what motivated USAID to accept entering into partnership with Shell, the 
local representative indicated:
First Shell is willing to commit significant resources to the partnership. 
Secondly, we absolutely understand the situation and the complexity of the 
challenges facing Shell. They have done more than anyone else has and we are 
supportive wherever we can. Not many such MNCs would constructively and 
openly engage with society as Shell does. [16]
Independent sponsors are independent and receive no instruction from the firm. They
are motivated by the fact that CSR features among their main areas of interest. This
includes several research and/or advocacy-oriented development and environmental
NGOs, development and multilateral agencies. They operate from their own resources
and interact with the firm from the outside in. They draw their influence from their
ability to reach and sometimes influence wider audiences. Influential observers are
independent entities with varied interests in the firm’s CSR agenda. Members of the
media, academia and regulatory institutions and political agents mostly feature in this
group. These stakeholders are driven by the interest of their respective profession and
operate from the outside in, akin to knowing the internal workings of the organisation.
Influential claimants have direct interests in the firm’s CSR programmes, and mostly
consist of local community organisations and other organisations that champion the
cause of local communities. They are often invited by Shell Nigeria to their annual
stakeholder consultation workshops, and engage with the company based on certain
claims and grievances related to the allocation of oil proceeds, compensation schemes,
environmental matters etc. They often use confrontational tactics to promote their
cause, and are outsiders to the organisation. They draw their influence from their
ability to mobilise public opinion and run negative campaigns against Shell. They may
include such organisations as the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
(MOSOP) and Friends of the Earth Nigeria, to mention but a few. The next section
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outlines Shell’s operations in Nigeria, and the social political and institutional contexts 
within which the company’s strategies emerged.
7.4 Engaging communities
It is clear that Shell and the Nigerian Government have radically changed their 
approach to stakeholder engagement in Nigeria over recent years. While the new 
government elected in 1999 seems to prefer dialogue to the heavy-handed tactics of 
past decades, Shell has adopted a broad-based community consultation programme. 
The next section describes the company’s stakeholder engagement with the various 
stakeholder groups as described in this section. From 1996, Shell approached 
community relations with a growing financial and institutional commitment. There was 
a marked change in its strategy towards dialogue with the communities. A process of 
stakeholder consultations began in 1997 to establish a sustainability agenda. Shell 
executives claimed that since that time, the company’s relationship with external 
stakeholders has been central to its CSR strategy. This is reflected in the survey data 
presented in Table 7.2, which shows the interaction between oil companies and 
stakeholders in Nigeria. Shell was the more active in terms of contacting external 
stakeholders and Shell was the company that was most frequently contacted by 
stakeholders between 1996 and 2004.
Table 7.2 Frequency (percentage) of Oil Company vs. Stakeholder Interaction in Nigeria (1996-2004)
Shell Chevron Mobil Agip TotalFinaElf. Texaco Statoil
Oil company 
initiative
contact 35.7 17.8 17.8 3.57 3.57 10.7 10.7
Stakeholder
initiative
contact 30.9 21.4 14.2 7.14 7.14 9.52 9.52
Source: Survey of Shell Stakeholders in Nigeria, 2005.
Shell’s new social engagement tactics that emphasise collaboration and consultation 
through stakeholder participation and dialogue has marked a new era in company- 
community relations, in which community capital is seen as essential for insuring the
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operational licence to operate16. Shell and the Nigerian Government have invested 
more money into developing good community relations. Shell has established a robust 
community engagement programme in the oil producing areas. Oil companies operate 
in parts of Nigeria where 70 per cent of communities lack access to clean water, 
electricity, and infrastructure, and have not developed along with the rest of their 
country (Boele et al., 2001). A survey of all the stakeholders of the oil MNCs in 
Nigeria, conducted during field research, showed the following results as depicted in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2. The respondents (See Fig. 8.3) were asked to outline the main 
reasons why, on the one hand they contacted the oil MNCs, and on the other hand, why 
the oil MNCs contacted them.
As depicted in figure 8.1, the main reasons why the oil MNCs contacted stakeholders 
were oil spill clean up, gas flaring, peace building and conflict management, 
partnership in development, capacity building and compensation for land used. As 
shown in Fig. 8.2, the main reasons why stakeholders contacted the oil MNCs are 
capacity building, economic empowerment peace building and conflict management, 
environmental management and security and violence issues. These increases in CSR 
investment as shown in Table 3 were made during a period of intensified pressure from 
communities and NGOs, media and political scrutiny, Shell’s CSR contributions were 
substantial as compared, for example to 5 year bilateral aid flows from the UK 
Department for International Aid (DFID) (See Table 4).
16 The social licence to operate refers to good corporate relationship with society, an enabling operating environment that 
does not threaten the company’s long-term access to resources.
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Table 7.3 SPDC’s Community Development Spending Profile (US$ mil.)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Roads and Bridges 7.5 11.8 33.6 5.2 23.3 4.1 85.5
Education and schools 8 9.2 7.1 8.1 12.6 8 53
Electrification 0.4 0.5 1 7.2 6.7 4.8 20.6
Other infrastructure 7.2 11.1 0.5 13.3 5 2.9 40
Agriculture 2.8 1.7 1.9
coCO 4.8 2.3 17.3
Business Dev. &micro- 
credit
- 2.7 0.5 2.9 4 1.9 12
Health care 5.7 5.8 5.9 4.9 3.9 2.6 28.8
Capacity, IEC & ne' 
ventures
oocb 1 1.2 2.2 3.8 2.5 17.5
Water schem es 4.2 8.2 8.5 4.4 2.8 1.7 29.8
Total 42.6 52 60.2 52 66.9 30.8 304.5
(Source: SPDC Nigeria)
Fig. 7.1 Stakeholder motivation in contacting oil companies
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Fig. 7.3 Profile of respondents
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In an integrated supply chain, the local practices o f multinational company business 
units do not go unnoticed. The research established that many international 
stakeholders were familiar with the problems being experienced by the communities in 
the oil producing regions o f  Nigeria. Shell’s CSR programme has received as much 
interest from its supporters as its sceptics.
Table 7.4 Totals DFID and GPEX Bilateral Aid to Nigeria
Other
Finan
cial
Aid
Technical
Cooperat
ion
Grants 
and 
Other 
Aid in 
Kind
Humanitarian
Assistance
Total
DFID
Bilateral
Programm
e(£)
2002/03 622 20 138 8011 288 29 059
2003/04 594 21 391 9 132 15 31 132
2004/05 763 31 933 14
143
393 47 232
2005/06 2
132
40 711 34
290
907 78 038
2006/07 1
828
45 658 33
142
924 81 553
TOT
2002/
07
1979
113 173 98618 2527 81553
(Source: DFID Website: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/files/pressreleases/statsrelease- 
bilateralaid200607.aspl 1/29/07).
The level o f CSR expenditure is unprecedented in Nigeria and CSR issues are 
managed at the highest level within the Shell Group. New structures and roles have 
been created across the company to manage CSR issues because o f their reputational
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and operational significance to the company. For instance, there is a Nigerian desk at 
the headquarters, which closely follows CSR issues in Nigeria and maintains 
continuous liaison with the CSR team.
7.4.1 Shell’s operational cohabitation with communities
In dealing with communities, Shell has established a number of mechanisms through
which the social development agenda of its CSR policies is negotiated and
implemented. As presented in Figure 7.6, Shell has its own Community Development
Offices (CDOs) located in company headquarters that facilitate their relationships with
communities. A Shell community development employee explained that the company
established contact with local communities through community-based structures
represented by traditional leadership:
Many communities in the oil producing areas have established Community 
Development Committees (CDCs) with membership from the three major social 
groups: elders, youth and women. The CDCs build on the traditional systems of 
decision-making and authority. Shell often implements community projects 
through these CDCs. Under the CDC, there are generally three Project 
Monitoring Committees (PMCs): one for elders, one for youth, and one for 
women. The CDC elects the PMCs, and they report to the CDC. When Shell 
award funds to a given community, the funds are allocated through one of these 
PMCs, and the subsequent projects are implemented by the PMCs that are 
deemed appropriate. For example, education projects are typically monitored by 
youth PMCs, while women’s PMCs generally monitor health projects. [19]
In Shell Nigeria, community members are employed as Community Liaison Officers
(CLOs), deployed by Shell to respond to community grievances. The CLO is usually a
prominent person, such as a former government officer or a retired governor, whom the
company pays. The CLO often holds an influential position, defending both the
interests of the community as well as the interests of the company. According to a local
development NGO, we interviewed:
The CLO is often more powerful in communities than the chief or other 
traditional leadership. Largely, he is a member of the village elite because of his 
social and economic status. He commands the monies from the oil companies
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and does not necessarily consult the villagers each time he may want to spend 
that money on some of the projects of his liking. [128]
The community relations unit located in Shell Nigeria’s External Relations Department
manages all community affairs, and has deployed a large number of CLOs throughout
all the oil-producing regions as liaison officers. Some critics of Shell community
practices however indicated that:
Shell’s community relations unit favours influential community members such as 
kings or chiefs, educated elites or vocal youth groups. For instance when awarding 
contracts, these are often given to the most prominent and obstructive groups in 
order to maintain control and to quiet resistance, rather than negotiating with 
community groups to address underlying frustrations. [135]
Large amounts of cash have been channelled through Shell’s local contracting policy, 
with both positive and negative impacts. On the positive side, many infrastructure 
projects have been initiated and some remote areas have begun receiving services that 
the government was not able to provide. On the negative side, the company decision 
over who has access to contracts remains controversial. The key dynamics surrounding 
the contracting process have had mixed implications on CSR objectives. What further 
complicates this is that this often takes place within the context of the traditional order, 
where there are established traditional hierarchies in communities that are based on 
wisdom and age. A local Chief interviewed admitted that the introduction of cash in 
communities has distorted the traditional power structure, often connected with the rise 
of multiple chiefs, each one claiming legitimacy, as the leader of a group with which 
the company must negotiate.
There is a struggle for access to money, a struggle that frequently involves 
violence. Many community members may develop mistrust because we receive 
cash from Shell and other companies that is intended for community. Especially 
the youths have lost respect for the elders. Money has been a poison to our 
youth. They no longer listen to us, let alone trust us. [147]
In the attempt to seek consensus and mitigate possible revolts, and perhaps to improve 
participation and representation, Shell has identified some youths as ‘leaders’,
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providing them with a social and financial status that is heavily contested by other 
youths and frequently leads to the use of violence. Youth groups also threaten one 
another and use the threat of violence to hold a dominant voice in communities. They 
have rejected the authority of traditional leaders upon observing those leaders 
accepting cash payments from oil companies. These youths have reportedly adopted 
violence against the company in order to ‘get in on’ cash payments. As a result, 
companies must pacify communities on a continuous basis under threat of violence 
from youth groups. It was reported that:
If  a youth can mobilise a group of 15 armed youths, they call themselves a youth 
group and demand contracts from companies. Elders complain that every few 
months a new gang is formed, usually made up o f anywhere from 15 to several 
dozen youths who demand to be heard and negotiated with. Failure to meet with 
these new demands has led to the takeover of oil company facilities and 
kidnapping of company staff, some of which have resulted in deaths. [128]
Following the rise of armed and unemployed youth gangs, a number of oil companies 
have adopted a policy of appeasement that involves hiring youths to protect their 
pipelines and other assets from attack. Companies will award ‘surveillance’ contracts 
to youth groups to prevent them from attacking facilities. It may also involve paying a 
fixed and regular monthly salary to the members of youth gangs to ‘protect’ these 
facilities from other youths. In essence, the system has become a method of pay-offs, 
in response to threats of vandalism or theft, through a legitimised contract system.
7.4.2 Negotiating contracts, participation and representation
Negotiations between community representatives and Shell are typically held at the 
company headquarters. This is efficient for the company as it is less time consuming 
and allows company officials to feel in control of negotiations. Negotiating and 
meeting in headquarters also protects company staff, the majority of whom are 
Nigerians and feel threatened when they have to visit areas populated by members of
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traditionally marginalised ethnic groups. They are much more comfortable meeting at
their offices. However, there are drawbacks to this approach:
We observed that negotiating in the company headquarters, rather than in the 
oil-affected communities, can have negative side effects that feed into conflict 
between groups. It prevents the company from ensuring that the type of contract 
awarded is an adequate response to the grievances of local communities. By 
actually visiting the community in question and spending time to speak with 
people there and witness the situation, company officials will have the 
opportunity to verify data. It does not ensure that the details of the final contract 
are made public. When representatives meet with companies in company 
headquarters, the broader community that they claim to represent may not even 
know that the meeting takes place. When the venue of the meeting or 
negotiation is the community itself, community members can feel a part of the 
process and demand to know the details that will affect them. The localised 
venue will increase transparency. It allows “hoax” representatives to present 
themselves as legitimate, without the opportunity for the public to verify 
whether they represent the communities’ true interests. [148]
In terms of contractors to implement projects in the communities, by awarding 
surveillance contracts or contracts for cleaning up oil spills to community members, 
the company is trying to support the local population and provide income for the area. 
However, this encourages some communities to ‘create’ work. A Shell Nigeria 
Corporate Advisor explains:
There are examples of villagers sabotaging pipelines in order that they will 
receive a contract to clean up spillage. It has also been suggested that awarding 
contracts to local contractors increases the levels of violence around an oil 
installation such that it needs ‘protection’. [116]
There are frequent conflicts of interest for chiefs and CDC chairs, who are the local
leaders and decision makers, as well as the prime recipients of contracts. A Human
Rights Watch researcher we interviewed explained:
Although they have been elected to represent community interests, community 
members complained that they tend to guide community requests so that they 
themselves are best positioned to receive and implement a contract once it is 
awarded. [T37]
Fig. 7.4 Organisation of Shell Community Outreach in Nigeria
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Shell officials told us that all community projects are based on needs assessments 
conducted in the communities. They state that appropriate participatory rural 
assessment (PRA) techniques are used to determine the requirements o f the 
community. Community members, however, reported that they are rarely consulted 
before oil companies initiate assistance projects in their communities. They say that the 
Community Liaison Officer (CLO) often forwards community assistance proposals to 
company headquarters with little input from the affected communities.
While Shell may consider these proposals as reports from the community, they
may often represent the interests o f the CLO and his network [135].
Oil company-funded community projects are fiscally monitored by accounting firms 
external to Nigeria. Local NGOs state that external auditors base their audits solely on 
the figures provided to them by the companies; they do not verify their validity, or 
even the actual existence o f  the projects in the field. We were told that external 
auditors have approved accounts for projects that have never actually been constructed 
based on the figures presented to them.
2 0 2
In addition to financial auditing, Shell has a system for monitoring the implementation 
of the community development projects in which they invest. This monitoring of 
project activities is generally the responsibility of senior company officials, and is 
carried out through field visits. We were told that monitoring is often hindered by the 
fact that senior company officials are members of ethnic groups (often Yoruba or Igbo) 
from outside the Niger Delta. These ‘outsiders’ are perceived as having greater access 
to educational and economic opportunities than their counterparts in the Niger Delta. 
These external monitors have become the targets of community frustration stemming 
from the Niger Delta communities’ lack of access to equitable resources and 
opportunities. As a result, senior company officials who are ‘outsiders’ do not visit the 
oil producing communities, fearing that they would put themselves at risk. They 
reportedly rely on the reports of other, less senior staff that are often not from the areas 
that they are monitoring and are exposed to large amounts o f cash with no supervision 
from their managers. Thus, the monitoring of projects by less senior staff results in 
poor transparency, and corrupt and ineffective practices. Implementing projects on a 
community level is entrusted to CDCs, which existed before the oil companies arrived. 
They implement projects at village level with relatively small amounts of cash. 
Members of CDCs generally have relatively low levels of formal education, as the 
more educated villagers leave to seek work in urban areas. The oil companies have 
continued to distribute project funds through the CDCs, since it was a traditional 
structure that was already in place. However, the arrival of the oil companies meant 
that much larger amounts of cash were going into the CDC system. We were told that 
because of this influx of cash, some of the more educated elite, for instance, retired 
businessmen and civil servants, returned to their villages to gain access to CDC 
money. We were told that because the local villagers generally lack the business and
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financial skills to manage these large amounts of money, project funds frequently 
disappear into the pockets of these individuals.
The responsibility for security and protection of company facilities belongs to 
government security forces, which includes both mobile police squads and the national 
army. When companies experience security problems with local communities, such as 
flow stations being occupied or communities staging protests, they call on these forces 
to ‘provide security’. The violent tactics of these security forces have been documented 
by local and international groups and have been the subject of widespread international 
condemnation.
According to a Nigerian Ministry of the Environment official, conflict between 
companies and host communities may arise from a failure to pay compensation for an 
oil spill, from lack of employment opportunities, or from other perceived negative 
impacts of oil companies’ activities. Communities reportedly express their grievances 
initially by writing letters to company executives, and if this fails, they send 
representatives to the company headquarters. An inadequate or unsatisfactory response 
may spark a mass community protest, sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent.
In general, NGOs and communities report that oil companies deny any responsibility 
for the actions of the Nigerian Security Forces related to oil company operations. NGO 
representatives explained that the police employ disproportionate violence, which has 
been verified and documented in reports of national and international human rights 
organisations, such as Human Rights Watch. Community members told us that the 
police use various strategies to deal with community opposition. Shell stated that, in 
general, they request ‘protection’ against what are sometimes violent community 
protests, in order to ensure continuation of their operations. They state that they have
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little control over what the Nigerian Security Forces actually do once their efforts are 
set in motion.
According to a human rights lawyer with whom we spoke, during incidents of civil 
disobedience, the police accuse the most vocal youths o f ‘armed robbery’, which is a 
capital offence that does not allow for release on bail. Lawyers claim that the legal 
process is easily protracted by prosecutors, since ‘overwhelming’ evidence is needed to 
prove one’s innocence. As one lawyer mentioned, “if  these youths do not have a 
human rights agency on their case, they are locked in jail for years and simply die.” 
During our fieldwork, one NGO found seven youths that had been in prison for over 
four years without anyone being aware of their whereabouts or physical condition. 
Human rights lawyers pointed out that, during imprisonment, the hard-core criminals, 
influence other youths, perpetuating and heightening the cycle of violence. In areas 
where oil companies are present, crime rates are considerably higher, as depicted in 
Figure 7.1.
Shell goes to great lengths not to be perceived as favouring any one ethnic group. This 
attempt to be neutral has actually backfired on the company in many cases, reinforcing 
historical divisions and inequities among ethnic groups. We were told that in the oil 
exploration areas, the educational infrastructure is poorly developed and most people 
do not have access to schooling, while other groups such as the Yoruba and the Igbo, 
have historically always had better access to educational opportunities. In companies 
where recruitment is based on merit, individuals from the traditionally more privileged 
groups have ended up in senior positions.
As a result, the senior management of companies operating in the Niger Delta is 
typically made up of people from ethnic groups outside the Delta Region. Community 
members insist that people from indigenous groups are only employed as unskilled
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labourers such as guards and drivers. This deepens the cycle of marginalisation; 
communities in the Niger Delta see other tribes who they consider their traditional 
oppressors taking jobs for which they feel they should be given priority.
A Shell executive we interviewed explained the issue as:
“Our business is capital intensive and technology intensive. You need people 
who are knowledgeable to operate the equipment. It would be a bad idea to 
employ locals with insufficient training and experience” [13].
7.4.3 Community perceptions
The relationship between Shell and the communities is currently informed by a number 
of perceptions in the community and among some NGOs. Whether the perceptions of 
the communities are correct is no longer relevant as they have become fact for 
community members, and hamper constructive stakeholder relations. For instance, 
some NGO staff, lawyers and oil observers interviewed in Nigeria and outside Nigeria 
were of the opinion that some of Shell’s local staff was corrupt. They believe that the 
way the company’s policies are designed encourages corruption, especially among 
community relations staff. The contracting policy is perceived as the most open to 
corruption. The fact that contracts are awarded to individuals and not to communities, 
and that they are signed outside the community and not made public increases this risk. 
An independent NGO monitoring committee explained that many chiefs were not even 
aware that they were supposed to have a project in their village, whereas, according to 
company records money had been allocated to the community.
A human rights researcher in the Niger Delta that we interviewed indicated that he 
suspected that corruption among Shell’s local managers was preventing change. 
Another indicated that the CSR programme is managed by local staff; given the fact 
that expatriates are only there for short periods, they have neither the country 
experience, nor the time or interest to get involved in social issues. They indicated that
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formalised monitoring and auditing does not capture the reality at the local, community 
level, and emphasises procedures rather than substantive progress.
In the past, Shell has funded many projects that proved unsuccessful due to lack of 
effective planning and basic consultation. There are many reported instances of health 
clinics being constructed, but not being staffed with health workers or given drugs to 
operate them, plants that were never operational due to lack of electricity supply, and 
local ‘ghost workers’ who were paid to keep them from disrupting oil production 
operations.
Shell managers we interviewed accepted that mistakes had been made, but that they 
were learning from their mistakes, and had devised appropriate strategies, processes 
and mechanisms for engaging with communities and promoting community 
development and environmental sustainability.
7.4.4 Community development and the licence to operate
The company negotiates its licence to operate through its CSR programme. The licence 
to operate, if interpreted as risk mitigation using environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) scoping exercises, is to determine the level of social investment and to mitigate 
externalities related to the project under consideration. These costs are internalised, and 
are part of the business plan, reflected in the net present value (NPV) of the project. 
Unexpected risks, such as blockades or violence, are covered by insurance, and 
provision is made, in terms of discounted risks, in the ex ante phase of the project. The 
EIA process, in the case of a major field campaign, is broad, and covers several 
communities (as fields typically cover a broad area), involves a health impact 
assessment and involves government as part of the process. The government has a
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mandatory 28 days when the report is made available to the public to allow them to 
raise objections. Dissemination of the report however is controlled.
Objections usually relate to such aspects as re-routing pipelines, and flow lines, etc.
These costs are internalised. Those costs that cannot be predicted are covered by
insurance at the delivery level. However, it was reported that every field development
operation involves negotiations through liaison officers, with a view to minimising
delays on the project. A Shell executive explained:
The oil field engineer (manager) is mandated to ensure that there is as little 
disruption to the project as possible. Project delays have an impact on the project 
bottom-line. Before bringing up a field development plan to the executive 
committee for an investment decision, he must thoroughly consider all perceived 
risks, and internalise these in the business case. The investment is done based on 
the perceived risks such as the level of activism, and the probability for project 
interruptions. The engineer must know in advance, what the issues are and the 
impacts for which compensation is likely to be sought. All this information 
must be collated and aggregated at the higher level of the business plan. [II]
There are tiered negotiations, based on the licensing process.
That oil is important is not necessarily a positive thing. Oil companies are under 
scrutiny and, at worst run the risk of being nationalised if they operate in ways 
that are contrary to government policy. The oil companies missed an opportunity 
in not encouraging the government to maintain traditional export in order to 
achieve a balanced environment, where most people would be employed, as this 
would be less threatening to their operations. [II]
Oil is a vital natural resource to Nigeria, and has geopolitical and rent-collection 
implications. It is central to government, individual government officials and inter­
group relations. It underlies a certain political economy of survival. There is a basic 
and essential element of self-interest.
Shell has realised that it is the only one that is shamed by the bad situation in 
Nigeria, not the government, not the other multinationals. The fact that Shell is 
investing in CSR issues is recognition that the government has weak structures 
of governance, tax collection, etc. [128]
7.4.5 Shell and competing oil MNCs in Nigeria
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As shown in Figure 7.2, Shell scores highest in comparison to the different oil 
companies operating in the same context, with regard to their engaging with the local 
communities over the last 8 years.
Shell has engaged with communities on a multitude of issues, geared towards 
development and capacity building in recent years. However, Shell has a long presence 
in Nigeria, which is also linked to Nigeria’s colonial history, because of which it 
gained competitive advantage, obtaining a large concession and monopolising Nigerian 
oil output. The company has relied on the support of the national authorities to solve 
problems with disgruntled communities. The company has been supported by the 
Nigerian security forces, and put less emphasis on dialogue and consultation with 
communities to solve problems. This policy backfired when local communities began 
to associate oil companies with the government, particularly with regard to the use of 
the security forces. Villagers expressed their feelings via sabotage of company assets 
and the kidnapping of company staff. Shell lost its social licence to operate and was 
forced to resort to damage control strategies. A Shell executive made the following 
comments:
Timing the start of community relations programmes is a factor that has a 
significant impact on the success of company relationships with communities. In 
the past, Shell started community development projects only after oil 
explorations had already begun and conflicts with communities had already 
begun to arise. By then, community relations usually served to compensate 
communities for the negative effects of business operations. By that time, 
relations between companies and communities had already been compromised. 
[15]
Shell managers in Nigeria indicated that they have now introduced consultation 
processes for nearly 95% of projects, based on Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), as a way of engaging with communities in scoping exercises, identifying the 
impacts of the projects and costs of mitigation. These processes have been 
implemented with the help of NGOs and other consulting firms enlisted by Shell. This
209
type of consultation is now a legal requirement. It is a process that ends with the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the company and 
communities concerned, stipulating the social investment to be expected. However, 
there has been concern about the EIA scoping exercises undertaken. Communities do 
not have the capabilities to participate effectively in the process. The EIA process is 
lengthy and technical, and requires prior knowledge and information, which 
communities do not possess.
We were told that EIA reports were not disseminated broadly enough to allow 
communities to express their concerns over their provisions, and that the time available 
for this was limited. They tend to reject the process as rubber-stamping. A human 
rights worker indicated that although the process is not perfect, it is much better to 
have it in place, than not, and that aspects of it will improve with time. A Shell advisor 
we interviewed indicated that the consultation exercise was designed as a way of 
getting a licence to operate through community dialogue and consultation.
7.5 Negotiating CSR from the inside: The role of integrated stakeholders
Revisiting the typology presented earlier and the various stakeholder characterisations 
outlined, there is an important distinction to be made between stakeholders who 
formerly worked for Shell and are brought in on a contractual basis, and those who 
have no previous ties with the company. Independent contractors are brought in to 
work on specific aspects and at different levels of the CSR process. Those with no 
prior knowledge of the organisation have to adjust to the rhythms and demands of the 
internal business culture. Most interviewees tended to think that this group has 
significant difficulties in adjusting to the internal organisational culture, and that they 
had to balance their own short and long-term business interests. For example, the
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Managing Director of one NGO that has been invited to assist the organisation in
implementing a number of community development projects and to carry out
consultation explained:
The job and its scope depend on the discretion of a given Shell field manager. 
My organisation is often faced with a dilemma relating to the extent to which we 
could challenge the Shell organisation without compromising our short and 
long-term collaboration. [138]
Those with previous ties to Shell were able to engage both formally and informally
with the organisation. They benefited from an extended social capital and could engage
with more advantage in the CSR processes within the organisation. Although they
were contractors their reach and influence extended beyond their terms of reference.
For example, one high level executive admitted:
Those consultants with prior working ties with Shell were very useful to the 
company. Their contributions are valued as they already have experience with 
the organisation, and with a better perspective about societal expectations, can 
be trusted to give an accurate indication of what would be required of the 
organisation by society. [13]
On the scope of the influence of this group of stakeholders, a Shell Corporate Advisor
explained:
In a way, what we do is largely determined by what the auditing companies, and 
mainstream consulting firms want us to do. For example, they emphasise 
reporting. Therefore, we emphasise reporting as an important part of our social 
and environmental report. They are interested in us having all the right 
procedures in place, so we tend to invest more in procedural outcomes. 
However, at the end of the day what is reported has to do with having 
procedures in place, often at the expense of substance. [116]
Stakeholders with a free/independent sponsorship have mostly had an independent 
relationship with the company and seem to retain the interest of the company’s CSR 
executives. This includes several research and /or advocacy oriented development and 
environmental NGOs. The latter operate from their own resources and interact with the 
firm from the outside in. While some of them interacted with the company formally 
and publicly, others preferred an unpublicised engagement. For instance a previous
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Human Rights Watch (HRW) executive admitted that they worked with Shell on the 
company’s CSR/human rights agenda and interacted at the various levels of the 
organisation, such as policy and implementation levels. The ex-human rights executive 
admitted having reviewed several policy documents and guidelines from contacts in 
Shell, with whom they had a collaborative relationship and that there was no payment 
involved. It was further pointed out by most interviewees in this group that they were 
respected by Shell because they were considered knowledgeable and able to offer 
constructive and independent advice. Shell has also consulted with foreign 
development agencies operating in Nigeria such as the United States Development 
Agency (USAID), on the community development strategy component of their CSR 
programme in Nigeria. They claim that the informal contact enabled them to exercise 
better influence because they did not come across as hostile, but rather had a research- 
based approach. Many human rights, development NGOs and some stakeholders held 
similar views from academia. The Shell executives interviewed in Nigeria and in Shell 
International confirmed that NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch played an important role, while the company sought to establish its Group 
sustainability agenda in the mid-1990s. The interviewees indicated that the company 
collaborates with civil society organisations from the highest policy level all the way 
down the implementation and evaluation processes of its CSR programme in Nigeria. 
These external stakeholders operate from both outside in and inside out, and operate 
based pn partnership. As mentioned earlier, the accession to the partner status is based 
on the stature and influence of the respective stakeholders in partnership with Shell, 
and they derive their influence from their own resourcefulness, capabilities and 
independence, not to mention the perceived significance of their respective 
constituencies in and outside Nigeria.
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In all, previous experience with the company and trust seem to be the most important 
factors that determine the influence that those stakeholders involved at various levels 
of the company’s internal CSR processes can have on their outcomes at various levels. 
The next section examines how the company has negotiated with those stakeholders 
identified as influential observers and /or influential claimants.
7.6 Engagement with the government and compensation policies
As discussed above, foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria must obtain mining 
leases from the Nigerian Ministry of Petroleum in Abuja. An oil-mining lease legally 
provides a company with the authority to operate in the area of agreement without 
obtaining the consent of the local community. Because all land legally belongs to the 
government, oil companies that receive government consent to operate may also 
acquire farmland and fishing areas.
In many communities, especially in areas with high population densities, land is highly 
valued and often sacred. In many communities the ties between individual, families 
and land is greater than the utility of the land for agriculture. In some clans, after the 
birth of a child, the placenta is buried at the place of birth, signifying a life-long bond 
with that land. Hence, there is often a deep sense of violation and humiliation when 
land is thus taken over for oil production activity without the consent of the 
community. Because land plays such a vital role in defining their identities, 
communities feel insulted if they are offered cash compensation. As one community 
member put it:
We are not talking about compensating boundaries here. Traversing land is a 
question of identity rather than determining where the boundaries are. If 
someone cuts through your land, that person is questioning who you are [147],
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Many stated that the usage of land by oil companies and compensation in cash has 
undermined the role of land in tying communities together and particularly where land 
and water are involved in communal ceremonies and traditions; the use of land by the 
oil companies has directly affected the social structures in these communities. 
Companies typically compensate individual landowners, even for land that has 
traditionally been communal. Some communities mentioned that they would prefer to 
be compensated communally, as this would reinforce the sense that the land brings 
people together, rather than separates them. Compensation is only awarded if the land 
is traversed by oil pipelines and is given to the owners of land 10 metres either side of 
a pipeline. Individuals are compensated based on the loss of a season’s harvest, but not 
the loss of future crops or the loss of the land. Grievances around land compensation 
exacerbate the communities’ feelings towards the government, and compensation for 
oil spills exacerbates tension between communities and the company.
Community members complained that gas flares raise the temperature in the direct area 
of the flare, which, farmers claim, reduces crop yields. Local populations feel that they 
are not sufficiently compensated for these effects, which adds to their grievances. Oil 
companies are required to pay ‘fair and adequate’ compensation to affected 
communities for damages that result from oil spills or other oil-related damages. Cash 
payments on an individual base have led to a ‘compensation culture’ in which some 
groups try to make a livelihood out of obtaining compensation. For example, Shell 
reports that some communities prevented clean-up teams from doing their work, on the 
assumption that greater environmental damage means higher compensation.
Some pipelines have exploded because of oil being tapped by others than the company; 
others have been deliberately vandalised in a bid to get compensation. As a result, 
some companies only pay if the spill is proven to have been accidental. To determine
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the cause of a spill, companies send their expert assessment team. If the team 
concludes that a spill has deliberately manoeuvred, the company does not pay 
compensation. In certain cases, for which companies have determined that they are not 
responsible, pipeline bursts have led to the deaths of hundreds of people. The 
companies pay the assessment teams, and the communities question the teams’ 
findings if companies decide not to pay compensation. There have been several 
instances of company staff and their contractors being held hostage by angry 
communities, to be released only when compensation has been received for a burst 
pipeline.
7.7 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has examined Shell’s stakeholder engagement in Nigeria. Dialogue has 
been privileged over the confrontational tactics of the past. This is primarily predicated 
on the recognition that communities are legitimate stakeholders, who have been 
affected by, and can affect the company’s oil exploitation activities. Companies make 
decisions about how to carry out their day-to-day operations, and these decisions 
impact on local communities. Community protests and the blockading o f oil facilities 
affect the company operations and finances; on-time project delivery is important and 
carries serious financial implications.
However, Shell enters in dialogue with communities on a community-by-community 
basis, rather than conducting collective negotiation and dialogue involving broader 
groups such as clans or regions that would encompass several communities. Dialogue 
with communities takes place with local elders, youth groups or others that hold 
authority at village level. Negotiation only takes place with ‘oil-affected’ communities. 
Another aspect of this engagement is that company-community interaction generally
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takes place at the company headquarters, either at the invitation of the company, or in 
response to a visit by a community delegation. Finally, communities report that Shell’s 
response to their complaints is sporadic and limited, and processes that affect them 
lack transparency. The prevailing sentiment among oil-affected communities is that 
company officials engage in community meetings only to gain a sense of the mood in 
the community and to identify groups in the community that may pose a threat to the 
company or to company assets.
Shell insists that they are under no obligation to ‘develop’ the communities in which 
they operate through oil companies are aware that without the support of the oil- 
affected communities, continued operations will become increasingly difficult. In 
recent years, Shell has approached community relations with a growing financial and 
institutional commitment. However, the company recognises its impacts on the local 
population, and the substantial investment in the oil producing communities testifies to 
a certain level of awareness within the organisation. There is an element of self-interest 
based on the realisation that confrontational tactics risk ruining the company’s 
reputation and brand. Hence, a different approach has been embraced. The investment 
in the CSR programme can be understood as a pre-requisite to establishing a level 
playing field for business-society relations in Nigeria. The company has established 
tiers of engagement, which it steers. The first engagement is at community level, with 
community liaison officers, and it enables communities to channel their demands to the 
company. At this level, the responsibility of the manager is to secure favourable 
conditions for his operations. This is risk management, and it is internalised in the 
business models for field development. The second tier is engagement on a national 
level with the national elite. The concern here is philanthropy and good corporate 
citizenship. It is at this level that various partnerships are established with national and 
regional development agencies, in undertaking development programmes on a broader
216
scale. In terms of business, this is conceived as an investment in reputation and public 
relations. The External Relations Division within Shell manages both the content and 
process of these programmes, and maintains the network of community liaison 
officers, while financial resources deployed or compensatory payments to communities 
are part of its project costs.
Although CSR activities are often communicated as unitary and cohesive, they are 
scattered across the organisation, and reflect the unbound and complex nature of the 
CSR concept itself. It is therefore not surprising that the various investments come 
from different accounts in the systems. In addition, the field research revealed that 
Shell’s CSR investments are often made instrumentally with respect to the company’s 
local operational context, and more general reputational issues. The next chapter 
outlines the role of the government in Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria.
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Chapter Eight
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ROLE  
OF GOVERNM ENT IN NIGERIA
8.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to critically examine the role the Nigerian Government 
plays in providing an enabling environment for Shell’s CSR policies and 
practices in Nigeria. It draws from the findings of my field research to 
answer the research questions outlined in section 1.4., namely exploring the 
ways in which the government is participating in CSR (facilitating, 
endorsing and partnering). It draws on theoretical conception of the role of 
government in CSR, and explores how government agencies have been 
given the mandate to promote CSR objectives, and the various partnerships 
between the government and the oil MNCs.
8.2 Conditions for an enabling environment for CSR in Nigeria
The government is, as discussed in Chapter 3, expected to play a number of 
key roles such as mandating, facilitating and endorsing the CSR agenda of 
MNCs in the Nigerian oil sector, in order to create an enabling environment 
for CSR. This is however made difficult by the contentious nature of the 
Nigerian oil sector and the role of the government, which rests on many 
factors. Firstly, the government suffers a lack of legitimacy among the 
communities, especially in the oil producing regions, following long­
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standing dispute over land and the subsequent control of the oil revenues 
produced in the region. Nigerians have traditionally felt a very strong 
attachment to land, as the common saying ’Land defines who you are’ 
demonstrates. For example, a youth leader who may become the future 
leader of the community receives additional communal land for cultivation 
and can sit in the Elder’s Council. People in the oil-affected areas mainly 
maintain their livelihoods through subsistence farming, fishing and some 
trade between villages. Land is typically considered to have communal 
ownership. In 1978, the military government of General Obasanjo passed 
the Land Use Act, which vested ownership and control of all land in the 
country to the government in the hands of the State Governors as 
representatives of the Federal Government. Traditionally land was 
communally owned and matters relating to ownership and use were 
determined under Customary Law by family or clan heads, chiefs and the 
elders in a community. The implications of this Act were enormous and are 
one of the root causes of the on-going oil conflicts. Effectively, the Act 
ensured that oil companies only require an agreement with the Federal 
Government, which legally owns all land. This provides companies with the 
“right” to enter communities and use land as they see fit (Soremekum, 1995; 
Frynas, 2000).
The costs of having the oil industry in their midst and the lack of benefits 
deriving from its presence have turned the oil producing areas into 
simmering centres of conflict and often-open violence. Communities feel 
that they have been pitched against each other or embroiled in clashes with 
state security operatives attached to oil company offices or other
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installations. In 1995, the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha 
hanged the writer and Ogoni human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. This 
was the climax of the period of tension that followed agitation in the oil 
producing area; beginning in the early 1990s calling for an end to 
environmental degradation, payment of reparation for this, as well as a 
campaign calling for the development of the oil producing areas. This had 
immediate implications for the relationship between communities and the 
oil companies. For example, oil companies, notably Shell, were accused of 
inadequately compensating communities for oil spills (leading to destruction 
of livelihoods), making use of violent government police forces and not 
having asserted its political advantage to prevent the hanging of the activists 
who were opposing the large presence of Shell in the region. The best 
example for this change in conflict dynamics is the fact that now Shell 
claims that it has been instrumental in assuring that currently 13% of the oil 
revenues flow to the State from which oil is derived. However ‘solving’ this 
large issue of dispute has not resulted in a subsequent reduction of violence 
and tension between the company and its local working environment. Thus, 
the conflict in the Niger Delta has increased over time through its own 
dynamic (Frynas, 2000; Forrest, 1995; Khan, 1994; Olorode et.al, 1998).
Secondly, there is a legacy of poor environmental governance by the 
government, and the oil MNCs. According to Duruigbo (2003; Aprioku, 
2003), Nigeria was until recently an exemplar of irresponsible oil 
development. For decades, oil companies operated with little or no 
accountability, partnered by a repressive dictatorship bent on exploiting 
Nigeria’s oil wealth for the benefit of corrupt elite. Oil-related
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environmental, political and human rights abuses were commonplace. 
Although there is hope for change since the 1999 democratic elections, since 
when the government have made tentative attempts to establish more 
responsible and accountable practices and standards for oil development, the 
burden of past abuses still weighs heavily on the present. The question 
remains as to how far these reforms will continue and to what extent 
corporate social responsibility practices will assist this process.
Thirdly, the government is perceived as corrupt and insensitive to the needs 
of the people. Research on the political economy of Nigeria concluded that 
few nations in the world face so damaging a legacy of political corruption, 
repression, pollution, and destitution (Sala-I-Martin, 2002 and 
Sabrahamaniam, 2003; Duruigbo, 2003; Soremekum, 1995; Khan, 1994; 
Frynas, 2000). As mentioned earlier, very little of the estimated $275 billion 
earned from oil since the mid 1970s has reached the people; as much as $50 
billion has simply disappeared overseas. Soremekum (1995) suggests that 
during the civilian rule of 1979-1983, the Nigerian state lost about 12.5 
billion naira in oil revenue, as a result of fraudulent practices. The ruling 
elite and its business partners siphoned off US$ 3-4 billion in oil deals in 
less than four years from November 1993 when Gen. Abaca came to power, 
until 1997. From 1997-1998, approximately 11 licences were allocated 
without a public tender to indigenous companies, and of the 11 licences to 
indigenous companies, only 1 company had previous experience within the 
oil business. This way, the idea of the ‘comprador’ state, as Turner (1980) 
suggests, seems to hold true. With bribes, intermediaries acquire contracts, 
which they sell to foreign companies. This has operating consequences, as
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there will be no oversight, and since any infringement by these companies 
would implicate those involved in the system, no policy, or fair inquiry is 
possible, or has reliable outcomes. These oil lifting contracts and oil licences 
were mainly allocated to senior serving retired military officers.
Even if corruption did not prove to be an obstacle to adequate policy in the 
oil producing areas, the government's ability to carry out effective reforms 
may be limited by factors characteristic of the current Nigerian political 
economy. Under colonial governance, ownership rights for oil were 
restricted to British companies only, in particular Shell D’Arcy. A major 
shift in ownership structure occurred in 1969 when the Petroleum Act was 
enforced. This Act transferred ownership of oil mineral rights to the Federal 
Government in the thick of the 1967-1970 civil war. By this Act, the Federal 
Government significantly altered not only ownership structures over oil, but 
also the country’s revenue allocation formula. Whereas prior to the civil 
war, oil revenues and mining rents were shared on a 50-50 basis between the 
central government and the three administrative regions into which the 
country is divided, the new system determined that only states in which oil 
was exploited would receive about 13 % of the revenues of their oil. 
According to recent reports, these states are far from being satisfied and 
violence has escalated. Meanwhile, a significant part of wider public 
opinion disagrees with the 13%, which they regard as unnecessary special 
treatment of these regions. This prompts the question of whether the current 
13% transfer of oil revenues to the oil producing states will be maintained 
by subsequent administrations in Nigeria.
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Fourthly, the government is perceived as unable to set and enforce standards 
of appropriate environmental conduct for the oil MNCs towards the 
protection of communities and the natural resources they depend on. Until 
commercial oil production began four decades ago, Nigeria had a nearly 
pristine environment. Though degraded by deforestation and oil pollution, 
the Niger Delta’s mangrove forest remains the largest in Africa and the third 
largest in the world. It provides local communities with a host of resources, 
such as medicines, fish, wood for fuel and shelter, as well as vital ecosystem 
services like stable soil and habitat for wildlife, which include several 
endangered species such as the Delta elephant, the white-crested monkey, 
and the river hippopotamus. In addition to providing sustenance to a 
community that lives largely on a subsistence basis, the Delta also provides 
an important spawning habitat for Nigeria’s commercial fisheries. Oil 
production threatens these resources and ecosystem services in a number of 
ways. The immediate threats come from oil spills and gas flaring. While 
spills inevitably accompany oil production, in Nigeria they occur with 
alarming frequency and magnitude. A former Minister of Works and 
Housing in Nigeria has stated that 2,796 oil spill incidents involving a total 
of 88.2 million gallons of crude oil were reported between 1976 and 1990 
(Aprioku, 2003). Since this total includes only those spills the companies 
chose to report, the total amount is likely to have been much higher. Three 
factors combine to make spillage an especially acute problem in Nigeria.
Oil delivery infrastructure is obsolete and/or inadequate. Recent field 
research conducted by a group of nongovernmental organisations,
223
academics, and activists found evidence o f corroded, rusty, and visibly 
leaking pipelines throughout Rivers State (Christian Aid, 2003).
Sabotage o f pipelines is a persistent problem. According to the Department 
o f  Petroleum Resources, oil companies in 1993 alone lost nearly 30 million 
barrels o f crude oil because o f clashes with oil producing communities. 
Community members sometimes intentionally damage pipelines to express 
dissatisfaction with corporate practices and to demand redress. Recently, 
rebel attacks have targeted offshore facilities such as the Bonga fiels (See 
Map 6.2), disrupting oil production output from Nigeria.
Map 8.1 Bonga oil field17.
More often, they tap the pipeline to siphon crude and sell it on the black 
market. Spills and pipeline leaks are poorly monitored, often not reported, 
and repaired slowly. Leaks and spills routinely persist for weeks before 
being stopped or cleaned. A single leak in Otuegwe region o f  the Delta was
17 Rebels attacked the offshore on June 2nd, 2008, which disrupted oil production in Nigeria.
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reported to have spilled over 800,000 barrels o f oil over several months 
before being repaired (Frynas, 2000). Under Nigerian law, companies are 
not responsible for cleaning up spills caused by sabotage and under no 
obligation to compensate affected communities.
Fig. 8.1. Petroleum Exploitation Process (Adapted from Frynas, 2002; Fee, 1988)
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8.3 Promoting compliance and the problem of enforcement
The ability o f the government to play a strong mandating role in support of  
CSR initiatives is also bleak. As discussed above, the government ability to 
define minimum standards and enforce them is limited. This assessment, 
coming from members o f the agency responsible for regulating the Nigerian 
oil industry, is borne out by a tangled history o f  ineffective laws and 
destructive policies. A number of laws, the most significant o f which are the 
Petroleum Act o f  1969 (which replaced the original act o f  1916), the Oil in
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Navigable Waters Act of 1968, and the more recent Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency Act of 1988, regulate oil production in Nigeria. The 
Petroleum Act led to the adoption of statutes mandating that the licensee or 
lessee of an oil exploration or prospecting licence or a mining lease adopt all 
practicable precautions to prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers, the 
territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil, mud or other harmful 
fluids or substances, and where any such pollution occurs or has occurred, 
take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end it. However, these 
provisions are highly generalised and lack specific enforcement 
mechanisms.
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act implements the 1954 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, restricting 
discharges of oil into the near-shore sea and navigable inland waters. It 
provides for regulations requiring Nigerian vessels to monitor discharge 
levels and stipulates fines for violations. While there is some criticism as to 
the effectiveness of these regulations, the main weakness of the law is that it 
has failed to keep pace with international agreements -  notably the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which 
is meant to supersede the 1954 convention. Significant aspects of maritime 
oil law, including the mandating of load-on-top methods and double-hulled 
tankers, have yet to be incorporated in Nigerian law. Moreover, the bulk of 
oil production in Nigeria occurs on land, where regulation is less developed 
(Frynas, 2000; Forrest, 1995; Olorode, 1998).
226
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act reflects the former 
military government’s response to worldwide public demand for legislative 
mechanisms to protect the environment. It established the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), responsible directly to the 
President, assigned with responsibility for the protection and development 
of the environment in general and environmental technology, including 
initiation of policy in relation to environmental research and technology. It 
also advises the government on environmental policy and establishes such 
environmental criteria, guidelines, specific actions or standards for the 
protection of the nation’s air and interstate waters as may be necessary to 
protect the health and welfare of the population from environmental 
degradation (Forrest, 1995).
However, critics have pointed out that the Act needed further strengthening, 
and that previous regulation needed to be improved (Duruigbo, 2003). 
Others have argued that the FEPA focused on industrial activity, leaving 
non-industrial sources of pollution unregulated (Frynas, 2000).
Prior to the Federal Environmental Protection Act, there were no definitions 
for hazardous wastes. Though the Act gives FEPA the authority to define 
hazardous wastes, the agency has inexplicably failed to include oil in its list. 
The law also creates a difficult regulatory burden, forcing the regulatory 
agency to prove that hazardous substances have been discharged in ‘harmful 
quantities’ before liability can be established, requiring in effect a case by 
case demonstration of harm. This task is far beyond the agency’s paltry 
resources, especially given the number and magnitude of oil spills (Ibid.).
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The 1992 Environmental Impact Assessment Decree extends the reach of
FEPA to include mandatory environmental impact assessments of projects
in a number of areas including petroleum. FEPA is mandated to facilitate
EIAs, the minimum contents of which are stipulated by law, and to ensure
that appropriate mitigation steps are taken. While the introduction of
mandatory EIAs is a positive development, the inability of local people to
verify many of the assessments limits their effectiveness.
...oil companies’ operations in developed regions are usually 
accompanied by environmental impact assessments, social and 
environmental policies, and a great deal of effort to appease the 
justified concerns of local communities, these practices are not 
exported to lesser developed regions, where little or no media 
attention is paid and where accountability is unheard of(Frynas, 2000; 
PP42).
According to Duruigbo (2003), Nigeria’s environmental laws are vague,
outmoded, and inadequate. Prevention plays only a minor role as the
existing law emphasises remedial measures such as liability, compensation,
and cleanup. In addition, the fines imposed in case of any breach of the rules
are too small to deter polluters, while imprecise language creates room for
manoeuvring. Critics of Nigerian environmental laws further assert that
standards that are clearly spelled out are weakened by poor enforcement.
Although there have been signs of improvement, A Shell executive
observed the following:
Enforcement is further complicated by many factors. Besides the lack 
of enforcement skills, we are dealing with multiple regulatory 
agencies with conflicting interests and competing jurisdictions. While 
this transfer has been in effect for a long time, however, the law has 
not been updated to reflect the change. This creates confusion over 
who actually has regulatory powers. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that FEPA and DPR subject oil companies to double 
regulation on environmental issues. Copies of the same EIAs, for
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example, must be submitted simultaneously to the two agencies. This 
duplication makes both compliance and enforcement more difficult. 
[114]
For example, FEPA says that companies, including those in the oil and gas
sector, now readily submit themselves to the requirements of the EIA
Decree. They apply for and must receive an environmental permit prior to
beginning projects with potential environmental impact, contingent on
impact assessments. Public participation is a prominent feature of these
assessments: newspapers carry advertisements for public hearings associated
with particular projects, while EIAs list members of the public who
participated in these hearings. However, community leaders still insist that it
is possible for companies to obtain permits and commence oil production
without conducting an environmental impact study.
It is difficult to gauge the true state of affairs. Perhaps the lists of 
participant names are fictitious (given that no addresses are listed), or 
represent members of the public who have been handpicked by the 
companies in question. Conversely, it is possible that community 
leaders are not aware of how the process works and lacked 
information on when the panels were held (Duruigbo, 2003, pp9).
To eliminate such conflicts and redundancies, the government proposes to
vest all environmental functions in FEPA (under the Ministry of the
Environment) and transfer the relevant DPR staff to the FEPA. The DPR
reportedly opposes the proposal, as so does the Petroleum and Natural Gas
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), the white-collar oil
workers’ union. A compromise may result in the creation of a separate
agency devoted to regulating the environmental aspects of the oil industry,
staffed by environment-related DPR officials and oil related FEPA officials
(Ibid).
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This agency rivalry takes place in the context of scarce resources. A senior
official in the government of Rivers State claims his government cannot
afford US $25,000 to purchase a patrol boat for monitoring oil operations
and that they occasionally rely on oil companies for training their
monitoring teams. Shell’s Deputy Managing Director in Nigeria declared:
We have been training staff from the government’s regulatory 
agencies, and helped them with equipments so that they can do their 
duties. This is part of our capacity development programme. They 
lack both the expertise and the logistics necessary to move around and 
inspect companies’ performance [112].
It was also reported that FEPA also relies on non-governmental groups to
assist in identifying violations and pledges the government’s commitment to
enforcing them, although a representative of the agency insists this does not
compromise their ability to effectively regulate. Evidence suggests
otherwise: despite having an office in Lagos devoted to compliance and
enforcement, a FEPA official could not identify a single enforcement action
taken in the office’s history, insisting instead that it is involved in
‘compliance monitoring’ which he considers to be effective.
8.3 Creating an enabling environment for CSR
In late 1990s the Nigerian government and the foreign oil companies were 
prepared to invest more in the oil producing areas as a reaction to the 
pressures from anti-oil protests and deteriorating public opinion,. However, 
the government had previously established the Niger Delta Development 
Board (NDDB) by the Niger Delta Development Act of 1961. However, the 
NDDP was abolished for lack of clear vision of its objectives (Forrest, 
1995). Local politicians wanted something spectacular to show for political
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motives, therefore leading to some misguided effort being put into some 
grand projects. The NDDB was regarded as a public relations exercise, and 
this focus made the board ineffective in exercising development projects in 
the Niger Delta (Ibid.).
In the 1990s, the government launched several commissions to inquire into 
the socio-economic and environmental problems in the oil producing areas, 
and other wide-ranging concessions to the oil producing areas. The detailed 
recommendations of these bodies have not always been followed. The 
financial contribution of the oil producing areas was increased in 1992 
(Babanguda, from 1.5% to 3%), when the oil mineral producing 
development agency (OMPADEC) was established; it distributed 3% of 
government allocations to the areas. It later failed to satisfy people in oil 
producing areas. Conflict arose between different ethnic groups and 
common interest groups over the composition of the OMPADEC board, and 
over the formula for allocating the proceeds. Allocating finances as based 
on the proportion of oil produced in each community was unjust, to some, 
who had been producing a lot in the past until depletion. The data was also 
considered unreliable (Osaghae 1995).
The government has recently established a new agency, the Niger Delta 
Development Council (NNDC), established by President Obasanjo, in 1999, 
and have made a commitment that 13% of federal oil revenues should be 
allocated to the oil producing regions. The oil MNCs are also expected to 
make financial commitment to the NNDC, in order to allow the agency to 
fulfil its mission. However, at the time of my field research, there were
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several complaints. The agency was seen as too slow, bureaucratic, and only
focussing on small projects, rather than coming up with a master plan to
boost development in the regions through significant infrastructure
problems. The representative of NNDC explained:
Yes, we have an ambitious mandate, and there are high expectations 
for NNDC to deliver development in the Niger Delta. However, 
things are not that easy. The allocation o f funds is slow and 
bureaucratic, while the oil companies’ donations are very rare. With 
unpredictable funding sources, it is frankly difficult to deliver as 
expected at this stage [127].
A Shell executive also expressed doubts regarding the sustainability of NNDC:
There are already some concerns about whether the next President 
will keep the 13% revenue transfer to the Niger Delta. Many states 
are not pleased and there are already some disputes in the Nigerian 
political circles over the issue [113].
Besides the government’s attempts to develop the oil producing regions,
which has not been successful so far, the government’s approach to
community dialogue has not been helpful to the oil MNCs, as documented
in previous chapters, and elsewhere (HRW, 1996, 2004; Christian Aid,
2004). The government and Shell engaged communities through repressive
practices. Repressive security measures benefited from the support from oil
MNCs. For example, Shell, which has its own policy and security forces,
called Shell Police or called Mobile Police, who perform duties at oil
installations (Frynas 2000). The over-reliance on security forces by
companies, Shell in particular, may be explained by the fact that there are
close formal and informal contacts and access to the government. The fact
that Shell operates a joint venture with NNPC means the government has an
obligation to stand by the company in any instance of conflict with the
communities.
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The government has played a limited direct role in dealing with 
communities, as far as day-to-day operations are concerned, thus failing to 
assume its responsibilities to effectively monitor the oil MNC activities. 
Consequently, Soremekun (1995) argued that in such circumstances, it is 
normal that those affected have to engage with the companies in the event of 
damage, rather than the government.
During my fieldwork in Nigeria, I participated in one of Shell’s annual
stakeholder consultation workshop in January 2004. Shell had organised a
large event that brought together more than 700 people that included the
governors of the oil producing states, NGO representatives from Nigeria and
abroad, journalists, academics, oil industry executives, and only one
representative of the Federal Government of Nigeria. During the conference,
delegates listened to Shell’s presentations about the achievement of its CSR
programme in Nigeria, in terms of ecological sustainability and community
development. While a wide range of CSR projects were discussed, the role
of the government was a recurrent theme. Shell criticised the government
for failing to provide an enabling environment for its CSR programme,
while pro-Shell stakeholders took to the floor to commend the company and
the role the company has played in developing communities. A Shell
executive declared:
Anybody who is anybody is here. We have brought a fair share to the 
communities where we work, and we would like to urge the 
government to do the same. We are not the government, so our 
engagement is limited to what is relevant for us [II].
However, another Shell executive further explained:
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Although the government is passive, it participates in our CSR 
agenda. The government has paid its share of the CSR expenditures 
according to its equity position [II].
It appeared that Shell sought to distance itself from the government.
Moreover, Shell executives highlighted the vital role of government in
providing an enabling environmental in order for Shell to deliver successful
CSR outcomes.
8.4 Conclusion
This Chapter set out to explore the ways in which the government is 
participating in CSR by facilitating, endorsing, or collaborating with the oil 
MNC for the implementation of its CSR policies in Nigeria. The findings 
outlined suggest that government is unable to provide a regulatory 
framework that can facilitate the activities of oil MNCs. In addition, the 
relationship between Shell and the government is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it appears that Shell rather distanced itself from the government, 
blaming the latter for its inability to regulate the sector adequately, and to 
create the conditions for socio-economic development of the oil producing 
regions. On the other hand, Shell appears to have been in partnership with 
the government as they both attempted to pacify the oil producing regions, 
which have been plunged in violence since the early 1990s until today.
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Chapter Nine
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
9.1 Introduction
The thesis aimed to contribute to the perspective on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and multinational companies (MNC) in developing 
countries, from the context of corporate stakeholder engagement in the Nigerian 
oil sector. It critically examined the role of societal pressures as drivers of 
Shell’s CSR agenda, and explored how Shell implements its CSR programme in 
Nigeria, both in light of its strategic business objectives and its social 
responsibilities and environmental liabilities (See Chapter 6). In addition, the 
research explored the role of stakeholders in negotiating CSR policies and 
practices within the context of local sustainable development. It examined the 
forms of relationships existing between Shell and its stakeholders in Nigeria, 
and explored the interplay between the oil company’s business objectives and 
strategy in engaging stakeholders - such as the state, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), expert groups, and communities. The research critically 
examined Shell’s implementation of its CSR policies and practices in the 
Nigerian context (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, it examined the role of 
government in the oil MNC’s CSR agenda, and explored the conditions under 
which the government, in its dual role as business partner and as state authority, 
promotes CSR policies and practices in Nigeria (see Chapter 8).
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Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria were examined from the lenses of 
the resource-based view perspective extended to notions of legitimacy and the 
licence to operate. Additionally, the stakeholder engagement perspective was 
applied as a framework for examining the role of stakeholders in negotiating 
Shell’s current CSR policies and practices in Nigeria. This Chapter summarises 
the main findings of the research based on the major research objectives 
outlined in Chapter 1, and the major contribution to the theory of CSR in 
developing countries. It will conclude with a discussion of the implications for 
further research.
9.2 Main findings
The findings from this research emerge from a critical examination of the role 
of stakeholders in negotiating CSR policies and practices within the context of 
local sustainable development, and strategic business interests. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, section 3, and further depicted in Table 4.1 the thesis pursued three 
main objectives: Firstly, to examine how Shell implements its CSR programme 
in Nigeria, both in light of strategic objectives associated with the company’s 
business operations, and the oil company’s social responsibilities and 
environmental liabilities. Understanding of the link between corporate 
objectives and CSR initiatives and the role stakeholders play in negotiating CSR 
initiatives. Secondly, to explore forms of stakeholder relationships with the oil 
company, as well as identify the different context within which the different 
categories of stakeholders make sense of their relationship with the oil 
company. Addressing how stakeholders’ relationship with the company may 
influence its CSR policies and practices, and how the dynamic interaction
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between the company and its stakeholders affects their engagement. Thirdly, to 
explore forms of interaction of Shell’s CSR programme and the host country’s 
development framework. In particular, the role of the state as enabler, vs. that of 
multinational companies, and its CSR initiatives in the development policy 
agenda for Nigeria. The following sections outline the findings that emerged 
from my fieldwork.
9.2.1 Community pressures, CSR and Shell’s licence to operate in Nigeria
The first objective of this study was to examine how Shell implements its CSR 
programme in Nigeria, both in light of strategic objectives associated with the 
company’s business operations, and the oil company’s social responsibilities 
and environmental liabilities. In addition the study aimed to understand the link 
between corporate objectives and CSR initiatives and the role that stakeholders 
play in negotiating CSR initiatives.
The main link, as suggested throughout the literature (see sections 1.2; section 
2.4.3) is that Shell’s CSR policies are mostly driven by stakeholder pressure and 
the need to re-establish its good reputation and regain its legitimacy, both of 
which are essential in order to maintain the social licence to operate in the local 
context. The evidence presented in Chapter 6, based on extensive interviews of 
the executives from Shell and stakeholder organisations, strongly suggests that 
the anti-Shell protests of the 1990s have (following major incidents involving 
Shell) influenced its management and motivated them to develop and 
implement an ambitious CSR agenda in Nigeria. The mass protests against 
Shell, following the Brent Spa incident and the Ogoni crisis, had a negative
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impact on the company’s financial performance, and threatened its long-term 
competitiveness in the Nigerian oil sector and beyond.
The evidence presented in both Chapter 6 and 7 shows a clear link between oil 
production and certain types of conflicts, especially land conflicts, tribal 
conflicts, political conflicts and oil conflicts, as well as high incidence of acts of 
vandalism such as the destruction of oil facilities, theft and siphoning of crude 
oil and environmental accidents. The evidence shows that Shell’s CSR 
investments geographically overlap with the oil producing regions, whereas the 
priorities of its CSR agenda coincide with the concerns emerging from the oil 
producing communities (See Table 7.3, and Fig. 7.1 and 7.2).
However, the proposed relationship between the firm’s pursuit of the social 
licence to operate through CSR initiatives and stakeholder engagement is more 
complex than assumed. In terms of the benefits of increased reputation and 
legitimacy associated with Shell’s CSR policies in Nigeria, the study shows 
contradictory evidence. At the local level, the evidence shows that there has 
been continued community protests and sabotage of oil installations, including 
kidnapping of Shell personnel, despite Shell’s substantial increase in its CSR 
expenditures in Nigeria from US $ 300 thousand to US $ 304 million from 1998 
until 2003, mostly for development and environmental management in the oil 
producing regions of Nigeria.
At the national level, the evidence shows that there is some sympathy and 
appreciation of Shell’s development efforts through the company’s CSR 
programme. Shell has significantly engaged the civil society and formed
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partnerships with a number of stakeholders in implementing its CSR agenda. It 
has also engaged directly with national and international NGOs in contractual 
work both at the corporate policy and strategy level and throughout the 
implementation process. The external stakeholders assist the company in 
developing CSR policies, implementation guidelines and evaluation. For 
example, Shell regularly holds large-scale stakeholder consultation conferences 
in Nigeria, which take place annually and bring together all stakeholder 
categories including academics, development, environmental and human rights 
NGOs, government officials, investor representatives, representatives of 
communities, etc. There is among some of these stakeholders increasing 
recognition of Shell’s efforts along with the realisation that the oil company’s 
CSR programme may not be successful for reasons that are beyond its control. 
These include the lack of an enabling environment, due to structural conditions 
that undermine the potential of Shell’s CSR programme from yielding any 
significant outcomes for the poor in the oil producing regions.
Consequently, Shell has won prizes as the most sustainable oil MNC, and its 
programme in Nigeria has been hailed internationally as a best case for 
corporate citizenship. Shell’s reputation and legitimacy has significantly 
improved internationally from the dramatic period of the mid 1990s, while the 
situation remains more or less the same at the local level where community 
protests persist and continue to disrupt oil production in Nigeria.
9.2.2 The influence of stakeholders on Shell’s CSR policies and practices
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The second objective of the thesis was to explore forms of stakeholder 
relationships with the oil company, as well as identify the different context 
within which the different categories of stakeholders make sense of their 
relationship with the oil company. A number of research questions were 
introduced, such as investigating how stakeholders’ relationship with the 
company may influence its CSR policies and practices, and how the dynamic 
interaction between the company and its stakeholders, affecting their 
engagement, led this investigation.
The literature explored (See sections 2.4.3 and 3.3 -3.4) informed the hypothesis 
(see Table 4.2) that, given the weak institutional context in Nigeria, Shell will 
tend to pursue its value maximisation agenda through its CSR policies. As such, 
stakeholder engagement at Shell Nigeria will be mostly aimed at pacifying 
stakeholders who potentially represent a business threat, while the beneficiaries 
of Shell’s CSR policies and initiatives will predominantly be those stakeholder 
groups with better access to information, resources, capacities and capabilities 
to engage with and possibly mobilise against the oil company’s operations. The 
literature on the RBV (see Section 2.4.1) suggested that the impetus for the CSR 
agenda is that it has internal and external benefits for the corporation. 
Furthermore, the literature on stakeholder engagement and power (see Section 
2.5.1) led to the proposition that Shell might use its superior power position to 
achieve its strategic objectives.
The evidence shows firstly, that stakeholder engagement is at the core of Shell’s 
CSR agenda in Nigeria. The company engages stakeholders at all levels, from 
policy and strategy planning, to implementation, evaluation and reporting.
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Secondly, the evidence suggests that Shell’s all-out engagement has brought 
great benefits to the company in terms of reputation and legitimacy. It has also 
brought internal benefits based on the new competence flowing to the company 
through the direct involvement of NGOs and academics, assisting the 
organisation to develop innovative ways of engaging society. It has made the 
company more engaging, and built a functional bridge to the external world. 
New structures for managing the company’s relations with society, and public 
policy have emerged within the organisation (See Fig. 7.6). This expertise has 
been internalised and is continuously consolidated within Shell through 
stakeholder engagement.
Thirdly, the evidence shows that Shell has adopted a tiered engagement 
approach to its stakeholder relations, and has established a complex dialogue 
with different stakeholders, based on employment and contracting, 
collaboration, partnerships, or adversarial relationships. This approach has led 
to stakeholders’ differentiated access Shell’s CSR programme in Nigeria. The 
evidence reveals that, although the power of stakeholders and the urgency of 
their claims seem to be the main factors to trigger corporate response through 
CSR initiatives, stakeholders’ ability to access and possibly influence Shell’s 
CSR programme rests on previously established relationships of trust and 
shared values with the company.
The research findings show that the stakeholders with the most influence are 
those who actively engage with internal processes within the company through 
contracting or collaborative work. They enjoy mutual trust, and usually share 
common values and objectives with the company. These include consultants,
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who mostly comprise previous employees of Shell, and some research-based 
NGOs such the HRW and Amnesty International. Community-based 
organisations and advocacy organisations such as Friends of the Earth and 
Christian Aid have the power to affect the company through direct action 
against the company, but are less effective in influencing the company’s CSR 
policies and practices substantively.
Revisiting the typology presented earlier, there is an important distinction to be 
made between stakeholders who formerly worked for Shell and are brought in 
on a contractual basis, and those that have no previous ties with the company. 
These ‘mandated outsiders’ are brought in as independent contractors to work 
on specific aspects of the CSR agenda and at different levels o f the CSR 
process. Those with no prior knowledge of the organisation have to adjust to the 
rhythms and the demands of the internal business culture. Most interviewees 
tended to think that this group has significant difficulties in adjusting to the 
internal organisational culture, and had to balance their own short- and long­
term business interests in delivering their services to the company. For example, 
a managing director of a London-based NGO that has been invited to assist the 
organisation in implementing a number of community development projects 
admitted that the job and its scope depended on the discretion of a given Shell 
field manager, and that he and his organisation were often faced with the 
dilemma relating to the extent to which they could challenge the Shell 
organisation without compromising their short- and long-term collaboration.
Those with previous ties with Shell were able to engage both formally and 
informally with the organisation. They benefited from an extended social capital
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and could engage with more advantage on the CSR processes within the 
organisation. Although they were contractors, their reach and influence 
extended beyond their terms of references. For example, one high-level 
executive admitted that those consultants with prior working ties with Shell 
were very useful to the company. He felt that their contributions were very 
valued based on the fact that they already had experience with the organisation, 
and had a better perspective about societal expectations, and were trusted to 
give an accurate indication of what would be required of the organisation by 
society.
The ‘independent sponsors’, comprising research-based development NGOs and 
development agencies, have mostly had an independent relationship with the 
company and seemed to retain the interest of the company’s CSR executives. 
This includes several research and/or advocacy oriented development and 
environmental NGOs. The latter operate from their own resources and interact 
with the firm from the outside in. While some o f them interacted with the 
company formally and publicly, others preferred an unpublicised engagement. 
For instance previous Human Rights Watch (HRW) executive admitted that 
they worked with Shell on the company’s CSR/human rights agenda and 
interacted at the various levels of the organisation such as policy and 
implementation levels. The ex-human rights executive admitted having 
reviewed several policy documents and guidelines from contacts in Shell, with 
whom they kept collaborative relationship and that there was no payment 
involved. They draw their legitimacy from their perceived expertise and 
knowledge of society and social policy, and are perceived as a source of 
organisational learning. They have the opportunity to influence Shell’s CSR
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agenda at all levels, and are more independent than those mandated through a 
contractual relationship with the company. Shell has often entered partnership 
with some of these organisations to promote development. For example, Shell 
has actively engaged with foreign development agencies in Nigeria such as the 
United States Development Agency (USAID) on community development 
strategy component of their CSR programme in the country. The latter indicated 
that the informal contact they had with Shell enabled them to exercise better 
influence because they did not come across as hostile, and rather had a research- 
based approach. Similar views were held by many human rights development 
NGOs and some stakeholders from academia. The Shell executives interviewed 
in Nigeria and in Shell International confirmed that NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch played an important role while the 
company sought to establish its group sustainability agenda in themid-1990s. 
The company collaborates with this stakeholder group from the highest policy 
level and all the way down the implementation and evaluation processes of its 
CSR programme in Nigeria. Shell sizes up the potential candidates for 
partnership in this group based on the stature and influence of the respective 
stakeholder.
The latter derive their influence from their own resourcefulness, capabilities, 
and independence, and mutual trust. Trust seems to he the most important factor 
that determined the influence that those stakeholders involved at various levels 
of the company’s CSR processes could have on their outcomes at various levels.
The ‘influential observers’ category mainly consists of local community 
organisations and other organisations that champion the cause of local
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communities and hence have a direct interest in the firm’s CSR programmes. 
They operate as outsiders (outside in) and draw their influence from their ability 
to mobilise public opinion in support of their own causes. For instance, 
organisations such as MOSOP, Friends of the Earth, Global Witness and 
Christian Aid often adopted a hostile stance towards oil companies in Nigeria, 
and Shell in particular. They are independent and act in partnership with grass- 
root organisations, in defence of community environmental rights. They 
regularly report on the impacts of Shell’s operations on the communities. For 
example, FOE’s publication o f ’ The Other Shell Report,” which often coincides 
with the company’s shareholder meetings casts significant doubts on the 
company’s reports by reporting the demise of local communities as result of 
Shell’s operations. Many single issue and/or advocacy organisations, such as 
Global Witness, feature in this group. While they have a strong influence, and 
can potentially drive a hostile campaign against Shell, their weakness is that 
they invest few capabilities in research, and hence their engagement with the 
company often comes across as emotional rather than grounded in research. 
There is a climate of mistrust and mutual suspicion between Shell and this 
stakeholder group.
The ‘influential claimants’, mainly consist of local communities. Shell has 
established contact with these groups through community-based structures such 
as the community development offices (CDOs), and community liaison officers 
(CLOs) deployed by Shell to respond to community grievances. However, there 
was wide dissatisfaction with this arrangement and system of representation. 
Implementing projects on community level is entrusted to community 
development committees (CDCs), established before the presence of the oil
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companies. Oil companies decided to distribute project funds through the CDC, 
since it was a “traditional” structure already in place to serve communities. 
However, communities denounce some of the weaknesses in this system. First, 
communities report that company processes that affect them lack transparency. 
Second, while the company’s oil operations span the entire regions across 
community lands, the dialogue with communities takes place on a community- 
by-community basis, with “oil-affected” communities only, rather than on 
collective negotiation and dialogue with broader groups concerned. Third, 
company-community interaction generally takes place at the company 
headquarters, either at the invitation of the company, or in response to a visit by 
a community delegation. Although company officials reported that the objective 
of community dialogue is to assess the needs and requirements o f local 
communities, community members gave a different impression of how 
companies approach dialogue. The prevailing sentiment among oil-affected 
communities is that company officials engage in community meetings only to 
gain a sense of the mood in the community and to identify groups in the 
community that may pose a threat to the company or to company assets. This 
might be explained by the fact that the company is weary of the fact that 
villagers made their grievances known via sabotage of company assets and the 
kidnap of company staff. The findings also show that the company was keen to 
exploit the weaknesses of the local institutional and regulatory environment to 
ensure smooth running of its operations. For instance, during processes of 
public consultation, such as the EIA, the processes frequently denied sufficient 
time for feedback on reports from communities concerned. While time is a 
major parameter in the field development plan, and time-saving can have major
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cost-saving implications, time loss can often lead to big losses in exploration 
and production operations. Since the government is also party to the business, it 
has not demonstrated much concern for protecting community interests in this 
regard. The findings show that consultations with local stakeholders involve a 
bargaining process where Shell engages with communities on a case-by-case 
basis. With the communities denied the option to pull resources in a collective 
bargaining process, they may be unable to adequately engage the oil company. 
In short, there is a constant climate of suspicion and mistrust between the 
company and community stakeholders. This group only influences the CSR 
programme through staged pressure on Shell’s infrastructure. Whereas Shell 
previously responded heavy-handedly through coercion, it recently shifted to 
solving frequent crises through dialogue and negotiation with community 
groups, who use violence and confrontational tactics as a means of getting 
concessions from the oil companies.
Fourthly, the research findings suggest that Shell has an upper hand in dealing 
with its stakeholders, due to its relatively extensive resources in terms of 
financial power and human resources. The oil company has driven the CSR 
agenda globally as well as locally. Shell displays its discursive power in various 
ways, including mobilising stakeholders and facilitating them to attend regular 
workshops on its CSR programme in Nigeria, for which the company sets the 
agenda. Critical perspectives are overwhelmed by the company’s pervasive 
engagement with all stakeholders including the media, academia and the civil 
society both globally and locally.
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9.2.3 The role of the government in facilitating CSR
The thesis set out, in its third objective, to examine the role of the Nigerian 
government in enabling Shell’s CSR development initiatives, such as the ways 
in which the government is participating in CSR (facilitating, endorsing and 
partnering), and the current relationship between the government and Shell’s 
CSR agenda. The research explored how Shell’s CSR agenda interacts with 
Nigeria’s development policy framework. In particular, it explored how Shell’s 
CSR agenda addresses development in Nigeria, and how it deals with the 
country’s structural context and related challenges such as the resource curse 
problem and its implications in terms of governance, accountability, corruption 
and over-consumption.
The literature reviewed suggests that while government could play a decisive 
role in creating an enabling environment for CSR, it also suggested that this was 
a problem for developing countries, because they are too weak institutionally to 
play the proposed role (See Sections 3.3-3.9). The evidence shows that the 
relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government is and has always been 
strong. The two have been partners for a long time, ever since oil was 
discovered in Nigeria. This relationship became even more important as the 
Nigerian Government became a partner in the SPDC joint venture. The 
evidence shows that a good relationship is important for both Shell and the 
government. Whereas Shell needs government support to maintain the legal and 
economic licence to operate in the country (See Fig. 5.3 and Table 5.2), the 
government needs Shell to invest its massive financial resources and technology 
in the country’s national petroleum production. Nigeria’s external revenues
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come from oil export, and any under-investment or disturbance would have 
detrimental implications such as the deterioration of the balance of payment, 
and economic meltdown.
There is no evidence that Shell’s relationship with the government is affected by 
the company’s CSR policies and practices in either negative or positive ways. 
The government generally pays little attention to this programme, as has 
previously been documented by other scholars such as (Ite, 2004; Frynas, 2005; 
Wheeler et al., 2002). The evidence shows however that the government has 
failed to implement successful development policies in the Niger Delta, and has 
been inadequate in enforcing its environmental regulatory guidelines. 
Consequently, the government lacks the capacity to play a facilitating role for 
the CSR programme.
The evidence also shows that there are fears within Shell that endemic activism 
from producing communities complicates the future of the business in the long 
term. Shell has been blamed for its close relationship with the government, and 
popular anger has often been directed against Shell’s installations, as a way of 
getting the government to pay attention to community demands. Neither Shell, 
nor the government seem to be able to control communities. With government 
indifference, or lack of capacity (or both) needed to create enabling conditions, 
and given Shell’s urge to pursue its oil production activities under reasonably 
peaceful conditions, Shell appears to have opened direct engagement with 
community stakeholders. As such, Shell’s CSR programme is extensive and 
comes across as a fully-fledged social welfare programme for the oil producing 
regions of Nigeria.
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The evidence strongly suggests that Shell has assumed the role of government 
as provider of welfare services throughout the oil producing regions of Nigeria. 
However, there are major obstacles facing Shell in its attempt to 
implement/provide these services through its CSR agenda. These include 
inadequate regulations, insecurity, low capacity and lack of investment in public 
utilities. In addition, the corporation faces major dilemmas with regard to the 
scope and scale of its involvement, at least in the long term. However, while the 
robustness of Shell’s oil extraction business still justifies its involvement in 
Nigeria, Shell’s CSR programme and the company’s role as the welfare 
provider in these neglected regions has no end in sight.
In terms of the government’s endorsing role, the research reveals contradictory 
evidence in terms of Shell’s attitude. Shell executives have openly blamed the 
government for abdicating its development responsibilities towards the 
communities, and leaving this to Shell. Shell’s critical stance appears to 
distance its CSR agenda from the government. Whereas communities who 
perceive the corporation as an extension of the government have attacked Shell, 
the government endorsement of Shell’s CSR policies may reinforce this 
perception amongst the oil producing regions, with detrimental consequences 
for Shell’s operations in Nigeria. While Shell appears to distance its CSR 
programme from the government, at the same time maintaining a historically 
strong relationship to the government, the government’s involvement in Shell’s 
CSR agenda is insignificant. Despite a number of development partnerships that 
Shell initiated with prominent stakeholders such as the USAID, and the 
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, there is little indication that
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Shell’s CSR programme is mainstream within the country’s development 
agenda. There is little indication of how Shell could influence government 
development policies through its CSR agenda in Nigeria despite Shell’s positive 
and historic relationship with the government. Vice versa, Shell’s attempts to 
distance its CSR initiatives from government involvement leave limited 
possibility for the government to influence Shell’s CSR policies and practices.
The logical conclusion from these findings is that Shell’s CSR policies and 
practices are not achieving optimal results, firstly because the nature of the 
problems Shell is facing in the oil-producing region is complex, as it has to do 
with the colonial legacy of Nigeria, successive military governments that 
plundered the country’s resources rather than develop communities in the oil 
producing regions, negligence by both Shell and the government by 
implementing a risk-prone and unregulated oil extraction strategy with little 
efforts to mitigate the negative impacts on communities. Secondly, structural 
issues such as the resource curse, pervasive corruption, and patronage, 
undermine any attempt to equitably engage community stakeholders, or even 
make any significant impact on their living conditions. Thirdly, Shell’s limited 
engagement with the government and attempt to distance its CSR programme 
from the influence of the government appears to be counterproductive, a short­
term approach to a long-term problem. The government remains an important 
and necessary partner, if Shell is to achieve any significant development 
outcomes. This is also important if  only to maintain the company’s social 
licence to operate in Nigeria. The latter is all the more important given the 
evidence that neither the government nor Shell have been able to control
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communities, despite massive use of coercive force in the past, followed, in the 
recent years with massive CSR investments.
9.3 Research findings and implications for theory building
The findings have highlighted that there are internal and external benefits to the 
firm, through CSR policies. Firstly, the firm benefits from the knowledge that 
flows from external stakeholders to strengthen the company’s knowledge base 
which needed to be more in tune with society, and more competitive. By 
engaging with NGOs and development agencies and international organisations, 
and academics, Shell was able to develop a robust knowledge base that has 
enabled the company to better adjust to institutional changes, and adequately 
respond to societal expectations. However, none o f the perspectives applied 
explained why communities are persistently protesting against Shell, despite the 
oil MNC’s massive investment in development projects to the benefits of these 
communities (See Section 7.4).
The thesis has sought to bring ‘stakeholder engagement’ within the life of the 
organisation, enabling us to explore how stakeholders may affect the practices 
of the organisation. This was achieved by studying the relations between 
stakeholders and Shell in the Nigerian context, how participating stakeholders 
gain legitimate access to the stakeholder status and what means they find and 
deploy to influence Shell Nigeria’s CSR processes in relation to their respective 
objectives. In addition, the thesis has brought the concept of power to the centre 
of stakeholder theory. Power has often been approached from the perspective of 
self-interest maximising behaviour of stakeholders using their capacity to aid or
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impede business interests in their favour. We have introduced the notion of 
relational power exercised through company-stakeholder interactions. This is 
related to the capacity of actors to leverage the resources in their possession in 
order to gain bargaining advantage (See Section 2.5.2).
The evidence suggests that Shell has far more financial resources, know-how 
and access to information than its stakeholders in the local oil sector. The 
company has made use of its relational power to gain discursive advantage over 
local stakeholders while seeking to manage its reputation and operational risks. 
Shell’s stakeholder engagement has yielded clear reputational advantages, and 
has in the years since 1997 helped to restore its legitimacy and reputation.
However, this perspective fails to explain why local community stakeholders 
are not satisfied with the oil MNC, despite the efforts (See Section 7.4). There is 
little indication that the oil MNC has restored trust and legitimately established 
itself amongst communities that are directly affected by oil production.
The analysis conducted in this thesis has led to a number of important empirical 
as well as conceptual conclusions. Firstly, corporate social responsibility 
initiatives are not necessarily aligned with access to a social licence to operate. 
Many examples of community revolts, acts of vandalism targeting Shell which 
have increased in intensity and sophistication is strong evidence to suggest that 
CSR investments do not necessarily guarantee a licence to operate to the 
company. Community uprisings continue to undermine the company’s 
reputation despite its colossal efforts, in the last 8 years, to improve its 
practices.
253
Secondly, Shell has demonstrated an ambiguous relationship with the Nigerian 
Government. Whereas the two have been close partners in the oil exploitation 
and development in Nigeria, and while Nigeria has a share in the overall Shell 
investment in Shell’s CSR programmes, the government has taken a back seat, 
and does not seem to engage actively, if at all, with Shell’s CSR agenda and 
CSR initiatives in the country. While investing in CSR initiatives, the oil 
company avoids being perceived as a replacement for the government. Indeed, 
being perceived as the provider of citizens’ rights such as described by Matten 
and Crane, (2005), would backfire in terms of its strategic business interests in 
the long term
Thirdly, it appears that on many occasions, Shell’s executives have pointed their 
fingers at the government, blaming the latter for failing to take its responsibility 
to provide civil and social rights to the people living in oil producing regions 
who have been affected by the negative impacts of the oil industry. As such, 
Shell has been desperate to argue that the government failure to provide 
adequate structurally enabling conditions, leading to the failure of CSR 
programmes in achieving development objectives in the region.
Fourth, the current framework for stakeholder engagement remains ineffective 
in providing the right stakeholder representation in the CSR process and in 
enabling the different, sometimes discordant voices to find their expression 
throughout CSR processes. While the thesis has investigated local CSR 
practices of Shell, it appears that the success of new corporate practices does not 
solely depend on the content and modes of implementation (internal business 
systems) of the company’s CSR policies.
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9.4 Areas for further research
This study showed that the main challenges facing Shell’s CSR initiatives in 
Nigeria are linked, firstly, with the context in which these policies are 
implemented. While expectations are formed within the institutional context, a 
particular manifestation of corporate culture is strongly dependent on the social 
context in which the organisation is embedded, i.e. corporate employees, the 
people they know and the social and cultural systems that surround them. 
Hence, corporate practices and identity are distributed beyond the organisation. 
In this sense, further research on how the local cultural contexts shape local 
CSR policy outcomes would advance our understanding o f the localisation of 
CSR policies.
Secondly, the fact that government appears to be out of the CSR process has far- 
reaching implications with regard to what Shell’s CSR influence can achieve in 
influencing Nigeria’s development policy, and obtaining government active 
participation in Shell’s CSR initiative both to reinforce the role o f the company 
and complement its development action. As such, further research is needed to 
examine the ways in which the CSR agenda of MNCs may be better integrated 
with the development framework of the host state in developing countries, and, 
vice versa, explore the mechanisms that would allow government participation 
to be at the core of the corporate CSR agenda. My assumption is that such 
corporate-govemment collaboration in developing and implementing CSR 
policies in a host developing country may prove to be a valuable opportunity for 
the MNC to actively participate and positively influence national development
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policy, while government involvement with the company’s CSR processes 
would be a valuable source of capacity development (in terms of know-how) 
that may strengthen government policy action.
Such collaboration would generally provide a better platform for representation. 
It would bring the state to the centre of Shell’s CSR agenda in Nigeria, while 
providing the oil MNC with a legitimate platform to engage the government on 
its development agenda for the provision of much needed welfare services to the 
communities in the oil producing regions and beyond. The consociation may 
ultimately provide a platform where the voices of communities in oil producing 
regions may find expression. Similarly, the oil MNC may through partnership 
entrust the government with the implementation of certain aspects of the CSR 
programme (in the same way that some CSR programmes are implemented 
through partnerships with the civil society), hence fostering trust and 
commitment. This consociation promises to provide a platform on which 
stakeholder legitimacy is negotiated as it relates to the provision of 
development, representation and transparency, and ultimately a better protection 
of corporate reputation and a social licence to operate.
Further research would explore whether a consociational approach for 
implementing CSR policies and initiatives through closer corporate-host 
country collaboration could help solve persistent discontent amongst 
communities, in order to actively provide the enabling environment for CSR to 
achieve maximum development outcomes.
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Appendix 1: Online Survey questionnaire
(1) What is the profile of your organisation?
Answer (select on of the following options):
Government
Environmental NGO
Development NGO
Human Rights NGO
Company/firm (For profit organisation)
Educational Institution 
Religious organisation 
Media Organisation 
Other
(2) Has your organisation received financial support, or any other support from the oil companies operating 
in the Nigerian Oil Sector?
Answer: Yes or No
(3) Did you make contact with the oil company/companies operating in Nigeria for any of the following?
Issues?
Answer (select from the following options):
Pipeline leakage and clean up request for oil spills 
Compensation for land used
Request to clean up water wells, rivers, or polluted lands 
Gas flaring
Waste disposal and management 
Personnel employee rights 
Economic empowerment 
Security and violence 
Public health
Partnership in development 
Capacity building 
Gender issues 
Other
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(3) How satisfied were you (on a scale of 1 to 10) with the way the company responded to your 
Request?
(4) Does your organisation collaborate with any other organisation (Nigerian or foreign) in order to 
Influence?
Answer:_Yes or_No
If YES, do you:
i. Communicate regularly and share information on the same issue(s)?
Yes or No
ii. Participate in joint action /protest against the companies in the Nigerian oil sector?
Answer: Yes or No
iii. Sign petitions?
Answer: Yes or no
iv. Boycott company products?
Answer: Yes or no
v. Other?
(5) Work together and build capacity, empower people
(6) Does your organisation provide specific guidance and advice to companies wishing to operate in a socially 
responsible manner? If so, what is the nature of your advice?
Voluntary
Principles on security and human rights 
Advocacy and lobbying 
Exchange info
(7) Has your organisation been contacted by any of the following oil companies which operate in Nigeria? 
Answer
Shell 
Chevron 
Mobil 
Agip 
Total Elf
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Texaco
Statoil
(8) Has your organisation contacted any of the following oil companies, which operate in Nigeria?
Shell
Chevron
Mobil
Agip
Total Elf
Texaco
Statoil
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